

# THE RAMBLER.

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PART V.

## THE ROMAN QUESTION.

It is felt on all hands that the real importance of the movement provoked by the late war in Italy, and checked neither by the preliminaries of Villafranca nor the peace of Zurich, lies in the insurrection of the Romagna. This is the crowning achievement of Piedmontese policy ; in comparison with it even the acquisition of Lombardy assumes secondary proportions. It is the great difficulty which awaits the future congress, the turning-point of the struggle for Italian independence, and the test of its success. The interest of every party is concentrated for the time on Bologna. There it is that the revolutionary movement exhibits its real character, and that its adherents most openly acknowledge their real designs. At no period has the temporal power of the Pope so universally attracted the attention of men ; never has it been so completely the keystone of European politics. Often before now it has been called in question, often attacked, sometimes overthrown ; but no hostile enterprise, whatever may have been its success for a while, has ever borne so earnest and menacing a character as that which is now directed for the second time against the throne of Pius IX. On no other occasion have the apprehensions of the Catholic world been so strongly excited, or its sentiments more energetically declared. All men have become dimly conscious that this is no mere effort of religious antipathy, or of a transitory political ambition. The attack is against principles rather than facts ; it is the product of a combination such as has not yet been seen ; it is not a new fact only, but almost a new phase of history.

The whole Catholic Episcopate have uttered their powerful and solemn protest, and the Bishops of France and Sardinia have been amongst the foremost. In many countries the laity

have publicly condemned the rising in the Legations, and have proclaimed their attachment to the temporal government, and their adhesion to the act of the clergy. This is what was to be expected. It is incredible that the Bishops should not be unanimous, or that they should not be generally followed by the faithful, and supported by those who are of mark amongst them. But the gravity of the present crisis is to be found in the fact that, in the mass of those who bear the name of Catholics, the feeling which is so general is not universal, that in the question of the temporal power they are not unanimous. No Protestant power assisted in the insurrection, no Protestant doctrine had any thing to do with it. It has been the act of a Catholic people, abetted by Catholic powers. Catholicism is not enough to prevent men from joining in the work. Their sentiments in regard to it are not determined by their religious professions. The line which separates religious parties does not coincide with the division of opinions respecting it. Only a portion of the Catholic world has spoken, or has sympathised with the speakers. If we may apply a very arbitrary term, it is the Ultramontane portion of the Catholic body from which this protest comes. The existence of this distinction between Catholic and Ultramontane, almost as important for the cause of truth as that between Christianity and Catholicism, and the fact that the terms are not recognised as synonymous, is that which gives such momentous importance to the dangers now besetting the Church.

In the experimental sciences, where the insufficiency of our knowledge produces a corresponding incompleteness in our perception of the harmony between science and religion, we are compelled to proceed on the admission that, though there can be no discrepancy between God's words and His works, the harmony is not always fully apparent. But this separation cannot be admitted in life, or in those kinds of thought which directly affect practice. All those ideas which influence our actions must necessarily be brought into harmony with religion, which is the supreme guide of our actions. Our astronomical or our geological knowledge may not be able in all cases to furnish a confirmation of the facts of revelation; it is impossible, for instance, that both the Ptolemaic and Copernican theory should be equally consistent with Scripture. But that which is merely a deficiency in our knowledge, would be an error in our practice, where our proceedings must bear testimony to our religion. To demand this testimony from science, and to be indifferent to it in matters of practice, would alike be proofs of the weakness of our faith. These faults are common amongst us at the present day. There are

men who are resolved to discover evidences of faith even where they do not exist ; and who therefore shape their knowledge, as they should their actions, by their notions of religion.\* Such persons would be unwilling to admit that there can be a link wanting in the empirical proof of the original unity of languages. They would rudely deny that human vestiges can have been discovered in the drift thousands of years earlier than the received chronology of Scripture. Others, again, transfer to the practical order what is inevitable in scientific inquiry. They do not care to reconcile or to compare the teaching of their reflection with that of their religion : whilst one party assumes an agreement to exist where none can be proved, the other neglects it where it is imperative. Still, our lives are influenced by our notions not of natural but of moral science. In order that our lives may be in harmony with religion, our ideas must be in harmony with it also.† It is in the recognition of this last truth that what is called Ultramontanism, as opposed to a system of indifference as to the agreement between our several rules and motives of conduct, substantially consists. It signifies the conscious harmony of all our opinions with our belief; the habit of viewing profane things through the medium of religion, and of judging them by the standard which it supplies.

If Catholics often neglect to carry their religion into temporal concerns, and are jealous of allowing it to encroach on ground which is beyond its own immediate sphere, by a happy inconsistency Protestants often admit in secular matters conclusions which they could not derive from their religious system. They will accept the consequences of Catholicism, whilst they refuse to acknowledge the source from which they spring. They are practically Ultramontanes in all but religion ; for they sincerely maintain principles which in reality are corollaries of Catholic doctrine. Naturally such men,

\* "The Catholic Church, and with her all great and sound theology and philosophy, ever true to her character from the time of the fathers to the present age, has always maintained the agreement which God has established between reason and revelation, faith and science. Accordingly, she has at all times defended the claims of human reason together with the claims of faith ; and the time is at hand, nay, it has already come, when it must be the vocation of the Church to provide for the safety not only of faith, but also of reason and philosophy, against a hopeless scepticism and a spiritless materialism on the one hand, and a false mysticism on the other." Professor Heinrich of Mentz, preface to the German translation of Dechamps, *Le livre Examen de la Vérité de la Foi*, p. xiii.

† One of the most remarkable men of our time says of his own conversion : "J'ai toujours été croyant dans le fond de l'âme ; mais ma foi était stérile, parce qu'elle ne gouvernait pas mes pensées. . . . Cependant, si, aux jours de mon plus grand oubli de Dieu, on m'eût dit : Tu vas abjurer le Catholicisme, ou souffrir d'horribles tourments, je crois que j'aurais subi les tourments plutôt que d'abjurer." Donoso Cortes, *Œuvres*, ii. 119.

though not submitting to the Church, are attracted towards her ; and it is to this school of Protestants that we owe much of what has been written to her advantage, and much of the moral support which she now receives in the political world. For if it cannot be said that all Catholics are partisans of the Pope as a temporal ruler, it is by no means true that all who are not Catholics are against him. Many who would rejoice at the disappearance of his spiritual authority, feel bound to support him as a legitimate sovereign ; and among the most earnest defenders of the Protestant faith there are many stanch friends of the temporal rights of the Holy See. That cause has been abandoned and assailed only by such Protestants as have false political ideas, and by Catholics who understand neither religion nor policy.

Among the professions of attachment to the temporal power which have come from Catholics, those which treat it as a matter solely affecting religion appear to us of a very questionable character. This line of thought is not only false, but also eminently injudicious and unsafe. It narrows the ground on which the cause can be defended, and necessarily increases the number and zeal of its opponents. If we say that the temporal power of the Pope is to be maintained simply for the interests of religion, that the Catholic Church alone would suffer by its abolition, and that it differs not so much in its importance as in its nature from the authority of other princes, we challenge all who are not conciliated by this argument to do their worst against it. If the Church alone is interested in the preservation of the Roman state, those who are not of the Church must be interested in its destruction. It would be an act of the greatest injustice, to deny to the subjects of the Pope, on account of a religious interest which they do not consider paramount, a right which is acknowledged to belong to the rest of mankind. It is invidious to assert that the subjects of the Pope must be necessarily less free than those of other princes. Can any spiritual necessity be an excuse for so gross a political wrong ? On the contrary, the cause of the temporal power is the cause of other religions and of all other states, and it is in the interest of them all to preserve it. It has two sources of strength, each attracting its own supporters, and provoking its own adversaries ; it has the same rights as all other temporal authority, and it has, moreover, the Church for its protection. If its defence rested purely upon Catholic grounds, it would have no defenders out of the Church, whilst there are many traitors within. If we tell our adversaries that the temporal power is necessary to the spiritual, and is inseparably bound up with the Catholic doc-

trine, they will ask us how it is that all who are in communion with the head of the Church are not partisans of his temporal dominion. If it depends on religious considerations only, how is it that so many Catholics are not persuaded by them? Are there no sincere believers in Catholic doctrines among the liberals of the Continent? Unfortunately we have a divided camp, because religious arguments alone will not avail in a question which equally belongs to the political department.

The union of the temporal and of the spiritual authority in the same hand is a bond of union between the enemies of each. That combination of political and religious animosity—of the hatred which is inspired by a legitimate sovereign with the hatred which is felt for the head of the Catholic Church—is the special character of the present movement. As the motives of attack are twofold, so also are the grounds of the defence. The movement cannot be successfully met where its real character is not understood. A religious interest is at stake, but also a political principle. It is the peculiar nature of the crisis, that many Catholics are revolutionary, whilst the revolution itself is directed against Catholicism. The opposition offered to the Church on religious grounds has given place to a more vigorous opposition on political grounds. The religious element in a movement originally political is a very significant circumstance, and it is a new one.

The first French Revolution deprived the Pope of his dominions; and yet its cause was properly only political. Pius VII. was brought to Rome, not by a Catholic crusade, but by an alliance of the English, the Russians, and the Turks. The crimes and sufferings of that period were aggravated by the want of religion, not occasioned by hatred of it. The Revolution was at first a political theory, and the instrument of men without belief. Now the unbelief is the motive, and points out the ends to be aimed at. Instead of a political doctrine, it has become a religion of fanatics. The men of 1789 pulled down the Church because they considered her an adjunct of the State; the revolution of 1859 attacks the State chiefly that it may destroy the Church. At the end of the last century she did not seem a very serious enemy. She fell apparently with so little effort and so little resistance, that she was soon forgotten in the conflict with more threatening adversaries. Her persecutors bestowed no further thought upon her, and never dreamed she could revive. Protestants, who took no part in the work of pillage and destruction, looked all at once with unwonted compassion upon an

enemy they had fought so long, and who now seemed completely prostrate ; and this was the beginning of that fairness, especially in the historical treatment of the Church, which was displayed by Protestants, whose hatred had departed with their fear.

After repeated triumphs in the political order, the revolutionary party began to perceive that the Church, which they deemed irrecoverably implicated in the ruin of the civil institutions which they had succeeded in destroying, was rising again more powerful than ever, and was furnishing states with a new power of resistance. They understood that their successes were insecure so long as she remained, and they saw that she would prove their most formidable and their most implacable foe. Twice since the first great catastrophe the political revolution has made its way through Europe : once it was entirely political ; the second time it was at once political and social ; but each time it struck at the throne and not at the altar, and each time the Church was the principal gainer. The independence of Catholic Belgium is the monument of the revolution of 1830 ; the Austrian Concordat of the revolution of 1848. So far was the latter from being essentially directed against religion, that one republican government suppressed another solely because it had usurped the throne of the Pope. It is in consequence of this great inconsistency that the revolution has become awake to the consciousness of its real character and purpose ; and it is in connection with the French occupation of Rome that its inherent enmity to religion has been revealed. It has been the singular fate of the restorer and maintainer of the temporal authority of the Pope to conjure up against it a far greater danger than that which he dispelled. He has been unable to escape from the consequences of the revolution by which he holds his power.

Since the revolution has prevailed in the majority of states (and it reigns, under different disguises, at Paris as well as Turin), it has used its victims as instruments for the destruction of that power which alone could give them strength to resist it, and could be their ground of hope for their political redemption. The great triumph of the revolution has hitherto been to dissociate Church and State. The destruction of the temporal power (the sequestration of the Roman States) is the necessary conclusion of a work of which the confiscation of the property and the rights of the Church in each Catholic country was the necessary preliminary. She is the only anti-revolutionary power left standing ; and consequently the revolution on the throne, and the revolution in the streets, unite their forces to deal her a blow in the only

quarter in which she is accessible to their assaults. The strongest confirmation of our view, that the revolution aims directly at the ruin of the Church, and that its first step is to put the governments over which it has obtained power into a hostile attitude towards the court of Rome, is furnished by the only Catholic power that has succeeded in resisting the influence and overcoming the elements of the revolution. In Austria the revolution was crushed, and served only to increase the strength and energy of the government; and in Austria the Church was called on to complete the victory, and to aid in the work of restoration. Accordingly Austria was the first object of the attack which was aimed at the Roman States, because she was the first outwork of the Papal power. It was an undefined sense of this which, in the shape of denunciations of the Concordat, contributed so materially to the isolation of Austria during the late war. The states which assisted the revolutionary movement against the Church combined against the state which was combating the revolution by the aid of the Church. The Italian war was one act in the execution of a design of which the end is the extermination of the Catholic Church. Henceforward she will continue the chief object of the revolutionary efforts; and their success or their defeat depends on the solution of the Roman question.

It is a question affecting the foundation of all government—not concerning the good or bad government of Rome. The work of M. About, together with the clamour in the English press and in parliament, have so far succeeded in putting out of sight the real point at issue, and the real merits of the question, that many Catholics have been betrayed into the imprudence of defending the Roman government on the ground that it is far better than its adversaries affirm. We cannot but look with extreme suspicion on such an argument as this. It admits the foundation of our enemies' case, and accepts the discussion on grounds on which it can never legitimately rest. It overlooks the real question, and supposes an obvious absurdity—that the quarrel is with the accidental defects of the Roman government, not with its essentially ecclesiastical character. Does any serious person believe that, judged either on principles of centralisation or of self-government, whether we apply the criterion of the Code-Napoléon or that of the *Times*,—the shifting symbol of the political faith of Englishmen,—the temporal administration of the priesthood can be made to appear a good one? Can any Catholic, who knows the tests which Frenchmen and Englishmen commonly apply, desire that Rome should be well governed in their

eyes? Would any body be satisfied if it were governed after the manner of Piedmont, which is the Englishman's ideal abroad; or upon the Bonapartist plan, which seems to be the ideal of Frenchmen? Who is so insane as to believe that, if the most plausible grounds of complaint were removed,—if the roads were safer, the clergy less numerous, the people more wealthy,—a dozen voices among the thousands which raise their clamour now would be reduced to silence, or that any attempt to vindicate the reformed system at Rome would receive a more favourable hearing than meets its present defenders? The ecclesiastical government cannot accept its trial on this ground; it cannot recognise the jurisdiction of a tribunal which judges by a code that the Church herself must condemn. It is impossible to deny all the conclusions if we admit the premises, or to discuss the application of a criterion which we repudiate. There is a very old feud between the Church and the world, and it has not been settled by the admission of the secular code. We may not and cannot capitulate with the prevailing prejudices and habits of thought which chiefly distinguish this from past ages. The ecclesiastical government cannot be made palatable to the present generation. We cannot reconcile our contemporaries to the facts of the Catholic world, if we cannot reconcile them to its ideas. Every argument is vain which does not recognise that it is the divine institution, not the human defect, which men assail in Rome. If its government was the best in the world, calumny, by being less plausible, would be only more malignant and ingenious. Frenchmen see no salvation except in their own system of centralisation; and England has never been able to offer to other countries any thing but the phantoms of her own legislative institutions. Both are incompatible with the nature of a priestly government; either would be destruction to it. It is on this that its enemies found their calculations. They desire that its incompatibility with their notions of government should be manifested; and that the proof itself should be its ruin and their own justification.\* We have not forgotten the time when Pius IX. was popular in England; and we know how his popularity was obtained, and how it was lost. He exhibited from the first the character and designs of a reforming and constitutional prince;

\* “Le droit canon, inflexible comme le dogme, immobile au milieu du mouvement des siècles, est essentiellement distinct du droit légal, variable comme les besoins et les intérêts de la société; il a pu s'adapter aux premiers temps de la civilisation chrétienne, lorsque Charlemagne transportait dans ses capitulaires les règles et les préceptes de la théocratie; mais le droit canon ne saurait suffire à la protection et au développement de la société moderne.” *Napoléon III et l'Italie*, p. 26.

but whilst his civil administration was making him popular, the Queen's Colleges in Ireland called forth an act of ecclesiastical authority which was fatal to his political prestige. People believed that they had been deceived; they declared that his liberality was a pretence, that the old spirit was unchanged and unchangeable. From that time the alliance of political liberalism with the pontifical authority has been abandoned on both sides. Neither expects any thing henceforth from the other. Pius IX. called to the head of his government a man who was the very type and model of an enlightened liberal after the modern fashion,—an economist, bred at Paris and Geneva; a man of ability, but without belief, and who had first come under the notice of the Pope as the agent of the French government for the expulsion of the Jesuits. The liberal system had its day; and the result of the trial was conclusive: the Pope had done all he could, and was not responsible for the calamities which made the failure more signal. The trial was his own personal act, opposed to the habits of centuries, and to the advice of the majority of the Cardinals. He cannot undertake the responsibility of a renewal of an experiment which so conspicuously failed; and still less can we desire that he should renew, in the shape of a vigorous despotism, an attempt in which liberalism betrayed him, or that he should try, under the influence of France, what was unsuccessful under the influence of England.

We have no wish to assert that the Roman government offers a model of what government ought to be; still less do we mean to represent it as one which Englishmen ought to admire. It is impossible that, under existing circumstances, it should be exempt from great difficulties and great defects, or that there should not be difficulties and defects peculiar to it. They are of a kind which, we will undertake to say, is more keenly felt by the administrators than by the subjects. But the source of this imperfection lies in the very quarter from which the remedy is now proffered. It is not necessary to introduce into Rome a system in harmony with the ideas of the age; for it was done long ago, and the consequences stare us in the face. The difficulty is not in the Roman system, but in its opposition to the French reforms which have been grafted on it. The misfortune consists in its compulsory infidelity to its own traditions, not to the absence of modern elements. The more faithfully the ecclesiastical government pursues its own principles and its own ends, consistently with its laws and traditions, the more widely will it be at variance with the system by which it was altered first

of all, and by which it is now condemned. We do not, therefore, wonder at the difficulty, we should wonder at its absence; and we believe it due to the attempts which have been made to assimilate the Roman government with that of other states.\*

There is a wide divergence, an irreconcilable disagreement, between the political notions of the modern world and that which is essentially the system of the Catholic Church. It manifests itself particularly in their contradictory views of liberty, and of the functions of the civil power. The Catholic notion, defining liberty not as the power of doing what we like, but the right of being able to do what we ought, denies that general interests can supersede individual rights. It condemns, therefore, the theory of the ancient as well as of the modern state. It is founded on the divine origin and nature of authority. According to the prevailing doctrine, which derives power from the people, and deposits it ultimately in their hands, the state is omnipotent over the individual, whose only remnant of freedom is then the participation in the exercise of supreme power; while the general will is binding on him.† Christian liberty is lost where this system prevails: whether in the form of the utmost diffusion of power, as in America, or of the utmost concentration of power, as in France; whether, that is to say, it is exercised by the majority, or by the delegate of the majority,—it is always a delusive freedom, founded on a servitude more or less disguised. In one form and under one pretext or another, the state has been absolute on the Continent of Europe for the last 300 years. In the sixteenth century absolutism was founded on religious zeal, and was expressed in the formula *cujus regio, illius religio*. In the seventeenth century it assumed the garb of legitimacy and divine right, and the king was believed when he said, "*L'état c'est moi*." In the eighteenth century arbitrary government found a new and stronger basis in the theory of the public good, of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, and justified every act of tyranny by the maxim, *the king is the first servant of the state*. All

\* That the discord of which we speak is the key to the modern history of the Roman state, is abundantly shown in a work which will shortly appear in French, under very high auspices, and which will serve as a useful corrective to Farini. A simple illustration is the fact, that after vaccination had been made compulsory in Rome by the French, the law was abolished, we believe by Leo XII., as an excess of authority.

† Nearly the earliest and clearest exponent of this doctrine is Spinoza, who says, "*Nulla ratione posse concipi quod unicuique civi ex civitatis instituto liceat ex suo ingenio vivere*,"—"It is utterly inconceivable that each subject should be allowed by the constitution of the state to live according to his own choice."

these principles of despotism are incompatible with the Catholic ideas, and with the system by which the Pope, on pain of being in contradiction with himself, and with the spirit and practice of the Church, is compelled to govern. They are condemned by the traditions, and by the moral obligations, of the Court of Rome, whose system is one of charity and of liberty, and which knows no public consideration which is superior to the salvation of souls. It cannot be described more truly than in the words of Cardinal Sadolet: "Quod ut in exercitu, sic etiam in publicis rebus quotidie fit: ut summa re salva, quicquid præterea detrimenti in amissis civibus aut militibus factum sit, id pro nihilo pœne ducatur; at nobis ministris et sacerdotibus summi Dei, nihil tale impositum est; qui non curare commeatus et copias, neque cultus vitæ, aut quemadmodum ea commodè traducatur; sed viritim singulos homines servare et custodire jubemur."\* If we apply this standard impartially to the temporal administration of Rome since the first French occupation, we shall assuredly not find there a perfect or consistent development of the Catholic notion of government. Rome has not escaped the infection of popular ideas, though it preserved longer than other continental states the old habits of administration, and resisted longer the general tendency towards the absolutism of the state. At the time when other ecclesiastical states were proverbially the best-governed portions of Europe, the Roman States were not reckoned an exception; but with the revolution came centralisation, and the concentration into feeble hands of a useless power—the system, in short, of those states where the public ends neutralised and absorbed the liberty of the subject. In France, centralisation is a natural consequence of the whole notion of the rights of the state, which makes an absolute claim, for its own paramount purposes, on the coöperation of every individual. In Rome, no such right can be acknowledged: the increased power of government cannot be applied to the purposes for which it was originally intended; it must be made to serve the ends which in the eyes of the rulers are supreme, the welfare of individuals. The power which is not used in the exercise of rights which the State does not claim, must either be wasted, or applied to ends which in other countries are not considered within the scope of government. Absolute government must be either

\* "The common military and also political practice of taking next to no account of the loss of individual soldiers or citizens, provided the army or state is saved, is by no means binding on us ministers and priests of the most high God; our care is not for supplies of money or men, nor for the ornaments and conveniences of life, but our office to save and watch over each man individually." *De Christiana Ecclesia*, 1539; Mai, *Spicilegium*, iii. 103.

despotic or paternal. It is despotic if, as in most continental states, it is used for public or external ends; it is paternal if, as in Rome, it confines itself to private concerns. Hence the interference of government is felt in Rome as unpleasantly as elsewhere; for the unpopular side of centralisation is exhibited, and at the same time the public objects of centralisation, which, in the shape of glory or of monumental splendour, or of a symmetrical uniformity of administration, reconcile the people of other countries to a system which presses upon all the good sentiments of men, and wins them by their passions or their follies, are wholly abandoned. The Romans have lost their self-government in consequence of the French invasion, and have not obtained those material compensations which the French would have given them. The people are not fit for the old system; the government is unfit to administer the new, which the people demand, and which is pressed upon it by the whole weight of the public opinion of Europe. By a series of concessions which have not conciliated those who exacted them, the independent growth of a purely Catholic form of government has been impeded. This compulsory approximation to the practice of other countries is one great cause of dissatisfaction and of defect in the Roman States.

The combination of heterogeneous elements in the administration disinclines the people towards it: they have lost the old habits, and have become accustomed to ideas which are not fully admitted. Whilst the old Roman government is no longer so intelligible or so sacred to them, the temporal advantages which other countries enjoy are a temptation to imitate them. The Romans cannot be permanently contented with a vague mixture of old notions with new: they have neither the moral benefit of one system, nor the material advantages of the other; consequently the discontent in the Roman States, so far as it is independent of the revolutionary and Sardinian propagandism, is provoked both by the reforms and by the unreformed portions of the administration. For consistency's sake some change is needed, either backwards or forwards; whether a change for the better,—real improvements such as have been often meditated in Rome,—would have given strength to the government, is another question. In order to expect that real improvements would satisfy the malcontents, we must admit the discontent to be founded on just motives and on true views. Discontent may be a sign of disease; it is no proof that the disease is in the quarter, or the remedy in the changes, indicated by the discontented party.

Add to this the inherent antagonism between the political

system of an unbelieving age and that of the Catholic Church, —each of them burning what the other adores, —and the Roman question ceases to be so great a puzzle. Reforms are undoubtedly required : many have been introduced, more are promised. But we doubt whether they can seriously strengthen the government, and we are sure they cannot silence its adversaries. But if it is impossible that they should succeed in imposing their reforms upon the temporal dominion, it is equally certain that they cannot succeed in destroying it.

It is founded on the most sacred of human institutions, on the rights both of property and of sovereignty. It arose, as the necessary foundation of the liberty and independence of the Church, in ages when property was the indispensable condition of liberty, and sovereignty the only security for independence. For the Church requires that her head should be independent among other princes, that her ministers may be free among the subjects of princes. The sovereignty of the Holy See virtually began at the same time as the freedom of the Church ; and the same prince who gave the Milan decree, transferred the seat of empire to a new Rome, *jubente Deo*, as Constantine himself declares,\* in order that the head of the Catholic Church might never henceforth be impeded in the free exercise of his supreme authority by the presence of any other sovereign authority in Rome. The course of events since then has rendered the temporal sovereignty of the Holy See more and more necessary, and has gradually extended its dominion. It is not absolutely essential to the nature and ends of the Church ; it has its source in causes which are external to her, in the temporal condition of the world, not the spiritual aims of the Church ; and as the world becomes impregnated with her ideas, the necessity of the temporal power would probably disappear. It is her protection against the State, and a monument of her imperfect victory over the ideas of the outer world. It is not so much an advantage as a necessity, not so much desirable as inevitable. It is required, in order to save her from the political designs and combinations of a system in whose name she is now required to surrender it. It appears to us that the temporal dominion over the Roman people may pass away when the spiritual dominion is acknowledged by all nations. We do not see that the manner in which the temporal power is assailed is a sign of attachment to the spiritual power, or that it gives us any reason to believe that the time is approaching when an institution which the

\* Codex Theodosianus, xiii. 5, 7.

public will of Europe cannot permanently suspend is about to depart, as it arose, for the greater security of religion.

The temporal power is not only a sign of the Church-militant, and a proof that her triumph over the world is not complete, but it is at the same time a result of the influence which in former ages she exercised in a far greater degree than now. As an acknowledgment of the veneration in which she is held, it must be as dear to those who reverence her as it is hateful to those who do not. Whilst that influence subsists, it must produce and preserve corresponding external signs of its action. Those who hope and believe that the influence is gone, naturally desire the abolition of so conspicuous a proof of its power. Those who feel and know that it exists, and wish to see it increased, cannot surrender that which is its most striking outward manifestation without acknowledging at the same time the hopeless decline of the spirit of which it is the expression. The attachment of Catholics to the Holy See is not so feeble that they cannot preserve this remnant of more faithful times. We shall defend it both for the sake of the piety and of the policy which have so long preserved it. In consenting to the abolition of a natural product of the spirit of religion, all Catholics must feel that their religion is precluded from calling forth similar results of the devotion she inspires,—that her influence for the future is confined, her freedom sacrificed. It is their duty to prove that the spirit which was universal of old, is still powerful enough to maintain against the unbelief of this age the most venerable institution of the ages of faith.

The Pope's temporal power is inconsistent, we are told, with modern opinion, and with the spirit of the times. The Church may not be stationary in her forms while the world advances; she must take her part in the general progress, and must be modified according to the varying requirements of successive ages. But the temporal power is not more inconsistent with the ideas to which it is to be sacrificed than the spiritual power; and it is not inconsistent with the system of ideas which the Church follows, and by which her spiritual authority is maintained. There have been periods in history when the Church has required to modify her temporal condition in order to be in harmony with the altered aspect of the world, and the spirit of a different age. It is natural and necessary that this should be, because religion, which is eternal and universal truth, inevitably combines with every partial truth. In our day all men have become aware that the same old contrast of the institutions of the Church with the notions of the age subsists once more. The same demand is

addressed to her as of yore,—that she should adapt herself to altered circumstances and increased enlightenment by putting away whatever is antiquated in her system, that is, whatever least tallies with the prevailing opinions of the moment; and another emperor assumes the office and claims the merit of Constantine, Charlemagne, and Henry III. But there is this great difference, that the system to which those princes endeavoured to adapt the situation of the Holy See was each time founded and formed on the Catholic ideas. They altered ancient forms in conformity with the development of the system of the Church herself; they brought her into harmony with herself, not with an extraneous system, and made her more able than she had been to pursue her own ends in her own way. The wisest and holiest of her clergy inspired and supported the undertaking, whose purpose it was to promote the influence and augment the authority of the see of Rome agreeably with the universal demand of the Christian world. But the system of ideas by which the Church is now judged, and which men attempt to impose on her, is not the growth of Catholic ages, or the product of Catholic doctrines; it is not adopted where they are held in their utmost integrity; but is promulgated in countries either heretical or infidel, and is supremely antagonistic, not to the present practice of the Church only, but to her whole history. It is a reform which not only acknowledges present defects, but implies a permanent and continuous error in her whole course; and condemns, therefore, the essence, not an accident. Every step taken in obedience to it removes her further from her own traditions and her proper ends.

For this reason we repudiate, not the interference of foreign powers merely, but their advice. The Holy See requires protection not only from the hatred of those who would destroy it, but from the errors of ostensible friends, whose improvements would be equally dangerous. Reforms such as are commonly recommended would be irreparable. It would be better that the Holy Father should be at the mercy of the English fleet, or that he should govern the Church from Gaëta, than that he should be compelled to govern his dominions on the principles of the French administration.

We are told that the Church would be stronger in her own sphere if she were freed from the reproach of being connected with a defective temporal government, which, if it cannot be reformed, had better be abolished. Yet few of those who speak so ill of the temporal government of Rome are really solicitous for the strength of the spiritual rule. It is hard to believe that both its friends and its enemies should have

miscalculated to so great an extent; that a change which the Bishops of the Church have universally condemned, which no Catholic of note has any where admitted as a possibility, and which at the same time her bitterest enemies so eagerly labour to enforce, should in reality promise a great benefit to her. Is it more likely that she would gain or lose if, on this important point, the league of her most violent enemies should succeed in overcoming the resistance of all her most faithful friends? The argument founded on the scandal of the bad government seems to us egregiously foolish, if it is not always hypocritical. Would those who cannot trace in the sovereign of the Roman States the features of Christ's vicar upon earth, have recognised on Calvary between two thieves the person of the Son of God? The visible signs can satisfy only those who are capable of perceiving the invisible signs as well.

The height of malignant absurdity is the plan which those who are ready to sacrifice the temporal power propose for the maintenance of the Pope. If he has not his own revenues, he must live upon the contributions either of governments or of the faithful. None, of course, can be expected from those states that are not Catholic; and there can be no security for their continuance in Catholic states. In France, where no institution is safe, no promise sacred, even for a single generation, there would be little hope of the discharge of so onerous and unpopular an engagement. Such a payment would depend on the durability of the government by which it was undertaken, on the continuance of a respect for religion in the ruling quarters; and it would be exposed to all the risks of revolution, changes of administration, financial necessities, and war. It would not be as safe as the interest of a loan. Yet many powers, Austria and Spain among the number, have failed to pay debts on the punctual discharge of which their financial credit depended. Such a plan would render the Head of the Church dependent for his maintenance on powers almost all of which have despoiled the Church at home. Long before the French Revolution there was a tendency, common to all Catholic countries, to curtail the revenues which the Pope drew from them. It will hardly be said that a religious spirit is so much more deeply rooted now that the recurrence of such a danger is out of the question. There is no European state in which a tribute such as is proposed would be worth five years' purchase.

Nearly the same arguments apply against an exclusive reliance on the other alternative, the direct contributions of the faithful, or Peter's Pence. They would be liable to nearly all the contingencies which render uncertain and valueless a

similar tax imposed upon the states. They would be interrupted not only by changes of religious belief, but by fluctuations of religious sentiment, by war, by pressure of taxation, by the law of the land. A purely voluntary system, which was not maintained even in the middle ages, would be still less practicable now.

The points on which we have briefly touched are some of the most ingenious and insidious of those which are advanced by the enemies of religion, and those by which Catholics are most likely to be impressed. They are not the true motives of our antagonists. For men who are moved by hatred and envy we have no arguments in reply. There are adversaries whom we must combat, whom we cannot reconcile. Their measures are not founded on a mistake; they know what they want, and how to seek it. They are right in regarding the Catholic Church as the irreconcilable enemy of their opinions and their designs, in treating the temporal power of the Pope as the foremost bulwark of the Church. But we too know what it is that we wish to preserve, and we know how to preserve it; and in the conflict with our antagonists we shall be as consistent and as uncompromising as they.

The position of the Catholics of England is clear. They are bound by their religious allegiance to the Pope, and by political consistency to the maintenance of his legitimate sovereignty. In this respect they have a great advantage over the inhabitants of Catholic Europe in general. Where revolutionary theories prevail, and where governments are founded on the sovereignty of the people, they are compelled by political consistency and the force of principle to promote elsewhere the principle on which they themselves are founded. It is hard for a French Catholic to speak with detestation of a revolution by which a nation asserts its rights over its rulers;\* it is hard for him to envelop in a common censure, as one great political crime, the Italian war and the insurrections of Central Italy. Englishmen are more fortunate in the analogy of their own constitution, and in the examples of the history of their country of the two principles on which alone both sovereignty and property repose—right and might. The former is the principle of our constitution, and was the guide of our policy from the time of the Stuarts to that when, after twenty years of war, we restored the Bourbons in France, not as the best, but as the rightful sovereigns. We have seen since then

\* "Pour ma part, j'ai toujours professé la doctrine que la majorité des états de l'Europe moderne,—la Suède, l'Angleterre, le Portugal, la Hollande, la Belgique, la Grèce,—ont consacrée par leur exemple celle de la souveraineté nationale, de la nécessité du consentement des peuples au gouvernement qui les régit." Montalembert, *Pie IX et la France*, p. 25.

a most signal token of the fall of the old parties, by the decline of the old opinions, in a new theory adopted by degenerate Whigs and degenerate Tories, and carried into action at the time of the European congresses, of which the prophet was Mr. Canning. According to this policy, the rights of sovereignty are transferred from the prince to the people, and no government is secure except by its power. Against this view, which unquestionably prevails now in the public opinion and the policy of England, and will probably prevail until a great national danger has aroused in us a horror for doctrines by which our independence and our freedom are imperilled, we have no other weapon but force, no argument but intimidation. We can only obtain influence over those who admit it by a display of our unanimity in respect of the temporal power. This is now our only security; and it is a very feeble one, for it is doubtful whether in numbers and influence we equal the party in whose eyes the Pope is as Antichrist, and the war against him is a holy war. But it remains for us to appeal to the public law which is at the foundation of our whole political system, and to do our utmost to revive those principles which England has already suffered for forgetting, and which are the strongest security of her own greatness, as well as of the temporal power of the Pope.

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#### THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE POPES.—No. I.

It affords a melancholy comfort, in the midst of the dangers which encompass the Holy See, and of the conspiracy which is seeking to blot it out from the political world, to carry back our thoughts to those ages of religious and political faith when the temporal authority of the Pope was acknowledged by a great portion of the European states. No writer has attempted to give a complete account of the successive steps by which this authority extended itself in opposition to the Empire; nor are the grounds of its establishment generally understood. A short description of what then occurred must, we conceive, interest alike the student of history and the sincere Roman Catholic.

It is admitted by most, if not all historians, that in the middle ages but two great systems of Christian states were known,—the East-Roman, or Byzantine, and the West-Roman, or German; and, as Koch shows in his *Tableaux* of the revolutions of the European states, a new system was inaugurated, only at the threshold of modern times, by the ex-

pedition of Charles VIII. to Italy. Both mediæval systems together comprised what is called the *respublica Christiana*. To the first, the schismatical, belonged, besides the Byzantine empire in Europe and Asia, its Slavonic and Rumanic dependencies; and, under Manuel Comnenus, it tried to draw Hungary within its sphere, while to a certain degree also the Russian countries might be given to it. Separation from ancient Rome, spiritual connection with the patriarch of Constantinople; the use of the Greek language in the liturgy and administration; the acknowledgment of the Byzantine βασιλεύς as temporal head; the absence of the characteristic signs of the West, of parliamentary assemblies, of the independence of the clergy, of the development of feudalism, of the freedom both of peasants and of towns; bureaucratic obstinacy; the use of mercenaries instead of national troops,—these form the peculiar character of the Byzantine empire, and of its influence in so far as it obtained complete authority. Add to this an intense and fatal hatred of the West, and of Rome in particular, together with a certain formal civilisation, which made Byzantium the China of the Christian middle ages. Geographically the Byzantine system spread over the greater part of the Greek (Illyrian) peninsula; but when the Hungarian domination extended over Dalmatia and Croatia, it was expelled from the north-eastern coasts of the Adriatic and from the middle Danube; whilst on the lower Danube the boundaries were uncertain, as the Bulgarian empire threw itself sometimes into the arms of Rome, sometimes of Byzantium.

Later than the Byzantine empire, the imperial system of the Teutonic states arose. Together with the German empire, divided into seven duchies, it comprised from the time of Otho I. the Italian empire, from the time of Conrad II. the kingdom of Arles, and from 962 the imperial dignity, which was considered as *translatio imperii a Francis ad Germanos*, as in the days of Charlemagne it had been conceived as *translatio imperii a Græcis ad Francos*. An old book of the Gospels of the time of the Emperor Henry II. describes how *Roma, Gallia, Germania, et Slavonia* render homage to the West-Roman emperor of the German nation. For *Gallia, Germania, et Italia* there were separate chancellors of the empire, in the Archbishops of Trèves, Mentz, and Cologne. The emperor, at the height of his power, considered the kings of the other countries as his provincial dependents, *reges provinciales*; which he could the more fairly do, since Poland, Bohemia, Denmark, and Hungary had attached themselves to the empire, either for a time or permanently. Thus one large

empire, extending on both sides of the Alps from the centre of Europe as far north as south, included the principal nations of Europe, — Germans, Romans, and Slavonians, — and constituted the West as distinct from the East. The ancients, whose states either consisted of but one nation, which regarded and treated every thing that was not Greek as barbarous, or else, where several nations were united in one empire, deprived them of right and liberty, could not show any thing similar. Only dying and decaying nations belonged to the empire of the East ; the new Roman empire embraced the most vigorous and flourishing nations on earth, united them by one faith and one empire, and gave them the most free national development in political forms, in literature, art, commerce, and science. But the empire, in exhibiting its outward strength under the Franconian and Swabian emperors, occasioned the formation of the *Papal system*, which had originated in the opposition of the Catholic countries to the schismatical empire of Byzantium.

Long after the piety of the Anglo-Saxon kings induced them to offer at the shrine of the Prince of the Apostles the Peter's pence in token of veneration and gratitude for the conversion of the Anglo-Saxon realm, Boris, king of the Bulgarians, sent his long hair to St. Nicholas I. (866) as a sign of submission, and called himself a servant of God, of St. Peter and his successor. He demanded an explanation of 106 questions, and the grant of a special patriarch of Bulgaria. The Bulgarian prince had conceived the idea of an ecclesiastical independence of Constantinople, of the establishment of a special patriarchate for Bulgaria, and the attainment of papal protection for the foundation of a new Catholic empire in Eastern Europe. The barbarian had commenced by the destruction of all the nobles who opposed him, together with their wives and children ; then he applied to Rome, where the matter was taken in hand with great precaution, and where the sanguinary basis of negotiations was no more liked than the strange demands. In 870, Byzantine priests succeeded in winning Boris again for Constantinople. The hair remained at Rome, but the king sought his fortune at Constantinople ; from whence, not quite 150 years after, under Basilius, the Bulgarian butcher, followed the almost entire destruction of his tribe.

The first transition from the act of veneration into an act of submission was thus made by the spontaneous act of the prince concerned, but it had no further effect ; so that the centre which might in this manner have been formed for the Slavonic people who dwelt on the Danube was crushed in its

germ. This people fell into the hands partly of the Byzantines, partly of the barbarous Magyars, and partly into those of the Germans. The last made Bohemia a tributary duchy; but Poland is said to have been raised to a kingdom by the Emperor Otho III. through the coronation of the Duke Boleslaus Chrobvi, and to have been thus drawn into the German system of states. At all events, "Otho," as Thietmar of Merseburg writes, "made Ale king of Poland, who till then had been a tributary, a sovereign; and raised him so high, that he soon tried to bring those who were not set over him under his dominion, and to make them slaves." The union with Germany, which brought only dependence, was soon dissolved by Boleslaus, and the preliminaries were laid of a similar connection with the Roman See; for to be subject to the Germans, to receive justice at their hands, was considered disgraceful for a Slavonian, as we see from the old Bohemian poem entitled "Libassa's Court." But it was no disgrace to pay tribute to St. Peter; and it was considered a particular honour to receive from his successor a crown which, being sanctified by the papal protection, could not be withdrawn. Certain it is that Boleslaus sought for it in Rome; and it is hardly to be doubted that it was granted. Since that time Poland appears among the tributary Roman countries, and withdraws from the German empire in order to join the papal system of states.

This had already been the case with Hungary. When Stephen, the son of the Hungarian prince Geysa, tried to establish in Hungary a Christian empire, he received baptism according to the Roman rite; it was only through the right estimation of its situation, between the Byzantine and German empires, the two great political centres, as Pope Gregory writes, that Stephen committed his realm to the Pope, and received a papal crown from Sylvester II. It became the real apostolic crown—a title applicable to no other. But this was not a mere title; it permanently secured the important border-land of Latin Christendom against the Greeks on one side, and against the supremacy of the German emperors on the other.

When the Emperor Henry III. wished to appoint a German vassal in Hungary, even the German Pope Leo IX. tried to preserve the original state of right against the emperor. In all other confederacies of states, each of them lost something of their independence, and the princes of their sovereignty, to the supreme power; that which we are describing conferred a guarantee of independence for the states and of sovereignty for the princes.

But time, which does not respect generalities, and which

tended to constitute legislative rules in the place of vague and indefinite forms, and to create obligations accurately defined, had already found in vassalage the most natural expression for subordination, till, in the age of William the Conqueror, no other could be imagined than feudalism. By this the limits of both factors were most accurately and simply determined; the church herself was obliged to submit to the feudal system, and, as we know, it cost more than fifty years' war (the war of Investitures) between the Pope and emperor before this affair was arranged in the German empire, and before the feudal system could be confined to the supreme dominion of the temporal power. But when, in the Concordat of Worms, in 1122, the dispute of Investitures had been brought to an end, the combat broke out anew, and with greater violence, in England, under Henry II., on account of the Constitutions of Clarendon. Thomas à Becket lost his life in the cause; and England, under John Lackland, almost lost her independence, and quite lost for a long time her power and authority.

The middle of the eleventh century, the age of Gregory VII., witnessed the rise, out of the elements already mentioned, of a political system which encircled the West-Roman empire of Germany, and from which even Germany and France could not entirely escape.

After the example of Poland, Bohemia also sought a nearer connection with Rome. The duke Spitignew had voluntarily promised an annual tribute of 100 pounds of silver to the Holy See, in acknowledgment of which he obtained in 1059 the right of wearing a cap. But the influence of the Emperor Henry IV. in Bohemia soon supplanted the influence of the Pope. The duke Wratisslaus received from the German king the royal chain.\* It is evident that this was intended to preserve the imperial authority over Bohemia, as in later times when Wladislaus, the second king of Bohemia, received the royal crown from the hands of Frederick Barbarossa.† Neither, however, was acknowledged by the Roman See as a legitimate king; and it was not till 1204 that Premysl Ottocar obtained from Innocent III. the recognition of a dignity which had hitherto been a German and Ghibelline gift. The abandonment by the Bohemians of the course which they had adopted under Spitignew, decided the future fate of the West-

\* "Cæsar (Henricus) ducem Bohemorum Wratisslaum tam Bohemiæ quam Poloniæ præfecit imponens capiti ejus manu sua regalem circulum." *Cosmas Pragensis*, 1086.

† "Imperator Wladislaum ducem Bohemiæ regis inornat diademate de duce regem constitutum." *Cosmæ continuat.* 1159.

ern Slaves. They became, in contradistinction to Poland, a German province of the empire, remained so notwithstanding their Slavonic nationality, and quietly suffered the Slaves of the Elbe to be germanised. To the political divisions of the Slavonic tribes was added another fact of importance. In the year 1076, Demetrius (Swinomir), who had been unanimously elected king by the Croatian and Dalmatian people, received from the hands of the legate of Pope Gregory VII. a banner, sword, sceptre, and crown, in return for the solemn promise of fidelity and obedience to the Holy See. At the beginning of the century the Croats had joined the Byzantine empire; now their accession to the Latin ecclesiastical system was settled, and their independence secured. It was only when they were not able to maintain the latter against the Hungarians, that their submission to the apostolic realm was made; not long before, Pope Gregory had written to the Hungarian king Geysa: "We think that it is known to you that the kingdom of Hungary, as well as other very excellent kingdoms, must remain in the enjoyment of its own liberty." Substantially nothing was altered in Hungary through the annexation of the Croats; since, indeed, the Hungarian kingdom likewise belonged to the Papal system. But long after the Croats had become Hungarian through their own quarrels, when Biach, the favourite residence of the dukes and kings of Dalmatia and Croatia (at the Riviera delle Castella) had been destroyed, when the Arpadian dynasty possessed the crown of Swinomir, and the Venetians the coast, the inhabitants of Castel Vecchio used to assemble at the annual change of the zupans, to celebrate the king's festival for eight days. The new zupan was clothed in the finest national dress; his sandals were adorned with gold thread, and he was hailed as king. He lived for eight days in the common hall, had guards around him, granted pardon and administered justice; and disappeared then like a meteor, as did the kingdom itself, and the history of this indolent and idle tribe.

While the Slavonic West was thus divided between Germany and Hungary, between the apostolic and imperial dominion, Poland, though divided in various ways, maintained its independence; and moreover, in the year 1295 the Roman See agreed to an arrangement for its preservation. Przwislaus duke of Kalisch was crowned and anointed in the name of Boniface VIII., and Poland obtained its renovation as a kingdom. Thus, by the establishment of the Papal system was a formula devised by which different nations found a common centre, and by which their national unity and independence were as much as possible secured.

We turn now from the Eastern states to the south and the west of Europe.

Southern Italy had become a disagreeable boundary for the West-Roman, or German power. Otho II. had lost the battle of Rossano; and under Otho III. the influence of the Greeks was still so great, that they expelled the German Pope, Gregory V., with the aid of the Romans, and appointed a Pope of their own, in 997. When the German emperors failed to form a state out of the Greeks, Longobards, Italians, and Saracens of Lower Italy, which, from its situation beyond the Roman state, could not but be of exceeding importance to maintain the imperial sway in Italy, it was undertaken by Norman adventurers. Conrad the Salian thought he had done his duty when he invested Ranulf the Norman with Aversa, conquered by Ranulf in 1028. But now a new centre was being formed in the important Melfi in Apulia, under the sons of the Norman Sire de Hauteville. As yet the threatening storm could be obviated by a union of the Byzantine and German emperors with Pope Leo IX.; but the Emperor Henry III. abandoned the Pope; and the Pope, after the manner of the German Bishops, who used to go to war themselves, collected an army of Swabian and Longobard knights, and took the field against the Normans; but was defeated by them, and taken prisoner.

The defeat of Pope Leo IX. at Civitata, on the 16th of June 1053, settled the condition of Southern Italy for the rest of the middle ages. The Normans remained in the country as vassals of the Roman See. Some years later, Robert Guiscard was acknowledged by Nicholas II. as duke of Apulia and of both Calabrias, and as the future master of Sicily; and all this "by the grace of God and the Holy See." The new duke defended Pope Gregory VII. against Henry IV.; and the son of Henry III. overthrew the Greek and Longobard dominions in Lower Italy, and threatened even the Byzantine empire. Before Jerusalem was conquered, Sicily was taken from the Saracens by the Norman duke Roger, and the Italian sea freed from the power of the Moslem; but it was not before the twelfth century that the different Norman dominions were united under the descendants of Roger the conqueror of Sicily, and that the different Norman possessions in Italy still feudally dependent on the Roman See were raised to a kingdom, which was subject to the Church, 27th September 1130. The new kingdom originated in the schism between Pope Anacletus and Innocent II., and was acknowledged by the latter 27th July 1139. It was in vain that the Emperor Lothar III. had made the greatest efforts to destroy the new

realm, and to extend the imperial dominion over the whole peninsula. The Emperor's departure for Germany, and early death; the death of Count Rainulf of Avellino, who had been raised by Lothar to the dignity of duke of Apulia; and the death of Anacletus, 1137 or 1138,—caused this change, which decided the fate of Italy for centuries. The Norman kingdom remained a Papal fief, and the same was afterwards the case with the kingdom of the Hohenstauffen. The French kingdom of the House of Anjou became so likewise; and many as were the lords Naples afterwards obeyed, by all of them the white palfrey was, up to the end of the eighteenth century, sent to Rome, even by the Bourbons, in token of dependence, which, indeed, in latter times scarcely existed more than in name. But as long as real vassalage existed, the greatest complications of the history of the world were caused by it. The fall of the House of the Hohenstauffen stood in close connection with the feudal tenure of the Sicilian crown from the Holy See with that of the emperor; as also did the change in the states of Western Europe, which proceeded from the Sicilian Vespers, and became the cause of the greatest conflicts in Europe,—the termination of the Crusades, and the decline of the Germanic empire, as well as the accession of the royal house of France to the thrones of Naples and Hungary, which led to a complete change of European politics.

In the same years when the Roman See obtained in Lower Italy a powerful protector in the person of an oppressor who had borne arms against it, Bertrand, by the grace of God count of Provence, surrendered to the Pope and his successors. He promised to be faithful to Pope Gregory VII., paid him all due honour, and left in 1081 all the churches he possessed to the Pope and his successors. Already some years earlier, Evalus, count of Roceir in Spain, had committed to the Roman See his conquests over the Saracens. Alexander II. accepted the donation. Gregory VII.\* urged on this occasion the restoration of the old privileges which were due to the Roman See from the Visigoths in Spain, and were partly deduced from the supposed donation of Constantine. And when, now some years after the defeat of the Christians by the Marobeths at Salaksa, the latter resumed the offensive, Berengarius count of Barcelona (1091) gave, with the same expression as the count of Provence, his whole honour, as it was due to him, together with the city

\* "Non latere vos credimus," wrote the Pope in 1073, "regnum Hispaniæ ab antiquo proprii juris Petri fuisse; et adhuc licet diu a paganis sit occupatum, lege tamen justitiæ non evacuata, nulli mortalium sed soli apostolicæ sedi ex æquo pertinere" (1073, 34, 35).

of Tarragon, conquered in the year 1090, to St. Peter; receiving it back as a Papal fief, for which he promised an annual tribute of five pounds of silver. Alfonso VI., king of Castile, had given up to Count Henry, of the Burgundian house, the country between the Minho and Douro (Portugal) as a Castilian fief, in order to be better able to carry on the war with the Marobeths. When Alfonso, Henry's son, marched against the Saracens, previously to the great victory of Ourique, he placed himself and his kingdom under the protection of St. Peter, and paid as victor the annual tribute of four ounces of gold to the Roman See. After he had taken Santarem and Evora, Lisbon and Alemtejo, Alexander III., the great adversary of Frederick I. (Barbarossa), raised him to the dignity of an hereditary king; but he bound himself in 1179 to pay to the Roman Church 100 byzantines (since 1212 = 2 marks of gold). "The little annual tribute," says Spittler (*History of the European States*, i. p. 126), "was the safest guarantee against all feudal pretensions of Castile." It has been erroneously inferred from the motto of the Portuguese kings, "*Gratia Dei sum id quod sum*," that the entrance of the kingdom of Portugal into the Papal system took place in a more independent manner.\* But the princes of the middle ages did not perceive any loss of dignity in this proceeding, but rather increase of strength; since the independence of their realms from the Roman See, the supreme spiritual and judicial tribunal, was secured, and the protection of the new system was undertaken by the Popes. Twenty-five years later, Aragon followed the example of Portugal; and from the commencement of the thirteenth century, the Iberian peninsula was bounded on the east and west by kingdoms which had voluntarily submitted to the Roman See. Whilst in the heart of Europe, by the pertinacious conflicts between the German emperors Henry IV., Henry V., and Frederick I. (Barbarossa), and the Popes, the whole political system of the middle ages threatened to fall asunder, a new combination began to be formed in the east, south, and west; and it is easy to understand the intrinsic right with which Pope Gregory VII. could imagine, after Henry's deposition, that the new king of the Germans should solemnly bind himself to the Roman See—to become the *miles* of the Pope, not, as Henry had done, to fight against him.

The north of Europe received the faith under totally different circumstances from the Roman empire. In the latter the emperors and their subordinates in authority embraced Christianity quite late, and, indeed, only when all the means

\* Grammont, *Hist. Galliæ*, lib. i. p. 71.

of resistance were exhausted. In the Germanic, and later in the Roman countries, it took root because *king* and *people* resolved to embrace it voluntarily and simultaneously. This may account for the eagerness of the neophytes not only, as was common, to place their crowns under the protection of St. Peter, but, like Ina king of the West Saxons, Offa king of Mercia, and at last Ethelwulf as king of all the Saxon tribes, to engage to pay tribute to St. Peter. It was not that the Roman See obliged England to pay tribute to St. Peter (the Peter's pence), but that the pence, collected from house to house, were a voluntary donation of the people; of which, moreover, only one half came into the hands of the Pope, while the other was given to the school of the Angles at Rome, and to the English hospital which was connected with it.

Under a banner which Nicholas II. ordered to be presented to William the Conqueror, the latter had achieved the conquest of the Anglo-Saxon kingdom. The Pope had acknowledged him as the legitimate heir instead of Harold, and the battle of Hastings (1066) assumed the character of an ordeal. William, on his part, sent the banner, the usual sign of feudal dependence, as an oblation to Rome; refused the requisition of Pope Gregory to pay homage to him and his successor (*fidelitatem facere nolui nec volo, quia nec ego promisi nec antecessores meos antecessoribus tuis fecisse comperio*), but promised to pay the St. Peter's pence. Nevertheless the Pope treated him as a trusty and well-beloved son of St. Peter ("fidelis S. Petri et noster." Baronius, 1080, 59), and required of him to allow Norman and Anglo-Saxon Bishops to go freely to Rome (1079).

After the dynasty of William the Conqueror had become extinct beneath the weight of its crimes, Henry II. tried to subject the Church of England to the feudal system. The founder of the royal house of Plantagenet, however, being at war with his own sons, saw himself forced to do what William I. had scouted; he acknowledged England's feudal dependence upon the Roman See.\* England had become a patrimony of St. Peter. Henry received for it the protection of the Pope; and the rebellious sons were excommunicated. Before this time, as early as 1155, Henry had notified to Pope Adrian his intention to invade Ireland, in order to

\* See Henry's letter to Pope Alexander III.: "Vestræ jurisdictionis est regnum Angliæ, et quantum ad feudatorii juris obligationem vobis duntaxat obnoxius teneor et obstringor. Experiatur Anglia quid possit Romanus Pontifex, et quia materialibus armis non utitur, patrimonium B. Petri spirituali gladio tueatur." Bar. 1173, 9.

subject the people to laws, of which they were considered to be destitute, and to extirpate at the same time the vices of which they were accused. When the Pope wrote thereupon that Ireland, and all islands which the Sun of Justice, Christ, shines upon, belonged to the rights of St. Peter and the Roman Church, Henry promised to pay for each house in Ireland a denarius per annum to St. Peter, and to guard the rights of the Church there. Upon this Pope Adrian allowed the English king to undertake the expedition to Ireland, which established the sovereign authority of the Anglo-Saxons and Normans over the Celts. The Anglo-Saxons did not object to the proceeding of the Pope concerning Ireland; though for England herself it became the commencement of a great change, and led to her entrance into the political system of Rome. It is, however, certain that the proud and impetuous King Henry was not of opinion that England had by this drawn a humiliation upon herself: the extension of his power over Ireland, and the restoration of peace in the country, were important advantages. If the powerful ruler whom the West of France obeyed, did not sink in the eyes of his contemporaries because he was in one of his possessions a vassal of France,—to become a vassal of the Pope offered, at all events, less danger, and far greater advantages for the kingdom itself, than to be a feudatory of the French king. Henry had already made Ireland a tributary country, when he decided to make England a patrimony of the Roman See. He certainly knew what he was doing in 1155 and 1173, and that the step which he took in 1173 was a sure forerunner of the submission of England to the Roman See, as a complete feudal fief, although it is no less certain that this last change of affairs could have taken place only under such a miserable and contemptible prince as was John Lackland, whom the English felt called upon to resist not only by themselves rebelling against him, but also by inviting Pope Innocent III. to vindicate the rights of the Church. The submission of John, however, saved England from the fate of becoming a French province. The king transferred “spontaneously, and upon the council of his nobles, the two kingdoms of England and Ireland to the Roman See,” in order to obtain them again from it as a vassal; promised to take the oath of a vassal (*homagium ligium*), which he also really did; so that he became a vassal to God, to St. Peter, to the Roman Church, to his master Pope Innocent III. and his legitimate successors, in 1213. He paid for England 700, for Ireland 300 marks of silver; but the Pope made him understand that he now possessed the two countries in a much more

solemn and creditable manner, and that that which belonged to the priest belonged now to the kingdom, and *vice versâ*, just as we read in Moses and St. Peter.\*

The Pope's words were about the royal priesthood of the Jews, but in deed he delayed the expedition of Philip Augustus to England; he protected King John against the English barons, who wished to deprive him of his crown, and against the dauphin Louis, who had already come over to England; and when, amid these confusions, King John died, without so much as belonging to himself (*nec se ipsum possidere*), as Matthew Paris says, Henry III., vassal of the Roman Church, maintained himself only through her protection against the enemies of the house of Plantagenet.

In a similar manner Pope Innocent had, at a general desertion of the followers of his father King Henry VI., protected the boy Frederick II., feudatory king of Sicily, in the possession of his maternal inheritance, when the Norman hereditary kingdom in Lower Italy had, through Constance, come to Henry VI., the Hohenstauffen.

Three years after the death of king John, Reginald king of the Isle of Man, to whom the Hebrides and Orkneys also belonged, submitted his kingdom to the Roman See. As usual also, Reginald changed his hereditary possessions into a Papal fief, which he received back again as such, and for which he paid the annual tribute of twelve marks. There were then only a very few states that kept aloof from a system which, resting on a voluntary submission, promised to give the West of Europe quite a different centre than that which the German emperor, the successor of Augustus, intended to establish by the force of arms. In the midst of the most violent struggles of the emperors with the Popes, when the latter often did not possess a foot of land as quiet property, the Papal league formed itself as if off-hand, and had at last, up to the beginning of the thirteenth century, increased so vastly that it overshadowed the imperial league. Only the French crown, which still lived upon the memory of the Merovingian and Carolingian greatness, and which already Pope Gregory called the first empire of the West, kept entirely aloof from it; though the king had already become *rex Christianissimus*, an expression which is repeatedly used by John of Salisbury concerning the French king, when he was affording protection to Pope Alexander III. against "the tyrant of Europe," Frederick I. of Hohenstauffen.

\* "Ecce sublimius et solidius nunc obtines illa regna quam haecenus obtinueris, cum jam sacerdotale sit regnum et sacerdotium sit regale, sicut in epistola Petrus et Moses in lege testantur." Raynoldus, 1213, 83.

## THE FORMS OF INTUITION.—No. II.

OUR next step is to show how the five forms of intuition complete the map of the soul; how (1) *space* and *time* exhaust all phenomena, while (2) *force*, *knowing power*, and *will* exhaust all substance. About the first question there is no manner of doubt; the second requires explanation.

That absolute Being may be analysed into power, intellect, and will, is a recognised truth; “the wise will come to the conclusion that force, intellect, and love are to absolute being what the three dimensions are to body; and that they constitute its unity as the three dimensions of space constitute the unity of the solid.”\* “We conceive God to operate with each of these three attributes as if they were three distinct faculties, while we reduce the action of His other operative attributes to one of these three modes, . . . not one of which, taken abstractedly, or as it may exist in creatures, is necessarily united with either of the others; for power may be conceived without intelligence, and intelligence without volition.”† “To these three all the other properties of God, which express any operation, such as mercy and justice, are easily reduced; indeed, the latter are no other than the three former distinguished by different names, according to the different external objects of their exercise.”‡ Campanella calls these forms “the three primordialities” of God.

But there is not the same unanimity in analysing the human soul into these three primordial powers. Plato divided it into the reasonable, the irascible, and the concupiscent parts. Aristotle divided the reasonable soul into sensibility, intellect, and desire. St. Augustine similarly divided it into memory, knowing power, and will; and this division, in spite of the indistinctness of the first two terms, has, out of respect to its great author, been generally treated as more strictly scientific than he meant it to be—seeing that, in proposing it, he distinctly asserts that these three faculties do not make up the whole conscious self, and that he only selects them because children are tested in the three points of memory, understanding, and inclination.§

\* Gratry, *Connaissance de Dieu*, vol. ii. c. viii. § 5, p. 134, 4th ed.

† Ubaghs, *Theodicæa*, nos. 372, 373, 3d ed.

‡ Claessens, *Ontologia*, no. 115. Claessens and Ubaghs are professors of the Catholic University of Louvain.

§ De Trin. x. 11: “Remotis igitur paulisper *cæteris quorum mens de seipsa certa est*, tria hæc *potissimum* considerate tractemus, *memoriam, intelligentiam, voluntatem*. In his enim tribus inspicere solent etiam ingenia parvulorum, *cujusmodi præferant indolem*.”

After St. Augustine, the Schools taught that the triune image of God in man is found in his memory, understanding, and will. But to defend this position, it was necessary to call human *memory* the representative of the Divine power;\* and to assign as its office "*Divinitatis potentiam cogitare*," and as its disease "*impotence and weakness*." But St. Augustine had given a better analysis of the mind† into *esse, nosse, velle*, "*being, knowing, willing*." Being obviously answers to power, since all reality is a force. Leibniz‡ follows this analysis: "*Answering to the Divine power, knowledge, and will, we find in the soul the subject or base, the perceptive faculty, and the appetitive faculty*"—*appetitus humanus qui est voluntas*;§ the perceptive power, which is the reason; and the base, which is the substance or being of the soul. Bossuet also finds in the soul "*ces trois choses, être, connaître, et vouloir*;"|| while Thomassin¶ substitutes "*unity*" for the base, but with the same intention. Isidore\*\* had boldly identified memory with this mental base or essence: "*The memory is the mind. As vivifying the body, it is soul; as knowing, it is mind; as willing, it is spirit; as recollecting, it is memory*."

And, in fact, when the schoolmen examine the conditions of human acts, they no longer adhere to St. Augustine's first analysis. Human acts imply power, or they cannot be; reason and will, or they cannot be human. Hence all freedom requires a certain "*liberty of power, of knowledge, and of will*."†† St. Augustine had said as much in his book on free-will. Hence we must not wonder if St. Thomas, who, in his speculative theology, had adhered to the "*memory, reason, and will*," begins his moral theology with a different division, and quotes St. John Damascene‡‡ as his authority for saying that the image of God in man consists in his "*intelligence, freedom of will, and spontaneity of power*."§§

To substitute "*memory*" with the schoolmen, or "*sensibility*" with Gratry,|||| Cousin,¶¶ and the mass of modern psychologists, for the simple form of *force* or *power*, tends to render a systematic psychology needlessly difficult. Doubtless the memory or sensibility is the great sphere and storehouse of the creative force of man; a force which always

\* St. Bernard, *serm. xlv. de diversis, alias i. ex parvis*.

† *Confess. lib. xiii. c. 11.*

‡ *Monadologie, no. 48.*

§ St. Thomas, *Sum. 1, 2a, q. 2, art. 7.*

|| *Elévations, sem. ii. no. 6.*

¶ *Dog. Theol. pt. i. lib. i. c. xix. § 5: cf. St. Thom. Sum. 1, q. 11. art. 1.*

\*\* *Originum, xi. 1.*

†† St. Bernard de Gratia et Lib. Arb. *passim*.

‡‡ *De Fid. lib. ii. c. xii.*

§§ St. Thomas, *Prologus in 1am 2æ.*

|||| *Connaissance de l'Ame, liv. iii. c. i.*

¶¶ *Du Vrai, du Beau, et du Bien, 1re leçon.*

remains "immanent," and cannot really put itself forth beyond the soul; for though it directs, it does not constitute, the force which moves the body. Gratry describes the sensibility as "a spring always flowing and fermenting; consisting of instincts and desires, not of perceived ideas or voluntary movements: an instinctive fund of force, obscure, involuntary, undefined, rich, which is my life-spring, my base, my fulcrum, and my food."\* These "instincts" and "desires" belong rather to knowledge and will than to pure force. We rather understand force to be that which in God gives and creates real existences; in man, receives the shock of them and discovers them; in the world, strikes us as objective, and discovers itself to us as reality.

2. In examining whether these five forms complete the map of the mind, the first step is to fit them together, and to assign each its own province. Our readers will allow us to use metaphors which, though current with Plato, will sound strange to ears accustomed to the modern abstract terminology. With the ancients the soul is a "sphere," or a "circle," or even an "onion." Such metaphors seem to moderns capable of giving only gross and material views, or dim and shadowy notions. Still, as all metaphysical terms originally belonged to the physical order, and have only been refined and spiritualised by use, which, while it renders language more precise, tends also to decrease its power, and make it colourless and unsuggestive, we ought at times to recur to the fountain-head for more vivid metaphors, new or old. No strict rule will apply. Metaphysical thought is a science; but metaphysical expression is an art, like poetry or painting. It is not as if some words had from the first belonged to the world of mind, others to that of matter; all originally denoted sensible things, but have been gradually abstracted from body, and appropriated to spirit. But as this assertion does not affect our argument, we will not stay to prove it.

A vocabulary of mind having once been secured, mistake is henceforth impossible. The ancients, who called the soul a vapour, a breath, or a sphere, might seem in danger of materialism; but we may return to the terms of the childhood of philosophy without fear of putting her into her cradle again; she is strong enough to hold her conquest of an abstract nomenclature, which has once for all established the possibility and the reality of metaphysical thought: no new metaphors will blot out the memory of this conviction. We may safely liken the soul to a series of concentric transparent spheres,—

\* *Connaissance de l'Ame*, liv. i. c. i. § 2.

“involving and involved,  
Sphere within sphere ; and every space between  
Peopled with unimaginable shapes ;  
Yet each inter-transpicuous ; and they whirl  
Over each other with a thousand motions,”\*—

without leading men to think it a gelatinous organism, or a series of cells one within another, transmitting rays, like the coats of an eye, or secreting its products like a stomach. We may say that, in the interchange of perception and thought between the central self and external objects, the rays have to traverse a series of media, whose colours they borrow in passing, and whose species they assume, with as good right as Locke talks of the *tabula rasa*, or Leibniz of the veined marble. Let us, then, compare the soul to a concentric series of spherical surfaces, on which she receives the photographs of the senses from without, or sketches the movements of the spiritual activity within.

The outside coat is the blank surface or form of space, on which all extended phenomena are depicted.

The next behind this is the tablet of time, a form on which succession and duration are represented by the symbol of motion. The perception of a moving phenomenon employs both these forms. We put the tablet of time within that of space ; because, while space is representable without conditions of time, time can only be represented in terms of space, as the motion of a point along a single line. Space is the primary intuition, self-evident, obtrusive ; time is behind it, more obscure, only to be represented as reflected upon it.

But a moving phenomenon implies more than extension and succession—it implies a motive force. Time and space, being only the passive measures and frames of things, tell us nothing of the thing in itself, or of the force that moves it. By space and time we investigate its shape, size, velocity, duration, direction, and position ; but no more. If we would transcend these categories, and pass from the phenomenon to the substance and force of the thing, we have already risen to the level of ideas which cannot be reduced to terms of space and time, nor adequately represented through these forms exclusively : for the outline is not the essence of an object, nor velocity the essence of motion ; we require a new mental tablet, on whose surface to represent the thing, no longer as phantom or phenomenon, but as actual substance or force.

And so we arrive at the sphere of force, the confines of

\* Shelley, Prometheus, act iv.

the *me* and the *mine*, of the inner and outer man of the mind.\* Here the soul ceases to be merely receptive and passive, and begins to be active; having passively received the impression of shapes moving in space and time, she perceives them to be realities, by a kind of creative act which injects substance and force into the empty phantoms, and adds or attributes to the phenomena more than appears on their surface. The appearance gives only extension and change of place or shape; but these are not yet substance and life, we want deeper faculties than the mental forms of space and time to give us the intuition of living substances. In sensation, we do not see substance, or reason, or will; but we are forced to attribute them to the objects of sensation, because our own power, reason, and will, are the canvases on which the picture is painted, the stuff out of which the image is formed.

To obviate the suspicion of scepticism, we must anticipate the course of our argument, and affirm the reality of objects before coming to the proof of the reasonableness of the conviction. There is no doubt of the existence of space and time, in the things which they embrace; but we would not say that space and time exist as the infinite quantities we are obliged to fancy them. Aristotle warns us against transferring the necessity of our conception of space to the necessity of nature.† St. Thomas talks of an imaginary time beyond real time, and an imaginary space beyond real space.‡ The students of Louvain are taught to distinguish between real and possible space and time: the real being finite, limited, and contingent; the possible, infinite, eternal, and necessary.§ Balmez, who of course denies the infinity of body, holds "that where there is no body there is no space."|| Hamilton asks, "If extension be only a necessary mental mode, how can we make it a quality of external objects?" and he gives us the "one possible answer:" "It cannot be denied that space, as a necessary notion, is native to the mind; but does it follow that because there is an *à-priori* space as a form of thought, we may not also have an empirical knowledge of extension as an element of existence?"¶ No doubt

\* "Ascendentibus introrsus quibusdam gradibus considerationis per animæ partes, unde incipit aliud occurrere quod non sit nobis commune cum bestiis, inde incipit ratio, ubi homo interior jam possit agnosci." (Aug. de Trin. xii. c. viii.) Τὰ ἔξω οὐκ ἐγώ, ἀλλ' ἐμά· ἐγὼ δὲ τὸ λογικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς. (Pseudo-Basil. orat. i. de Hominis Structura.)

† Phys. iii. c. viii.

‡ Sum. 1, q. 46, art. 1 ad 8.

§ Claessens, Ontol. nos. 324, 325, 348 and 349.

|| Fundament. Phil. iii. c. xii.: cf. St. Thos. Sum. 1, q. 8, art. 4: "Gratum milii esset *ubique*, supposito quod nullum aliud corpus esset."

¶ Lectures on Metaphysics, lect. xxiv. vol. ii. p. 114.

objects exist in space, though all we see of them are the photographs on our visual organs. Substances and living beings exist outside us ; but it is only in our internal subjective life that we mirror and perceive the phenomena of substance of life. "We know other minds by our own, and after knowing them, we believe them to exist from the existence of our own ;"\* and as matter reveals itself to us conditioned and regulated by our ideal space and time, so do mind and substance reveal themselves conditioned and regulated by the forces which constitute our conscious soul.

These forces are power, or simple force ; intellect, or knowing force ; and volition, or willing force. Each has an activity and passivity of its own ; for each is capable both of generating its proper act, and of receiving its proper impression. Hence, like space and time, we may say that their tablets are hung up in the inmost recesses of the mind, to receive the impressions of substance, reason, and life—of the world, man, and God. They are the forms of our inner vital knowledge, as space and time are the frames of our outer phenomenal knowledge. Let us represent them as three more concentric spheres—the power-sphere outside, the will innermost, and the knowing power between them. Power is outside, as space is outside time, because, as time is represented in terms of space, so knowing and willing are thought of as modifications of power, knowing and willing forces ; also, in the pure intuition, knowledge follows power—the knowable and the doable are convertible,†—and Will only has place in the sphere of the possible and the known. Moreover "actual entity" (and nothing that is not force can act) is the "first intelligible," and therefore force is the simplest knowable substance.‡

Simple force is not necessarily living or rational. It may be, like light, blind and unconscious, though inconceivably subtle and agile. To represent living conscious force, we want a deeper faculty than the power-sphere. As moving phenomenon requires the composition of space and time, so does conscious force require the composition of the power-sphere and the knowledge-sphere for its apprehension. Simple substance is represented on the first sphere as blind unconscious power, still or active. The first step towards changing this into living substance is made by ascribing to it an extrinsic purpose, and an intrinsic adaptation ;—"a reason combined and connatural with the substance, but inanimate, unreasoning, and unintelligent, operating solely by

\* St. Aug. de Trin. viii. 6 ; see also ix. 3.

† Vide supra, p. 32.

‡ St. Thos. Sum. 1, q. 5, art. 2.

the external art" of the framer,\*—an organising force implying purpose and selection, like vegetative life, which seems to manifest an unconscious science, alive as compared to dead mechanical force, because it spontaneously disposes itself according to a predetermined plan. Life may be separated from consciousness in the immediate object of thought, but not in the object absolutely. If the reason of the living organism is not self-determining, then it is determined by another governing reason. Passive reason and active consciousness, separate or united in one subject, together complete our idea of knowing force; but consciousness, reason, and design, are advances upon the simple idea of force, and require a deeper faculty, a more inward form, for their representation. This form is the second, or knowledge, sphere of the inner mind.

We can imagine a conscious force that has no power to withdraw itself from the sequence of external impressions, no will, no choice. Such perhaps is the instinct of animals, governed by appetite, which is the counterfeit of will; but add volition, a free, self-determining, self-regulative power, and we have advanced another degree—to an idea which cannot be represented in the form of knowledge, but implies a deeper condition. This last step in the synthesis of living force, by which we recognise it as not only rational but voluntary, brings us to the innermost form of the soul, the central will-sphere, where forces are represented as wishing, desiring, loving, willing, not by a constraining force that governs them externally, but by the conscious internal determinations of love and hatred, refusal and choice.

3. Many writers have fancied the various mental powers to be thus sheathed one within another. Plato builds up the soul of a number of concentric spheres, nervously alive to every motion of the body in which they are sheathed, and all formed from an essence composed of "substance, self, and not-self." These concentric spheres Plato divides into two series,—that of "diversity," or not-self, to receive the impressions of transient phenomena; that of "sameness," or self, to envisage eternal truths. Outside is the sphere of the unchangeable; then the spheres of the mutable, with the perishable earthly element in the midst,† according to the supposed analogy of the solar system. If he had known the Copernican system, doubtless Plato would have placed the spark of divine light, the personal will (which, indeed, he does call the root

\* St. Athanas. c. Gent. xl.

† This only applies to the great model soul, that of the universe; the souls of men Plato held to be enclosed in their bodies.

of the soul), in the midst, and round it the various spheres. There is a danger in making the earthly and perishable part the centre of the soul system, and animating it by plunging it into the boundless abyss of real being; for when the perishable perishes, the soul must lose its personality, and become once more confounded with universal being, as it does in the Oriental and Egyptian systems,\* which describe the soul as emanating from the universal spirit, and descending through the seven planetary spheres, whose qualities it borrows on its way, till it comes to the earth and unites itself to a perishable body; on whose death it reascends through the same spheres, returning to them what it had borrowed, namely, the various powers of growth, craft, concupiscence, ambition, covetousness, and treachery; and thus defecated and impersonalised, is reabsorbed into the bosom of infinite being. In a more orthodox spirit, Dante, in his *Convito*, tells us that as the earth is surrounded with nine spheres, so nine sciences envelop the spirit of man, and illuminate and fecundate the world of thought. The arts of the *trivium* and *quadrivium* are the seven planetary spheres; the eighth, with its two poles, is physics and metaphysics; and the crystalline sphere, or *primum mobile*, is moral philosophy, which vivifies the intellectual spheres: beyond all these is the infinite, immovable, self-luminous empyrean; this is theology. In all these systems the progress was from an earthly centre to the absolute spirit outside; it is a truer view to place a limited real being in the centre, and enclose it in the coatings of the mutable. "Poor soul, the centre of my sinful earth," says Shakespeare. Like the onion, the vitality of its tunics increases as they approach the centre. St. Augustine calls the intellect and will the "inner man" of the mind. A whole sermon of St. Bernard is devoted to showing that the intention is the inner bone or framework of the soul, the affections its flesh, and the thought its skin.† St. Teresa compares the soul to a palm-fruit, the delicious kernel of which is surrounded with several layers of rind; or to a central castle of crystal, surrounded on all sides with various dwellings.‡ These comparisons serve to correct what is amiss in the grand allegory of Plato, with whom the surface of the soul is the divine part, while its depth is but a piece of clay.

4. And the faculties of the soul are not only thus sheathed within one another, but within the bodily organs also. We

\* See Origen c. Celsum, vi. 22; and Pseudo-Hermes Trismegistus, *Pœmander*.

† Sermo vi. de diversis.

‡ Castle of the Soul, 1st dwelling, capp. i. and ii.

may distinguish three limitations of its liberty. 1. Natural; because like all creatures it falls short of the infinite. 2. Structural; because the knowing faculties are sheathed in the forms of space and time, and cannot reason except in terms of space and time. 3. Physical; because the operations of the soul require material organs, not because man is an organism, but because he is an intelligence served by organs.

The soul, as it reveals itself to experience through these organs, manifests three sets of functions that harmonise exactly with its transcendental powers. Plato divides the soul into the reasonable, the irascible, and the lustful or appetitive parts. The *θυμοειδές*, or irascible portion, is that which leads a man to exercise and labour,\* and pushes him in search of strength, victory, and glory.† To borrow a Kantian term, we might call all the faculties which minister to the pure force of the soul its conative faculties; they are characterised by effort, endeavour, exertion; they are the blind *nisus* of nature, exhibited in struggles, whether of body or mind. The faculties which fetter, while they minister to, knowing power, are the senses, the memory, the imagination, and the rest. The will is solicited, but not fettered, by the affections, appetites, and passions, and by the feelings of pleasure or pain which accompany every act, and every endeavour of every faculty. In the body these three forces preside over the triple nervous system—the ganglionic system of nutrition and instinctive force, and the two cerebral systems of sensation and voluntary direction of motion.

We have not room to discuss the effect which this arrangement has upon the liberty of the soul: our conclusion would be that of St. Bernard—that the will in itself is left wholly free, but imperfect; for its perfection requires “true knowledge and full power,” “not because power and knowledge are will, or because will can make a person strong or wise, or any thing but a voluntary agent,” but because “no one can be wise or powerful without the liberty of knowledge and power which Adam lost.” The will is free, because it is not tied either to the conditions of space and time, or to the organs of the body. The power and knowledge are not free, because they are tied to those conditions; and the slavery of our power and knowledge maims, though it does not enslave, the will.‡

5. The three inner forms of the soul constitute the per-

\* Rep. iii. c. xvii. p. 410 B.

† Rep. ix. c. vii. p. 581 A.

‡ St. Bernard de Grat. et Lib. Arb. cc. vi. vii. viii. (See some remarks on this subject in the *Rambler* of Dec. 1858, pp. 384-5.)

sonal essence. The *ego* affirms itself to be force or substance, knowing power, and will, and not to be space or time. Personality is the conscious unity and permanence of a given force, knowing power, and will. Therefore it is not a form of intuition; for all such forms must be universal, like space, time, and force. But personality, considered as a relationship apart from the substance of the person, cannot be unlimited. If it could be infinite, it must be either *extensivè* or *intensivè*. A personality universal in extent comprehends all other possible personalities, and confounds all persons into one. "Personality infinite in intensity" is a phrase without meaning. Unity, distinction, individuality, when once real, do not admit of degrees. The quantity of personality is as great in the meanest as in the mightiest: to attribute to one more personality than to another, is only an inexact way of declaring that the power of one is more intense, his knowledge wider, or his will firmer. Power, knowledge, and will, are the forms of personality—personality is not their form: hence the greatness of a person would reside, not in the degree of personality, or of individuation, but in his degree of power, wisdom, and goodness.

Our personality resides chiefly in the central will, for in this there is the greatest permanence. It does not much matter to a man what his knowledge or his power was a month ago, but he is always responsible for the state of his will. From the central will the self looks forth to gather in its harvest of ideas; it looks through all the concentric spheres in which it is enveloped, and which, "like a dome of many-coloured glass, stain the white radiance," and modify the various perceptions that pass through them.

But the gaze of the self through the surrounding spheres is no mere passive looking; the compound sphere, like the wheel of the prophet's vision, darts forth on all four sides, without leaving its place, or discomposing the order of its parts. Each concentric envelope still keeps its own rank; the external tunics of space and time still cover the active powers in their most distant ventures. Wherever the intelligence darts forth, its elastic case still covers it; when it looks outwards on the universe, the clouds of space and time always float in the humours of the spiritual eye. The vision of Ezechiel gives an apt image of the soul—wheels of four faces or spheres, wheels within wheels, concentric elastic spheres full of eyes, darting forth like lightning every way, without needing to turn the back, and animated with the spirit of life.\*

\* Ezech. i. 15-21.

We may call the space-sphere the external rind of the soul, the window through which the mind sees the external world, because the mind can neither perceive nor conceive any external thing except in terms of space. The same is true of time: the internal faculties can never throw off their overcoat, but must always remain within and behind their envelope, and look through it as through a glass. Naturally enough, then, the external forms must be seen in and with every thing; if we see all objects in space and time, we must also see space and time in all objects, and space and time become the necessary groundwork and condition of all perceptible things. Wherever the mind can advance its view, still space and time go before it like a dimness in the eye, or a flaw in the lens; wherever we turn our gaze, the cloud is before us still: space and time are the receptacles of all possible phenomena, infinite as possibility itself.

Infinite, that is, in thought, not in reality; for, as Aristotle warns us, necessity of thought does not always imply necessity of nature. "To trust to our thought is absurd; the infinity we think is not in the nature of things, but in our thought. If we fancy a thing to be increased to infinity, the thing really becomes no larger. It is only time and motion and thought that are infinite, where the product does not remain as a real existence."\* This principle will enable us to see that we need not affirm the primary infinity of space, but only of the force which can generate space. The illimitable activity of our power-sphere, working under cover of the space and time spheres, enlarges them to the measure of its own growth, and at last affirms them to be infinite. But they are only infinite because the prior infinity of power and thought creates infinite space and time to contain it—*ens creat existentias*. After any given motion and thought, further motion and thought are always possible; whether the space passed through and left behind subsists or not, we cannot tell; we only know that force can push on for ever, and that wherever *our* force pushes on, it goes on enveloped in imaginary space, with this dimness in its eyes, this overcoat encasing the soul, and forcing her to think that the receptacle which contains her is and must be space. Thus the idea of infinite space is conditioned by the idea of the possibility of infinite motion. Deny the infinity of motion, and it is easy, with Aristotle and St. Thomas, to deny the infinity of space. Then space is assumed to be limited; and when we have arrived at the limit, whatever we may fancy, there is no real space beyond. Still we must necessarily affirm the possi-

\* Arist. Phys. iii. 8.

bility of motion beyond, if not for us, at least for some moving force. Thus to our reason not space but power seems to be the first and necessary infinite; the infinity of space follows because our power-sphere is encased in our space-sphere, so that our force can never exert itself *ad extra* except in space. The movement of power makes its own path, and this path seems to us to be space. But there is no reason why a conscious power may not exist without the envelope of space. To him space would not appear to be infinite. The self-contradiction of the idea of infinite space is only a warning to us not to raise a power conditioned like our own to infinity, but to free the conception of infinite power from all conditions of space. Because the time and space spheres are the outside shell of our minds, so that we can project no idea, however transcendental, except by passing it through this medium, it does not follow that every other conscious being is so constituted; rather, as we are obliged to express the most subtle spiritual ideas in terms of space and time, though we well know that they have nothing to do with space and time, so we may easily imagine that the infinity which we attribute to space and time is only a symbol expressing the infinity which belongs really to the inner forms of the soul.

For these powers, though not infinite in us, must be conceived as infinite in themselves. If force has its limits, where it dies out, still we must conceive that beyond these limits there is something possible. But nothing can be conceived possible except there is a power to perform it; so that the same act of thought which sets a limit to force, where it evaporates in weakness, proclaims that force reigns beyond that limit. It is equally impossible to set bounds to knowledge in itself; when we come to the assumed limits of knowledge, we must still assume a possibility of knowing what lies beyond. Our knowledge is limited, not knowledge in general. So with will; beyond the assumed limits of volition there is an infinite possibility, and therefore an infinite scope for choice between the possible alternatives. That our own power is limited by our muscular weakness, does not prove that power in itself ends in weakness. That our knowledge is limited by our mode of consciousness, does not prove that knowledge in itself ends in the contradictions of reason. And that our volition is limited by our enslaved knowledge and power, is no proof that will in itself is so limited; rather, as we have an unlimited liberty of velleity, we can partly comprehend the meaning of an infinite liberty of will.

6. The soul, then, cannot project herself, or represent her thought, except by writing her hieroglyphics on the can-

vases of space and time; but can she retreat within herself, and detach herself from space and time, like a hedgehog rolling up, or a tortoise withdrawing into its shell? Not with any clearness of consciousness, nor with any thought capable of representation; for

“Cede la memoria a tanto oltraggio,  
Quale è colui che somniando vede,  
E dopo 'l sogno la passione impressa  
Rimane, e l' altro alla mente non riede.”†

But even in the natural order, as St. Augustine owns,‡ men have been able to catch, in mystic trance, a momentary glimpse of what goes on “in the inmost abyss of the soul, where no image can enter, where she carries on no operation, nor knows, nor understands”—far below “all forms of thought.”§ We represent incorporeal natures as monads or points, because the point is no part of space; similarly the instant *now* is taken as the symbol of an achronous nature, and eternity is said to be an everlasting ‘now.’ Hence it has been supposed that we may have a glimpse of the eternal substance in a momentary intuition which admits of no succession, in a single *ictus* or flash of thought, which is instantly clouded over again by the phantasms of time and space.|| Tertullian summons the heathen soul to bear instinctive witness to truths which on reflection she denies; which, unasked, she knows, but attempting to explain, explains away. Leibniz sees no absurdity in supposing that certain truths are graven on the soul which she has never known, nor ever will know distinctly in this life.¶ There is, then, a possible knowledge deeper than reflection; and men profess to have attained it in the Buddhist abstraction, the ecstatic intuition of the Neo-Platonists, the logical process of the Hegelians, and in that “circular motion of the soul” recommended by the Pseudo-Dionysius, and after him by St. Thomas, who describes it as a forgetfulness of the distinctions of external things, and an abstraction from discourse of reason, followed by a fixed, immovable contemplation of the one simple truth.\*\* We will

\* These are St. Teresa's examples,—*Castle of the Soul*, dwelling iv. c. iii.

† Dante, *Paradiso*, xxxiii. t. 19.

‡ De Trin. iv. 13: “Nonnulli eorum potuerunt aciem mentis ultra omnem creaturam transmittere, et lucem incommutabilis veritatis quantulacunque ex parte contingere.”

§ Tauler, and St. John of the Cross; quoted by Father Dalgairns, *On the German Mystics*, p. 57.

|| “Statim se opponunt caligines imaginum corporalium, et nubila phantasmatum, et perturbant serenitatem quæ primo ictu diluxit tibi, cum diceretur ‘veritas.’” St. Aug. de Trin. viii. 2. See also xii. 13, and Confess. i. 245.

¶ *Nouveaux Essais*, lib. i. upon § 5 of Locke's Essay.

\*\* Sum. 2, 2æ, q. 180, art. 6 ad 2.

only observe, that the soul thus shrinking up within its shell, withdrawing itself from the time-and-place sphere, ceasing to beat against the bars of its cage, entering its closet and shutting the door, hovering round itself, and concentrating its energies around its own nucleus,—does not separate itself from the forms of power, knowledge, and will, but rather separates and refines these forms from their logical and representative expression in the outer forms of space and time. Those who assume that logic is the measure of every possible consciousness, deny the possibility of such an act. But it is rash, on a mere theory, to deny what a mass of men declare to be a fact of experience.

7. The soul, though divisible in thought into three different spheres, apprehends herself first of all as a confused unity, and only learns to analyse herself by her analysis of her knowledge. Since, then, every perception has an element derived from without (the phenomenon), and another derived from within (the substance), the original unanalysed idea of substance would be our internal consciousness of our whole complex nature. Hence our first impulse is to endow all external things with our whole nature. And does not the child or savage, whose curiosity or terror is excited by every object of nature, love or hate this object only because he has unconsciously endowed it with humanity, with power, consciousness, and will? Does he not, as he gradually gains experience, learn to abstract portions of these attributes from what he perceives, unlearning the belief that trees and stones are malignant or benevolent beings, withdrawing from them the attributes of sensation and knowledge, learning thus to divide and distinguish his own powers without reflecting directly on them,—

“For speculation turns not to itself  
Till it hath travelled, and is married there  
Where it may see itself,”\*—

but simply by leaving a different amount of power similar to his own in each object of his contemplation? He leaves to the tree an inferior kind of life—the vegetative; he cannot concede so much to the stone, but abstracts from it all spontaneous power, however unconscious and irrational, and only leaves to it the still latent force which is reality and substance. And as the mind at first pours herself wholly into nature, so does she reciprocally assimilate all nature to herself, and is unable to distinguish the nature of what she sees

\* Shakespeare, *Troilus*, act iii. sc. 3. It must be remembered that “aliud est non nosse, aliud non se cogitare” (Aug. de Trin. xiv. 5),—“the mind knows itself before it can see itself outside itself.”

from her own till she has learned the lesson of abstraction.\* Thus real existing substance, or latent force, is the last term in the objective analysis of our spiritual consciousness, the simplest idea of which we have any real consciousness: we cannot attribute actuality or reality to things to which we cannot attribute this force; they lie further off, nearer to nothing, than our intelligence can reach.

For as our senses are confined within a limited circle of sensible phenomena, so perhaps our intelligence may be restricted to a limited sphere of intelligible things. The eye can only see the ethereal vibrations, and the ear hear the aerial ones, within certain numerical limits. The infinite number of quicker or slower possible vibrations is unseen and unheard. So it may be with the internal eye or ear of reason; there may be states of being whose pulsations are above or below its scale. Besides the order of substance, there may be a super-substantial and an infra-substantial order.

Our simplest idea of substance is the still or latent force which we attribute to matter: this we conceive to be the lowest grade of real being; every real being that we can think either *is*, as a stone; or *is and moves*, as the wind; or *is, moves, and grows*, as the plant; or *is, moves, grows, and feels*, as the animal; or *is, moves, grows, feels, thinks, and wills*, as the man. For higher beings we cut away the lower grades, and conceive them in terms of the higher human essence—power, knowledge, and will; lower beings are thought of as between force and nothing. Latent force or substance is the last of conceivable actualities; we cannot halve it or diminish it. Hence to objects of thought that are not yet latent forces we are obliged to deny substantial actuality, and to conceive them as only improperly termed beings—mental abstractions, having no intelligible place in the nature of things; yet they may have some place if there are possible degrees of force which our intelligence does not comprehend. Thus space and time, which the intellect conceives as nonentities, may have a lower degree of entity than our intelligence can reach; for there may be as many degrees between the simplest force intelligible to us and the simplest force absolutely, as there are between the slowest visible and the slowest possible vibration of the ether.

Our notion of the grades of being is not arbitrary, but is ruled for us by nature; not by external nature, but by our

\* "*Rerum sensarum imagines a se discernere non potuit mens, ut se solam videat,*" till she learned "*id quod sibi addiderat detrahere,*" and saw that "*aliud secum amando, cum eo se confuderat et concreverat.*" See St. Aug. de Trin. x. 8.

own. We have no senses to discern being and life; we read them off the mirror of our soul. If we had not substantive existence, like the stone, we could not see it in the stone; if we had not sensation, like beasts, we could not attribute it to them; if we were devoid of intellect and will, we could never attribute them to men. We have a certain community or analogy of nature with these grades of being, and we can only comprehend being so far as we have that community. Hence we infer that, as we are not space, space, as an actual substance, cannot be intelligible; and as we are not time, substantial time is inconceivable; but as we are force, knowing power, and will, the self-existence of force, wisdom, and will is perfectly conceivable.

This is the ancient maxim, "like knows like;" a maxim that is untrue of phenomena,—for we are not like the natural objects which we see,—but which is ever true of our ideas of substance. For phenomena, and all natural sciences, the maxim is, "all knowledge is in the antithesis or contrariety of subject and object:" they demand forgetfulness of self; for it is absurd to look within for what can only be found without. "Know thyself" is the maxim of metaphysics; for it is absurd to look without for what can only be found within.\* Natural science is always adding new worlds to our knowledge; metaphysical science can never show us a world other than that within us. Hamilton's objection, that if only the similar can know the similar, our soul must exist as extended in order to think extension,† is thus obviated; because extension, as object, belongs to the phenomenal world, as he owns (p. 114), and therefore comes under the maxim of contrariety; not under that of similarity, because we *cannot* think of extension as a real and substantive existence. It should be observed, that the ontological maxim is "like knows like," not "the identical;" now the smaller degree is similar to the greater, as any circle to all circles.

The soul's inability to conceive space and time as substances need not prove their objective non-existence, but only their want of community or analogy with the nature of our soul: it proves that the soul is not space or time; that she is neither extended in space, nor subject to loss of identity through succession of time. Space and time, the sphere of her actions, are foreign to her nature, as the clothing is foreign to the man. They are not forms of the soul, as they are of matter and material phenomena. They may be en-

\* "Erravi . . . quærens Te exterius qui es interius . . . quærens Te extra me, et Tu habitas in me," &c. Aug. Solil. c. xxxi.

† Lectures on Metaphysics, lect. xxix. vol. ii. p. 192.

tities, but they cannot be substance. Hence *ens* cannot, without reserve, be predicated of God. He is *ens* only ontologically—as power, wisdom, and will: He does not exist in the forms of phenomena, in extension, succession, or any of the inferior categories of being; he is not, therefore, in the pantheistic sense, the universal *Ens*.

But if, as we affirm, the soul has a relationship with material substance, how is it that space and time, the forms of matter, are not also forms of soul? Is not extension of the essence of matter? The soul's community of nature with material substance is not perfect, but partial and analogical. Hence we cannot comprehend matter as a whole, but must split it in two—phenomenon and substance. In substance we recognise a force similar or analogous to our own. Phenomenon we take for granted; but, on reflection, annihilate by reducing it to points, which belong no longer to extended phenomenon, but to force and substance.\* Matter, then, presents itself in two aspects: as extended phenomenon, it seems an unsubstantial phantom; as unextended force, having a position in space, it is a real substance. But is this a true description of matter as it really exists? No; it is both too much and too little: the real substance of matter is lifeless; the substance we give it is borrowed from our living soul;† while its extension, which we reduce to nothing, is really something. Material substance in itself is something generically different from soul—not the same as soul to a certain extent: the soul is not matter raised to a higher power, or a synthesis of material substance or force with knowledge and will—the soul is not matter and something more—but is eternally distinct from it, and removed by the whole diameter of being. Therefore, of matter in itself she is wholly ignorant; though, in consequence of some analogy, she is able to conceive it in terms of her own nature. Hence all metaphysical search for the true nature of matter must be without result; we might as well try to perform a surgical operation upon a man's image in a glass. We can never know the exact truth about it; if, in contemplating it as substance, we are forced to make abstraction of its extension, we do not affirm that the force which underlies phenomena is essentially unextended, but only that extension lies further back, nearer to nothing, than the point where our idea of substance commences. If matter, as substance, is extended, in this respect it is not analogous to soul, which is unextended. It is, as St. Augustine says,

\* See our former article, p. 34.

† “Major est notitia corporis quam ipsum corpus. Illa enim vita quædam est in ratione cognoscentis; corpus autem non est vita.” Aug. de Trin. ix. 4.

"quiddam inter formatum et nihil, nec formatum nec nihil, informe prope nihil."\* We comprehend no "form" but soul, and its forces. Matter has some similar, but no consubstantial, force; our reason, therefore, forbids us to own that it has an intelligible "form:" on the other hand, our consciousness forbids us to call it *nihil*: "cognoscendo ignoratur, ignorando cognoscitur."

Similarly, we can never understand the essence of space and time, or decide whether they are real attributes of things in themselves. The first impulse of mankind is to slight the laws of extension and space, and to believe in all kinds of metamorphoses of matter. Matter is to them a shadowy appearance, which may be changed at the caprice of the indwelling and informing soul: the soul, by a magical formula, might transform its body into an elephant, a mouse, a seed, or a flame, or make it pass through solid bodies without rending them; for material substance is at first apprehended as a spiritual thing like soul, subject only to the laws of thought. Mankind, grown wiser, still hugs the idea, and wishes it was true:

"If the dull substance of my flesh were thought,  
Injurious distance should not stop my way. . . . .  
But, ah! thought kills me that I am not thought."†

We know that matter has *a* reality in space and time, though we cannot quite comprehend *what* reality: we suppose that this reality is based on an essence or substance akin to soul; unextended in space, and permanent in time, and manifesting its presence and its power in phenomena. Yet we find that matter is inexorably subject to the laws of space and time: hence we guess that space and time, however foreign to the essence of spirit, are of the essence of matter; and that spirit is not the only real, though it is the only to us intelligible, essence. Matter is a substance; but unintelligent, and partly unintelligible: intelligible, so far as its substance is a force akin to ours; unintelligible, so far as extension belongs to its substance. All substance that partakes of the nature of space and time is unintelligible; because space and time are unintelligible as substances, and only intelligible as forms of phenomena and forms of dimension, shape, duration, and succession. We know not matter, for we have no matter in our souls; we know force, for we are force. We use matter, and it obeys us; we ask what it is, and it vanishes from the mind, resolved into force.

There is here a certain reciprocity; as we judge that

\* Confess. xii. 6.

† Shakespeare, Sonnet xlv.

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† Shakespeare, Sonnet xliv.

there are things (space and time) whose essence cannot be measured by the inner forms of the soul, so we judge that there are essences (mind and spirit) which cannot be measured by the outer forms. But as no matter can be rendered intelligible in the way of substance unless it is reduced to terms of the inner forms, so conversely no substance can be rendered conceivable in the way of phenomenon till it is reduced to terms of the outer forms. But, in spite of this necessity, the mind reserves its judgment, and while attributing force to phenomena, is still dissatisfied, and feels that force is not exactly the thing wanted; and while clothing spirit in terms of space and time, is still more convinced that the process is only valid conditionally as an hypothesis, not in the absolute nature of things. And this dissatisfaction results in two ultimate products: "positive philosophy," which is the denial of all force to phenomena; and "mysticism," which is the denial of the conditions of space and time to spirit.

And hence we learn in what sense to accept the maxim that to know a thing we must receive its form into our minds. To know a shape, we must generate it in our minds; but our minds do not become of that shape, square or round, any more than they become red or heavy in thinking of blood or of lead. How, then, do they become mineral-formed in knowing minerals, beast-formed in knowing beasts, and deiform in knowing God? Form is the substantial force that gives their being and denomination to objects: the mind, in thinking of matter as substance, reduces its own form of living force to the denomination of inert existence; it abstracts the forms of knowledge and will, and leaves only unconscious latent force. Thus the mind, though it does not become materialised in contemplating matter, may be said to reduce itself to the form which it attributes to matter. That the form which we suppose to be under phenomena need not be a true image of what *is* there, is plain to all who recognise that it is simply what we put there: "*Non oportet quod res eundem modum habeant in essendo quem intellectus in intelligendo.*"\*

8. And this brings us to the chief point of our thesis. The five forms of intuition are exhaustive. No external phenomena are possible except in the forms of space and time; no successive internal phenomena are possible except in the

\* St. Thomas, Sum. 1, q. 44, art. 3 ad 3: see also St. Aug. de Trin. ix. 4; Boeth. de Cons. Phil. v. prosa 4, and St. Thomas *ad locum*; St. Thos. Sum. 1, q. 13, art. 12 ad 3, q. 14, art. 1, and q. 79, art. 3; Proclus in Plat. Parmen. p. 748, ed. Stallbaum; and Hamilton, Metaphys. vol. i. p. 61.

forms of force, reason, and will, combined with space and time; no contemplation of the permanent and unchanging substance is possible except in the forms of force, reason, and will, separated from space and time. Force, reason, and will, are the proper forms of the *ego* or conscious subject; space and time of the unconscious object, or *non-ego*. But as soon as we think objects to be substances, forces, or spirits, our internal forms become also their forms; and the essence, life, sense, and intelligence, which we attribute to the beings perceived in space and time, are thought in the forms of our own conscious self. Thus space and time exhaust phenomena; force, reason, and will exhaust actualities; and the combination of the forms exhausts the combination of actual phenomena. There is no room for any thing else.

“Existence” is not a form of intuition, because of itself it is no intuition at all, except in the forms of force, reason, and will. This is the real discovery of Descartes in his famous “*cogito, ergo sum*.” We may doubt of our “existence” in general, because the word has no particular meaning; but we cannot doubt of our internal action (force), our thought (reason), or our wish. Existence is a form of reflection, not of intuition; we cannot know that we exist in general till we know that we exist in the forms of force, knowing power, and will. Besides, “existence” is predicated of space and time in one sense, and of soul in another: if these senses are confounded in a pretended universal form of “being,” the *nonentity* of space and time, the *quasi-nothingness* of matter, and the *reality* of force, will be undistinguishable; and we shall be compelled, with Hegel, to assert the ultimate identity of Being and not-Being.

9. But perhaps, though the three forms of force, reason, and will, are necessary for the conception of reality, substance, causation, intensity, and the like, yet in a scientific point of view the three are no better than “personality” alone, because only one *à-priori* science, that of morals, can be deduced from them, as geometry is deduced from space, and arithmetic from time. We, however, think that the number of *à-priori* sciences ought nearly to equal the number of the possible combinations of the forms taken two and two, or three and three together. Thus, geometry is the active reason contemplating space; arithmetic is the reason contemplating the divisions of time. The logic of contents, or deduction, is reason contemplating itself in terms of space and time; the logic of force, or induction, is the reason contemplating itself in terms of force. *Fiat experientia in minimis*, it says, because it knows that if there exists a force

adequate to effect the smallest change, this force may be assumed to exist, not only in the degree or quantity discovered, but indefinitely. Without the form of force, such a conclusion would be illogical. That there may be an *à-priori* science of morals is evident, because moral problems are "capable of being generated in our intuition, according to a definition or rule of production," by the internal powers alone; for the phenomenal accidents in which we symbolise the moral acts have really no more to do with them than the letters and signs of algebra and geometry have to do with the essence of the demonstration. The moral denomination does not lie in the physical movement, but in the intention. But only the physical movement is seen: "eyes draw but what they see, know not the heart." Hence the whole scheme of any moral proposition can be drawn *à priori* in the mind without the aid of any external element.

But we have no room to develop the scheme of scientific deductions from the pure forms of force, reason, and will; and in our third and final article we have to discuss a large subject—the criterion of the objective reality of our intuitions.

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## Communicated Articles.

### A FEW WORDS ON PHILOLOGY.

THE secular, as distinct from the religious, thought of man has been divided between two great objects, the world within us, and the world without us. The internal philosophy marks the earliest epoch of human thought, and its trophy is language; the external philosophy characterises the present day, and its trophy is mathematical and physical science; between the two epochs there was a transitional period, when secular thought was characterised by a vain attempt to sound the mysteries of the external world by language alone. To the first period belong the logicians, or word-masters; to the middle the physico-logicians, or word-wizards; to the third the physicists, or nature-masters. The work of the first was something sublime, as necessary for solitary thought as for social life; the work of the second was without solid result, except the criticism of our powers by noting the disappointment of their assumptions; the work of the third is the present growth of material appliances.

We have many a glimpse of our physical philosophers in their laboratories or their workshops, in their Polar expeditions, and in their tropical forest-life. No class of book commands a readier sale or a more sympathising audience than the record of the struggles of the man of genius gradually emerging into fame as he perfects his discoveries: Stephenson and Watt are typical men of our day, and their biographies are relished accordingly. Would that we could have a glimpse also of the first philosophers putting their verbal roots into their crucibles, and extracting from them vocabularies, and logic, and grammar! Without their labours, what should we be now? If we call Watt and Stephenson the benefactors of our race, because they have given us steam-power and steam-locomotion, what shall we call those who gave us mind-power and tongue-motion, without which the former would have been impossible, or if possible, useless?

The only way by which this picture can be restored to us is by the science of philology. That which it has already accomplished is full of promise. By it M. Max Müller of Oxford, and M. Pictet of Geneva, have undertaken to build up the history of the common ancestors of the Aryan race—of the Indo-Persians, Greeks, Italians, Germans, Celts, and Slaves—while they were still dwelling in Central Asia, before they were dispersed over Europe and Asia by the migration of their families. Whatever words philologists find common to the different branches of the Aryan race, must have been known to them before their separation; therefore a vocabulary of the words common to all the branches will give a list of the things known to the parent stock, and the statistics of their knowledge will inform us of many points of their history. Thus for their geographical position, which tradition has placed about the region of the Oxus, north of Irân and east of the Caspian: they had words for snow, ice, winter, and spring; therefore they did not inhabit a tropical climate: their land was not a dead plain, because they had words for torrent, valley, rock, and the like. They knew seas, like the Euxine or Caspian, but not oceans; for they had words for sea, but none for ebb and flow of tides. They had words for metallurgy, cooking, brewing, spinning, sewing, for pastoral and agricultural employments, for building, for houses and villages, for family and political relationships, for crime and punishment, for property and inheritance, for labour and slavery, for poetry and religion. And they must have been practically acquainted with those things for which they had names.

The common ancestors of the Aryan races were but a single branch of the great human family; every other branch must be subjected to a similar philological study before we can have materials for estimating the culture which our race had attained while it was yet in the unity of a single family. But though the science cannot yet pretend to restore the original language of mankind, it has secured some results which give us great insight into its probable characteristics.

Frederick Schlegel analysed languages into three classes: those with monosyllabic roots and merely rudimental grammar, like the Chinese; those with flexible dissyllabic roots and elaborate grammar, like the Sanscrit; and those with trisyllabic roots, like the Semitic languages. The prevalence of monosyllabic roots marks, to his eyes, "the stage of infancy in language, as children's first attempts at speech almost always incline to monosyllables; the cry of nature breaks out in these simple sounds, or in the infantine imitation of some natural noise."

Investigation has proved that monosyllabic roots constitute the original fund of all languages; but scarcely sufficient light has been thrown on the causes which have kept some languages monosyllabic and inflexible, while others have developed into the richest variety. These causes, however, have preserved for us a language still, as it were, in its infancy (the Chinese), which gives ground for the following conjectures of the aspect of the primitive language of mankind. 1. It is probable that all their radical words would be monosyllabic. 2. That these roots would be few in number; in Chinese they are supposed to be 272. 3. That these few roots would be applied to the numerous objects of language, by means of some variation in the enunciation, so that one and the same root may come to have various, and, at first sight, utterly unconnected meanings. 4. This variation might be of two kinds, according to the two powers of the voice, which is both an articulating and a musical organ. In the Chinese the primitive roots are modified by musical modulation, according to a fourfold method of accentuation; the roots receive no increase, no alphabetical change, for the varying pitch of the voice adds nothing to the word; alphabetical writing becomes too complicated to be used, for the inflections not being articulate, but only musical, cannot be expressed by letters, which only express articulate sounds; and the sound of the root being the same for its hundred meanings, alphabetical writing would not be of any use, as it would convey no precise meaning, such as the Chinese symbols *do* convey. The same reason accounts also for the

deficiency of grammar, which depends as much upon the inflections as upon the collocation of words. But as soon as the roots are articulately, and not only musically, varied, both alphabetical writing and grammar become possible. This articulate variation is of two kinds,—alteration and addition; either the monosyllabic root may remain monosyllabic, and yet be so altered as, while retaining an evident identity, to be a different sound,—as by a change of vowel, by addition or omission of the aspirate, by suppression of a consonant, or its change into an homologue; thus *wer*, *vir*, *guer*, *fer*, *pur*, *her*, *er*, *ar*, and many others, can be proved to be original modifications of the same root. Or the variation may be made by affixing syllables, which in time may come to coalesce with the root, as in the inflections of our nouns and verbs. Thus, as in Chinese one and the same sound may often be designated by 160 different characters, and may have as many distinct significations; so in our languages one and the same root, slightly modified by changes or additions of letters, may be applied to the signification of several different objects.

If we would enter the laboratory of one of the old word-masters, and note the manipulation to which he subjected his root, we have only to study an ancient tradition preserved in nearly all mythologies, in those of India, Scandinavia, and Oceania. Invented at a period when words were reckoned things, the fable must refer to the naming as well as to the reality of the universe. It is contained in the Rig-Veda,\* and runs as follows:—"Purucha (*vir*, the man) has thousands of heads, thousands of eyes, thousands of feet; he penetrates heaven and earth, and man. . . . When the Dêvas sacrificed him, spring was the butter, summer the wood, autumn the oblation. From this sacrifice sprung the curdled milk, the butter, and the beasts of the forest; from it sprung the hymns, the chants, and the metres of the Vedas; from it sprung horses, cows, goats, and sheep; Purucha's mouth was the Brahman, his arms the royal caste, his thighs the Vâiçya, and his feet the Çûdra; his heart the moon, his eyes the sun; from his mouth came Indra and fire, from his breath the wind, the ether from his navel, the heaven from his head, the earth from his feet, the points of space from his ears. Thus did the Rishis (sages) form the worlds." One meaning of this fable I take to be, that from the radical

\* Lib. iv. cap. iv. hymns 17, 18, 19; also in the white Yadjur-Veda, chap. xxxi.; in the prose Edda, chap. vii.; Hesiod, Theogony, 176-206; Berosus, Fragm. The Mexican legend of Ometeuctli, apud M'Cullagh; and the Polynesian legend of Rangi and Papa, apud Grey, Polynesian Mythology, &c.

names of man the word-masters derived their terms to designate—1. the seasons; 2. the materials of sacrifice; 3. the hymns and chants of the Vedas, the word and the truth; 4. animals; 5. the various classes of society; and 6. the universe. This will be found to be strictly true. It can easily be shown that the original roots for man, besides designating *being* and *unity*, and being employed as personal pronouns, enter more or less generally into words connected with war, strength, virtue and excellence, mind, truth, word, work; into the names of male animals, or of animals distinguished by their strength or their domesticity; into the names of the members of the body, of the universe, the seasons, and the elements; also into a large class of words which designate evil.

The two roots that originally signified 'man' were (1) *man* or *an*, changed into *wan* or *van* to designate woman; and (2) *wer*, *vir*, probably pronounced *whirr*, the male man, and all the attributes of virility. To begin with the latter root.

It is found in the Sanscrit *vīra* or *purucha*, the Zend *vairya*, the Scythic *oior*,\* the Greek ἥρως (*Fḗρως*) and ἄρρην, the Latin *vir*, the Lithuanian *vyras*, the Welsh *gwr*, the Gaelic and Irish *fear*, the Gothic *vair*, the Anglo-Saxon *wer* or *wered-folces* (men) opposed to *wifa* (women),† the ancient Persian *ariya*, men or heroes, the Hebrew *erel*, hero,‡ and the Malay *orang*, and Turkish *er*, man.

Similarly the root *man* or *an* is found in the Sanscrit *manush* (*manus* or *manushya*), a man; Hebrew anciently *anesh* or *anosh*, softened into *aish*; Greek ἄνθρωπος and ἀνὴρ;§ Latin *homo*, *ho-min-is*, *fe-min-a*, and *nemo*, *ne-min-is*; Teutonic *man* or *mensch*. The feminine form *van* or *wan* is found in the Sanscrit *yonī*, and in *vanitā*, woman; Greek γυνή; Latin *Venus*, *cunæ*, *anus*, and *ancilla*; Teutonic *quens*, *quean*, *wench*, woman.

In a periodical like the *Rambler* it is impossible to give any thing like complete lists of the vocabularies derived from these roots, or to do any thing more than indicate roughly, without any attention to the extra syllables, the words in which the roots occur. I do not pretend to any very critical accuracy.

The derivations from these roots are either natural or

\* Herod. iv. 100.

† Anglo-Sax. Gospels, Luc. xxiii. 27.

‡ Gen. xlv. 16, and Is. xxxiii. 7.

§ Are not ἀνὴρ, ἄρρην, and ὁρεάνης (a word for 'man' preserved by Plutarch), all of them products of the composition of the roots *man* or *an*, and *wer* or *er*? *man-wer* or *wer-man*? I may add ἀναξ, king, *the man*, as *queen* is *the quean* or woman. With ὁρεάνης compare the Bugis *woroane*, man.

conventional. Among the natural derivations I class such ideas as *war*, the very test of manhood, in Greek ἄρης or ἔρις, in Latin *ma-vors* and *furia*, in old German and English *werre*, in French and Italian *guerre*, *guerra*, in Arabic *harb*, in Malay *parang*:—or strength of body, the corporeal type of manhood; in Sanscrit *barbas* or *birta*, in Greek ἔρνος and Ἡρακλῆς, in Latin *vires*, *fortis*, in old German *fors*, in Gaelic *fearachd*, in English *force*:—or *virtue*, moral manhood; in Persian *arj* or *arz*, in Greek ἀρετή, in Latin *virtus*, in the Teutonic languages *worth*, in Gaelic *fear*:—or anger, the passion of manhood; in Sanscrit *virodh* enmity, *arati* an enemy, *birodhi* quarrelsome, Persian *ard*, Greek ὄργη, Latin *ira*, English *wrath*. To these I may add an immense assemblage of words signifying acts of violence: as the Latin *verbero*, *ferio*; English to *worry* or *harry*, *worstelen* (old Flemish), to *wrestle*; Hebrew *barah* to cut, *barach* to break through, *paraz* to rend; Sanscrit *prah* frangere: and other words connected with the watchfulness of the warrior; to *ward* or *guard*, to *ware* or *beware*; Hebrew *hur* to wake; Gaelic *fair* to watch: also words indicating acts of strength, such as to *bear* or *carry*; Hebrew *parah*, Sanscrit *bhri*, Armenian *bieril*, Greek φέρω, βάρος, Latin *ferre*, *portare*, Gothic *bairan*, English to *bear*, *burthen*, old German *bären*. Similarly the generic words for *work*: Greek ἔρδω, ῥέζω, Latin *operor*, old German *werke*, Hebrew *bara*, create; and especially the terms of agricultural employment, which are largely derived from this root: as, ἀρόω, *aro*, *eren*, to *ear* or *plough*; and a large family of substantives thence derived. Again, the root is employed to designate truth, or intellectual manhood, as in Latin *veritas*, in German *wahr*; and the vocal expression of truth, as *verbum*, *word*, Gaelic *fearb*.

Other natural applications of the root are to words which mark bodily virility; as Hebrew *arel*, Greek ἐρέβινθος, Latin *veretrum*, *barba*, *beard*, &c.; and to the names of male animals, such as ἄρις, *aries*, *vervex* or *berbex*, *weer* (Flemish), the ram; *aper*, German *eber*, *verres*, Sanscrit *varah*, *boar*; ἔριφος, the male kid; *hircus*, the he-goat; *hart*, *heort*, the stag; the bull, Sanscrit *barad* or *vrisha*, old Flemish *varre* or *ver*, Anglo-Saxon *fear*, German *farre*, Hebrew *par*; and others too numerous to go through.

I come now to the less natural applications of the root, which must have depended more or less on the conventional agreement of the formers of language. For instance, they seem to have built up the names of the body and its chief organs from this root, which in general, but not universally, they modified by changing the *w* into a guttural *k* or *kh*.

Thus we have *corpus*, *körper*, body, Hebrew *gerem*; *κρέας*, *caro*, flesh; *καρδία*, *cor*, Hebrew *kereb*, German *herz*, the heart; *κράς*, *κραῖρα*, *κάρη*, *κάρηαρ*, *κάρηνον*, *κράνον*, *cranium*, the head, Hebrew *rosh*; *κορυφή*, answering to the Latin *vertex*, and the Teutonic *wervel* or *wervel-top*, summit of the head; *κρόταφοι*, the temples; *κέρας*, Hebrew *keren*, Sanscrit *carnis*, Latin *cornu*, Gothic *haurns*, horn; *cerebrum*, in Teutonic *harne*, *hirn*, and *hersens*, brain; *crines*, *hair*; *karn* or *karna* (Sanskrit), *auris*, *ohr*, *oor*, the ear; *os*, *ora*, the face; *cervix*, Persian *gardan*, Sanscrit *gal*, German *hals*, Hebrew *ereph*, the neck; *ur* (Sanskrit), *bar* (Persian), *borst*, *burst*, *breast* (cf. *στέρνον* and *thorax*). Then we come to the (Sanskrit) *karmendrya*, or organs of action (from the words *karna* to do, *karan* cause, and *karm* action), the chief of which are, Sanscrit *kar*, Greek *χείρ* the hand, with its *καρπός*, *carpus*, or *wrist*; Hebrew *regel*, the foot, with its *versie*, *ferse* or heel; the larynx, the *veretrum*, and the *οὐρά*, Hebrew *ierckah*, old English *ers*; and in general the *ἄρθρα*, *artus*, or limbs which compose the body.

This is the body of *purucha* or *wer*, of which the Rishis built up the universe, Greek *οὐρανός*, Latin *orbis*, Teutonic *wereld*, *world*. From it came the elements, Hebrew *aor*, Coptic *ouro* light, and *har* heat; Greek *πῦρ*, Teutonic *vuer*, *feuer*, *fire*; the Latin roots *uro*, *buro*, *ferveo*, *ardeo*, *fornus* (hot, Nonius, xii. 52), and Teutonic *burn*, *warm*, Sanscrit *ghormo*, Persian *gurm*. Also *pruina*, Flemish *vorst*, *frost*; *fresh*, Flemish *versch*, French *frais*. For the second element we have Greek and Latin *aer*, air, "*Ἥρη* (Juno, the atmosphere), *Boreas*, *aura*, *breeze*; for the third, Sanscrit *vari*, water; for the fourth, Hebrew *eretz*, Greek *ἔρα*, Latin *terra*, Greek *χέρσος*, Teutonic *eorth*, *aerd*, *earth*; hence, perhaps, the quality *hard*, *στερεός*, *firmus*. From it come the seasons, *ῥαί*, *horæ*, *hour*, *uhr*, and the *year*, *jahr*, Sanscrit *varsh*: *ἔαρ* or *ver*, the spring; *ἔρος*, the summer; *ὀπώρα*, Hebrew *choreph*, Teutonic *herbst*, *harvest-tide*, or autumn; though the root is lost in *χείμα* and *hyems*, it reappears in the adjectives *χειμερινός* and *hybernus*, and is found in *bruma*, winter. From it also comes the sun, in Zend *hwarē* (gen. *hūrō*), Sanscrit *sūra*, Persian *khur* (whence the name Cyrus), in Egyptian *ra*, *re*, or *hor*, and in various African dialects *airo*, *ayero*, *eer*, *uiro*, *ghurra*, &c. And the moon, Hebrew *iareach*, whence *ierech*, month. From it the chief things of earth are named; *gir* or *giri* (Sanskrit), Hebrew *hor* or *hur*, German *berg*, mountain. The strong metals, *ferrum*, Hebrew *barzel*, iron; *æra*, brass; and the precious metals, *aurum*, *argentum*; gems, in Sanscrit *parb*.

Thus does the philosophic fancy that man is a microcosm take root in language. Thus, as Sir Walter Raleigh says, man became "a little world in the great one, in whom all natures were bound up together: our flesh is heavy, like earth; our bones hard as stones; our veins as the rivers; breath as the air; natural heat like the warmth enclosed in the earth; our radical moisture as the fatness of the earth; our hairs as grass; our generative power as nature which produceth; our determinations like wandering clouds; our eyes like the lights in heaven; our growth like the spring; our settled age like the summer; declension like autumn; and old age like winter. . . . . Man's four complexions are like the four elements, and his seven ages like the seven planets. Our infancy is like the moon, in which we seem only to grow as plants; in our next age we are instructed, as under Mercury; our youth is wanton, like Venus; our fourth age strong and vigorous, like the sun; our fifth like Mars, striving for honour; our sixth like Jupiter, wise and staid; and our seventh like Saturn, slow and heavy." This fancy, which was of real importance in the first formation of language, afterwards became of no use to any but the followers of magic, and now survives only in the pages of *Moore's Almanac*.

From Purucha also, says the Rig-Veda, come the sacrifices, and the prayers that accompany them. Thus we have *aradhan* (Sanskrit), worship, and *archa*, devotion; *ἄρα*, prayer; Hebrew *berith*, a covenant; *barak*, to invoke God; *ara*, a curse; Latin *ara*, an altar; *orare*, to pray, which with the heathen was done rather by gestures than by the voice or thought. The Latins, Pliny tells us, in adoration first kissed the right hand, and then turned themselves round once or more times; hence the sacred dances round the altar, by which the heathens imitated the motion of the heavens round the earth, were prayers; and hence the connection of words signifying to *turn* with this root; as *vertere*, to *whirl*; hence, perhaps, the songs which accompanied the dancers were *versus*; *carmen* seems connected with the same root, Hebrew *karar*, to move in a circle, to dance.

The number of animal names into which this root enters is great: animals known for their strength, as *horse*, *ors*, or *ros* (old German), Hebrew *parash* (the name *pferde* or *peerd* seems rather referable to the *bearing* beast, like the Greek *πόρτις*, ox); *ursus*, *ἄρκτος*, old Persian *varksha*, German *bär*, *bear*; Sanscrit *vrik*, Samnite *irpus*, wolf; *persa*, tiger; *ara* (Hebrew), lion, *gor*, lion's whelp. Terrible beasts, as the *worm* or *snake*, German *wurm*, Gothic *vaurm*, Latin *vermis*, Sanscrit *krami*, Persian *kirm*. Also the animal

which in Egyptian hieroglyphics signifies *man* in germ, namely, the *frog*, Flemish *vorsch*, French *grenouille*, which we may thus connect with the Latin *puer* (*por*), *pario*, *pariens*, Hebrew *bar*, Teutonic *barn* or *bairn*. Compare Hebrew *harah*, to conceive, *harch*, prægnans; *barna* (Sanskrit), to marry.

*Purucha*, says the *Rig-Veda*, is all things: the root *wer* is almost as universal; it abounds in the vegetable world; as *arbor*, tree, *herba*, *χόρτος*, grass; grain, *πυρός*, *hordeum*, corn; *hortus*, orchard, &c. Many of the names of vegetables exhibit good instances of the change the root undergoes, as *πράσον*, *porrum*, *garlick*, in Gaelic *fearan*.

*Purucha* also, according to the *Rig*, forms the various institutions of society. Thus we have Sansc. *pur*, Heb. *hir* or *ár*, Lat. *urbs*, a city,—*urbs*, they say, from *urbo*, just as *πόλις* is from *πολέω*, *vertere*; thus *urbs* and *orbis*, *πόλις* and *πόλος*, are symmetrical in meaning, and evidently from the same root, by the common change of *l* for *r*. Then we have *herus*, *herr*, master; *servus*, slave. And quantities of words signifying the political virtues or other acts: *ehre* (Germ.) honour; *verde*, *friede*, peace; *verden*, to *free*; *vereri*, to *fear* or reverence; *barin*, mercy; *ὅρκος*, *jurare*, Goth. *swaran*, to *swear*; *jura*, laws; *ware*, merchandise. The root is applied to females who are supposed to assume the male position—*παρθένος*, *virgo*, in Scythic *ara*, reminding us of the Greek *ἄρτεμις*. Artimpasa was the Scythic name for Venus; and this leads us to the old German *hür* or *hor*, *harridan*, and perhaps *harlot*.

But though the root of virility was thus used to express all things best and excellent, truth sometimes compelled the word-masters to sound a contrary note: the root enters into the words, Sansc. *bura*, Greek *χείρων*, *worse*; *errare*, to *err*; *harm*, *hurt*; *virus*, *φάρμακον*, *poison*. But it would take a volume to exhaust the extraordinary fecundity of this radical and symbolic syllable, which forms the heart of so vast an assemblage of words at first sight unconnected, but really bound together by the ideas of a primitive philosophy.

The genealogy of the root *man* or *an* is completely symmetrical with that of *wer*, except that the syllable signifies humanity rather than virility; hence it has not much to do with words of war, but there are a few, as, *minari*, to threaten, *emineo*, to be prominent, *munio* (whence *mænia*), Sax. *munthian*, to defend, Icelandic *mynda*, to guard; *μύνη*, a pretext; Goth. *mund*, Swed. *mynd*, tutela; Eng. *mound*, a castle. The root enters most largely into the mental operations. Sans. *man*, *manas*, *monoh*, *mens*, *animus*, *μένος*, the *mind*; Sans.

*monyote*, Germ. *er meinet*, *μνᾶ*, Lat. *meminit*, he *minds* or *thinks*; *μανθάνω*, to learn, *μηνύω*, to indicate, Germ. *meenen*, to *mean* or *betoken*. Sans. *manana*, Lat. *moneo*, to persuade; Sans. *manna*, to respect, *mans*, a wish, *manita*, dignity; Lat. *mandare*, to command; *μνοία*, supplication, *μῆνις*, indignation, *μανία*, madness, *μενεαίνω*, I desire; *minnen* (Goth.), to love (as *ἔρως* from the former root); *monstro* and *manifesto*, to show; *μένω*, *maneo*, Sansc. *mandan*, to remain; *immanis*, inhuman, *humanus*, *mansuetus*, humane. These are the natural applications of the root.

In its conventional application it also is used to build up the human body. Sans. *mans*, flesh, *munda* and *mundiya*, the head; *munh*, Germ. *mund*,\* the mouth, whence *μνίω*, *manduco*, to *munch*; *μυνδός*, *mutus*; *mandibula*, the jaws; *mentum*, the chin; *manus*, the *hand*; and *menta* or *mentula*.

From this body they built the universe, *mundus*, in Tamil *mandan*, in Sanscrit *mandal*, *circulus*, *orbis*, *cælum*; the *moon*, *μήνη*, and *μήν*, *mensis*, *month*; the *mountains*, *montes*; and some of the precious things of the earth, as, Sans. *manik* or *manikya*, a *ruby*: in this class the Sans. root *mand*, to shine, may be placed.

Some of the sacrificial words are connected with this root: as, Sans. *manat* or *manta*, a *vow*; *μάντις*, *hariolus*, a *prophet*.

Also some animals, especially in the eastern languages: Sans. *manja*, cat, *manduk*, frog; Lat. *mannus*, pony; Eng. *monkey*.

The root enters more largely into the classification of men: *munus*, a man's function (whence *communis*, *immunis*), and *municipium*, much the same as *urbs*. *Dominus*, perhaps the Deo-man, *minister*, *μάνης*, the servant or slave; *mang* (Icel.) commerce, *mangheren*, to exchange; *manceps* and *mango* (Lat.); *mangher* (Icel.), a *monger* or *trader*; *mancipium*, the thing sold, the slave: *many*, Goth. *maengd*, a multitude; *meint* and *gemengt*, *mingled*, whence *mongrel*, &c.

The root is also applied to heroic men and spirits: thus *manes*, the ghosts of the dead, *Minerva*, *Mana* the mother of the Lares, *Summanus* the Etruscan night-thunderer, *Manu* the Indian patriarch, *Menes* the founder of Egypt, &c.

Like the root *wer*, *man* is used sometimes to signify evil: thus, Sans. *mani*, proud, *manahin*, vile, *mand*, dull; *μάνος*, thin, *μίννος*, small, Goth. *min*, Gaelic *meanle*, Lat. *minor* *minimus*; *mendicus*, *mancus*, Germ. *manghel*, Celt. *man*, defect; *meen* or *mean*, base; *men* (Sax.), *crimen*, Germ. *mendad*,

\* With this may be compared Heb. *mun* or *min*, French *mine*, *mien* or *manner*; and the Tamil *manat*, likeness, and Persian *mana*, alike.

Lat. *menda*, a fault; *mentior*, to lie, Germ. *meinheid*, perjury.

As for the feminine form of *man*, *van*, *ven*, *pen*, &c., I think I trace it in a similar genealogy. In mental actions, as, *γινώσκω*, *γνώμη*, *fingo*, *pingo*, *censeo*, I *ween*, I *ken*. In some parts of the body, *γένυς* *gingiva*, *genæ*, *genu*, *venæ*, *γέντα* (viscera), *venter*, the wame or womb. In the names of certain animals which were held in esteem: *κύων*, *κύνος*, *canis*, *hund*, *hound*; Sans. *hans* a duck; Pali *hanza* a goose, Burman *henza*, Malay *gangs*, Gk. *χήν*, Lat. *anser*, Portuguese *ganso*, Span. *ansar*, Germ. *gans*, Swed. *gas*, Eng. *gander* (cf. *hen*, *hoen*); *ἵνός*, *hinnus* or *ginnus*, a mule. In the universe, the portion of the elements that was reckoned feminine is named from this root: *ventus*, *wind*, and *unda*, Celt. *avon*, *water*; and apparently the season *winter*. In words that signify fertility: as, Sans. *vansha*, *γένος*, *genus*, Teut. *conne*, *kin*, *chune* or *künne*, *family*; *geno* (*gigno*) *gens*; *onus*; *fons*, *fundo*; *fœnus*. In words that may be connected with social seclusion: *γωνία*, *angulus*, *winkel*, a corner, or the social respect shown to women, *honor*, *honestas*, *veneror*. But the list of evil applications is very large: thus we have *πένθος*, *funus*; *ποῖνα*, *punio*; *κενός*, *vanus*, *vain*, *wan*, *want*; *κόνις*, *cinis*; *venenum*; *inquino* (*cunio*), to defile; *wan* or *wam* (old Germ.), bad, which in composition becomes *un*, as *wanhope*, *unhope*, *despair*; *wandelen*, *wenden*, to *wind*, to *wander*; *wania* or *wonnia*, to *wane*; *weinig* or *wenig*, little.

These roots *wer* and *man* seem to have been applied in the earliest times to signify *being*, *unity*, and *personality*. Connected with *wer* we have the substantive verbs *worden* (Germ.) and *fore* (Lat.); *τὸ ὄν*, *ens*, reminds one of *man*, or *an*; as for unity, if we compare the Greek *εἷς* (*évs*), *ἓν*, with its feminine *μία*, and the word *μόνος*, alone, one, we may easily fancy that it was originally *man* or *men*; the Latin *unus* and the English *one* belong to the same root. As for personal pronouns, we have *μιν* in Greek, *man* (me) in Persian, in Sanscrit *vhon*, I, *man*, me; in Celtic *anon*, *on*, or *in*, I. I must add to these roots the Sanscrit *ek* or *eko*, one, Heb. *eched*, and then the community of the roots will be clear. The most ancient personal pronouns which we know are compounded of two particles, *an* and *eko*, as if *man-one* was the subject, *self*; *man-two* the second person, *thou*. Thus, in Hebrew *an-oki*, in ancient Egyptian *an-ok*, I; *an-ahhnu*, *an-an*, we; Heb. *anta* and *anti*, Egypt. *entok* and *ento*, thou, masculine and feminine. Later languages divided the word again: some, like the Greek, Latin, and Teutonic languages, took the *oki* for the personal pronoun; *ἔγω*, *ego*,

*ich, ik*;—and the *an* for *one*. Others, like the Sanscrit and Persian, took the *on* or *vhon* for the pronoun, and retained the *eko* or *ek* for the cardinal number. But besides the root *man*, the root *wer* figures at the base of names for unity—we have the Scythic *arima*, one (Herod. iv. 27), Lat. *primus*, Eng. *first*, Goth. *fruma*, Lithuan. *pirma*, Sans. *prathama*, Zend *frathama*, Gk. *πρῶτος*, old Germ. *éristêr*, Germ. *erst*. Hence many words and prefixes, as *prior*, Sans. *pûrva*, *fore*, *before*; *προ* and *πρω*, Lat. *pro* and *præ*. Connected with this tendency of the root are words signifying to go; *ἐρχομαι*, *πορεύω*, Heb. *arach*, to go, *orach*, a way, Teutonic to *fare*; whence *far* (distant), Lat. *porro*, Gk. *πόρρω*, Sans. *par*; hence *forth*, *from*, the Sanscrit *pra*, which in composition signifies forth, away. Hence again, such words as *werfen* (Teut.), to *throw*, *τοπέω*, *foro*, to *bore*, Heb. *baar*, whence *beer*, a well; hence again *per*, *durch*, *thorough*. But it would be endless to go through all the particles and prefixes which are derived from the roots *wer* and *man*; the latter appears in *ava*, *ἐν*, Latin *in*, English *on*; in the Persian affix *mand*; the Latin *mentum* (incrementum, &c.), &c. By it we may explain the Greek particles *μέν* and *δέ* as either one and two (*δύω*), or me and thee (*σέ, te*)—on my side, on thy side. And we must not forget the transcendental particle, Zend *areta* or *ereta*, old Persian *arta*, Gk. *ἀρι-* or *ἐπι-*, Eng. *harde* or *very*, Lat. *valde*. In Hebrew, says Gesenius, the demonstrative force was in the syllables *ar* or *har* and *ul*, *el*, or *hal*; “it is hard to say which form is the more ancient and primitive.”

The foregoing I know to be a very imperfect, and I fear somewhat uncritical, genealogy of these roots: my only object in putting it together is to suggest a mode of comparison between the most ancient languages, not by their grammars, for sometimes they have none; nor by the identity of their roots, for often, through custom, or defective education, the vocal organs have lost the power of sounding several consonants, so that the roots are hopelessly disfigured; but in the pedigrees or genealogies of the roots, and in the sequences of ideas and words to which they are applied. We must consider the root not so much as a sound, but as a symbol, round which a number of distinct meanings are conventionally grouped; if these groups are found to be symmetrical in various languages, it will show that they were all produced by common onomatopoetic laws, whose unity will prove the original unity of language, though it will never enable us to recover the primitive sound of the roots, or to use them otherwise than as the radical symbols which form

the heart of the prodigious multiplicity of Chinese characters.

It will be seen by the collections which I have made, that the roots are changed not only in different dialects, but also in the same; it is not as if *wer* was *always ar* in Greek, or *vir* in Latin; on the contrary, each language furnishes examples of nearly all the changes of the root which are found in the various languages. This circumstance might lead to doubts as to the identity of the root thus disfigured; but these doubts are capable of so complete a clearance in many instances, that we may readily incline to believe that the same may happen in nearly all. It seems to me quite certain, that the patriarchs of language acted consciously or unconsciously on the principle of designating the innumerable ideas of the mind by a few vocal roots variously modified.

In the Chinese we must search for these genealogies of words in the written, not in the spoken, radicals. And that they will be found symmetrical, any one may convince himself by looking through the derivatives of the radicals which represent the word *jin*, man. It is only through not searching on the right principle that Sir John Bowring\* declares that he believes there are many races of men whose languages present no traces of affinity. If any identical words exist, he attributes them to intercourse and commerce; "in the lower numerals of remote dialects there are many seemingly strange affinities, which may be attributed to their frequent use in transactions."† But in the slight notice he gives of the languages of the Philippine Islands, I find more than one affinity with the genealogies I have given above. As in the numeral *ca*, one (Sans. *eko*), connected with *aco*, ego, I, and *ca* or *y-ca-o*, thou; *anim*, we (cf. Coptic *anan*), and *anak*, the general name for son, as in Malay. *Arao* is sun or day; the very word that is used in Coptic, Hebrew, and the African languages. In the Maori *hina* is a girl (Sans. *ghena*); in some Australian dialects *einergùng*, from *einèr* or *innèr*, a woman.

The same genealogies of words, apparently from the same roots, *wer*, *man*, *an*, may be traced in the Australian dialects. Thus in the Raffles-Bay dialect‡ *oric* is man (conf. Malay *orang*); head, *warhee*; beard, *la-mur-mur*; venter, *mure*; leg, *murando*; elbow, *mirenan*; sun, *moorhee*; moon, *arana*; night, *arambolk*; land, *orad*; knife, *mürě*; iron, *wil-mor*; sick, *moort*; hand, *mancia*; fingers and toes,

\* A Visit to the Philippine Islands, p. 167.

† Ib. p. 230.

‡ Mitchell's Australian Expeditions, 1839. There is a short comparative vocabulary at the end of vol. ii.

eieman; nails, *manaweyiæ*; elder brother, *man*. In most of the other dialects *murro* is nose; neck or head, *woort*, *worro*, or *oorr*; hair, *ooran*; beard, *yerry* or *yarrang*; teeth, *yerra* or *deer*; tongue, *arrad* or *darline*; hand and fingers, *marra* or *murra*; sun, *moorhee*, *morre*, *yerri*, or *eery*; sky or clouds, *euro*, *yourung*, or *eurrong*; land, *moorce*; sea, *ma-mort*; thunder, *murrobo*; lightning, *marriup*; good, *murumbáng* or *múrroonbah*; big man, *berong*; boy, *boori* or *boorai*; man, *myën*; mouth, *munto*; woman, *einer* or *inner*. The word *gin*, used by Europeans to designate the native females, does not seem to be of native origin.

In the Malay it does not seem so easy to construct these genealogies of words; but one thing must strike any one who examines the vocabulary, namely, the great number of verbs, both in Malay and in the kindred Bugis, which begin with the syllable *man* or *men*; apparently this root signified man and hand, and thence passed into the composition of a multitude of words which denote action, mental or bodily. After the limited amount of study which I have been able to devote to this question, I feel quite sure that with patience pedigrees of words may be made for nearly all languages, which will go far to prove that the fable of Purucha applies as much to the other families of language as it does to the Indo-European, and apparently to the Hebrew and the Coptic stocks.

W.

#### ON THE SIGNS OF MARTYRDOM IN THE CATACOMBS.

THE great St. Leo says that the countless martyrs who died for the faith at Rome filled the Holy City with a population whose glory shone far and near, and crowned it with a diadem set with many a jewel. Of these jewels, if I may carry the figure a little farther, some are brilliant enough to dazzle the eye of the envious, and to extort an acknowledgment of their beauty and value; whilst the uncertain hue of others' glow seems to invite depreciation and attack. St. Xystus and St. Laurence, St. Agnes and St. Cecilia, St. Pancratius and St. Sebastian, are names illustrious beyond gainsay or cavil; but the hundreds of nameless martyrs whose remains have been extracted from the recesses of the Catacombs, have frequently furnished an occasion of controversy. Some men have gone so far as to charge the Church with forging relics; and have insinuated that, whenever it was considered advisable to pro-

duce a new saint, the Papal officials had only to descend into the Catacombs, to extract the first body they found, and to propose it, under some high-sounding classical name, to the veneration of the faithful. Others, though admitting that the Church is guided in such acts by a principle higher than cupidity and self-interest, endeavour to show the insufficiency and uncertainty of the signs by which she recognises certain remains as those of a martyr. Hence, whilst they drop the accusation of dishonesty, they urge with earnestness the charge of ignorance and inconsiderateness, and condemn the Church for venerating, as the relics of champions of the faith, unknown remains which cannot with any certainty be proved to have ever been animated by a martyr's spirit. The writer of the article on "The Roman Catacombs," which appeared in the *Edinburgh Review* of January last, belongs to the second class. He roundly asserts that the data on which the Roman Church claims for the unknown "corpi santi" of the Catacombs the honours due to martyrs, are insufficient and improbable. The following are his words :

"A great number of the tombs are found to contain, in a niche, a small phial, or glass vessel, which appears to have been filled with a red liquid ; and the Congregation of Relics decided in 1688 'that whenever the palm and vessel tinged with blood were found, they were to be considered most certain signs of martyrdom.' This hasty and improbable assumption seems to us not to support examination ; and we agree with Raoul-Rochette that these vessels may rather be supposed to represent the sacramental cup,—some of them bear the sacramental inscription *PIE. ZESSES*,—and that they have no necessary connection with the idea of martyrdom. The notion of collecting the blood of dead martyrs in a bottle, to be placed in their graves, is singularly childish and impracticable ; and we are not aware that it is alluded to by contemporary writers."

I wish to examine these assertions somewhat in detail. That the martyrs who suffered for Christ during the persecutions at Rome were buried in the many subterranean cemeteries around that city, is a fact of the truth of which their authentic acts and other sources leave no doubt. The site of the graves of the more illustrious among them had been always kept in memory till about A.D. 817, when their bodies were removed for safety into the city by Pope Paschal I. It is true that at that time some few of the more famous were allowed to remain in the cemeteries ; as, for example, St. Hyacinthus, although his companion in the Calendar, St. Protus, was removed ; but such cases are at best exceptional, and were occasioned by the hurry of the translation, and the local difficulties of coming at the remains. But the rest of the "turba piorum,"

as St. Damasus styles them, were left undisturbed where they had been originally buried; and whenever, during later centuries especially, their remains are discovered, the ecclesiastical authorities cause them to be removed, and preserved in a suitable place for the veneration of the faithful. Very many of the bodies thus removed have no epitaph and no name; many even of those whose name accompanies them are quite unknown to history. By what marks, then, are they known to be martyrs? It is clear that whenever the title of martyr is explicitly given them on their epitaphs, there can be no question as to the propriety of their being treated as martyrs; but the number of such inscriptions, although much larger than Tillemont admits, is still comparatively insignificant. Hence, in most cases, the Church has had to recognise the martyrs' remains by help of other and less evident tokens. Of the many objects represented on or placed near the sepulchres in the Catacombs,—such as vessels once filled with blood and still retaining its traces, ships, doves, anchors, palm-branches, the monograms of Christ, &c.,—only two are accepted as having any connection with the idea of martyrdom, viz. the palm-branch and the vessel of blood. Not that they are esteemed of equal weight when occurring separately, since sacred antiquaries are unanimous as to the sufficiency of the vessel of blood, whilst but few support the palm-branch when taken by itself. The entire question was discussed in a commission appointed for the purpose by Clement IX.; and after mature deliberation, the following decree was passed on the 10th of April 1668, not 1688, as the reviewer asserts:

“Upon the question of the signs by which the genuine relics of the holy martyrs can be distinguished from false and doubtful ones, the same sacred congregation, after diligent examination, expressed its opinion that the palm-branch and the vessel coloured with their blood should be considered as most certain marks; the discussion of other signs it deferred to a future day.”

This decision, although emanating from a commission, and not from a congregation (for the Bull of institution of the Congregation of Indulgences and Relics is dated July 6, 1669), has nevertheless the same authority as the decree of a congregation, since it was approved of and confirmed in the said Bull of institution. The reviewer brands it as a hasty and improbable assumption, and one which, in his opinion, is unable to endure investigation. His reasons are—1. because there is no necessary connection between the presence of the glass vessels, which seem to have been filled with a red liquid, and the notion of martyrdom; since these vessels may be sup-

posed to represent the sacramental cup: this hypothesis is supported by the authority of M. Raoul-Rochette, and by what the reviewer is pleased to call the sacramental inscription, *PIE ZESES: 2.* because the idea of collecting the blood of dead martyrs in a bottle is childish and impracticable; and, so far as he is aware, is not alluded to by contemporary writers. These are plain and intelligible reasons, and if true would at once render untenable the decision against which they are alleged. But although the reviewer lives in an age when, according to his own words, "the time seems to have come to bring back the study of the early Christian memorials to a true standard of accurate research," he does not appear to have caught much of the spirit of research which he so highly prizes. Had he done so, he would hardly have called hasty and improbable the decision of a question which had occupied learned men for many years; nor styled incapable of supporting examination a proposition which had been subscribed, not only by Roman antiquaries, but by unprejudiced authors like Mabillon and Muratori. In fact, there are very few questions which have been more fully discussed by the learned than the one of which we are treating. In the pontificate of Urban VIII., Fortunato Scacchi, who then filled the place of *Custode delle sacre Reliquie*, dedicated to that Pope a work, *De Notis ac Signis sanctitatis beatificandorum et canonizandorum*, in which\* he examines what proofs of sanctity are to be drawn from the Catacombs; and declares that the palm-branch, the sign of the Cross, the monogram of Christ, the dove and the anchor, are not certain signs of martyrdom, unless when other unequivocal tokens combine—such as when the instruments of suffering, bloody cloths or vessels of blood, accompany the remains. The instruments of torture are swords, loaded thongs, iron hooks, &c. Mabillon, both in his *Itin. Ital.*† and in the letter which he wrote, "De sanctorum ignotorum cultu," under the assumed name of Eusebius Romanus (and which he afterwards greatly modified), argues that the presence of the vase of blood is a most certain proof of martyrdom. Tillemont‡ declares that the express mention of martyrdom is abundant proof; and that the vase of blood is also of weight, although he thinks that the fact of its being found at the head of children's graves detracts from its value as an argument. But Cardinal Mai thinks§ that this scruple of Tillemont is easily removed; for both ancient writers, as we shall presently see in Prudentius, and the history of modern

\* Cap. ii. sect. 9.

† p. 141.

‡ Mem. H. E. tom. v. p. 536.

§ Prefat. in tom. v. Scriptt. Vett., Vatican Collect.

persecutions in Japan, establish the fact that infants even of tender age frequently fell under the sword of the executioner. Boldetti\* tenaciously asserts, that either the palm-branch or the vase of blood are tokens that the grave which they adorn is the resting-place of a martyr; and Muratori, although† he refutes at great length the arguments brought forward for the palm-branch, admits nevertheless that the vase of blood is a most certain sign of martyrdom. Aringhi,‡ Christianus Lupus,§ Blanchini,|| Buonarrotti,¶ in a word, all learned antiquaries, although at issue amongst themselves on other points, have adopted the same conclusion as the Congregation of Relics. Can it be possible that they have all fallen into a mistake; whilst the reviewer, the fortunate representative of the spirit of modern accurate research, alone possesses the secret of discretion and sound judgment, which leads him to discover that the glass vessel in question is simply the sacramental cup?

If the reviewer is right, the phials never contained blood. Now Prudentius,\*\* after having extolled the incredible wealth of the soil of Rome, so full of hidden memories of the holy martyrs, goes on to lament his own sad lot; that, being compelled to reside in Spain, so far away from his beloved Rome, he is no longer able to gratify his devotion towards these saints by devoutly visiting the spot where the marks of their blood are visible.

“ Vix fama nota est abditis  
Quam plena Sanctis Roma sit;  
Quam dives urbanum solum  
Sacris sepulchris floreat.

Sed qui caremus his bonis,  
Nec sanguinis vestigia  
Videre coram possumus,  
Coelum intuemur eminus.”

From this testimony we may gather, first, that Rome was beyond belief rich in relics of saints; secondly, that these relics were hidden in the sacred sepulchres, excavated in the Agro Romano; thirdly, that owing to his absence from Rome, he was forced to forego the enjoyment of a happiness which he had frequently tasted before, viz. that of seeing before him the traces of the blood of these saints; and therefore, being unable to gaze on them on earth, he had no resource but to look for them in heaven. Now it is certain that no other trace of martyrs' blood was visible in the Catacombs than that which the vases on the outside of their sepulchres presented. This any person who has visited them can testify; especially if he has been fortunate enough to see some of

\* Osservazioni, lib. i. passim.

† In Ant. Ital. Medii Ævi, tom. v. dissert. 58.

‡ Rom. Subt. lib. iii. cap. 22.

§ In Epitaph. S. Severin. p. 31.

|| H. Q. tom. i. part. 2.

¶ In the Preface to his Obs. in Vitr. p. xi.

\*\* Peristeph. hymn. 2, de S. Laurent.

the recently-discovered branches, where all the *loculi* are untouched, and almost in the condition in which they were left by the ancient Christians.

Nor let it be said that the phrase about looking upon the martyrs' blood is only a figurative expression, meaning that the poet desired to contemplate the constancy shown by them in their passion, and typified by their blood. Would not this contemplation have been as easy in Spain as in Rome? and how could he ascribe to his absence from Rome the fact that he was unable to give himself up to it? Why contrast it with that contemplation of the martyrs for which, in default of the other, he turns his mind to heaven, since earth is the only sphere for which the martyr's constancy contains a lesson? It is clear, therefore, from this passage of Prudentius, that in his day (he was born A.D. 348) the sepulchres of the martyrs in the Catacombs were distinguishable from those of the ordinary faithful, and that the presence of their blood at their tombs was the token by which this recognition was effected. I conclude, therefore, that the glass vessels once filled with a red liquid, which are still visible outside the graves, were the recipients of that blood, not, as the reviewer states, sacramental cups.

Again, I should like to know what connection there can be between the sacramental cup and fragments of bloody sponge? We do know, from a passage of the same Prudentius, which we shall see farther on, that the early Christians made use of sponges to soak up the blood that flowed from the martyrs' torn bodies in the hour of their passion. Now Boldetti\* relates the history of a discovery made by himself in the year 1714, in the cemetery of Basilla and Hermes, "*ad clivum cucumeris*," under the villa of La Pariola, now a country residence belonging to the Roman seminary of St. Apollinare. "I found," he writes, "affixed to the sepulchre of a martyr, a vase of blood; but although I used all possible care in loosening it from the plaster in which it was embedded, it could not be removed without fracture; for a part of it being firmly fastened to the wall by means of the plaster, adhered to it so tenaciously, that it could not be separated from it but by breaking it. However, through the hole thus made, was rendered visible what had not before appeared, and what perhaps would otherwise have remained unnoticed, namely, a sponge, once bathed in the blood of the martyr, which had been used to collect that blood, and then compressed into the bottle together with the blood itself."

Aringhi describes another of these vases placed near the

\* Osserv. lib. i. p. 150.

sepulchre of St. Saturninus, and mentions that the plaster in which it was fastened bore inscribed upon it the words *sā SATURNŪI*, that is, Sanguis Saturnini; and Boldetti describes other vases of the same kind with the letters *SANG* and *sā*, and a palm-branch rudely scratched in a similar position. Now, reasoning on the foregoing facts, it is not difficult to perceive that the vessels were beyond all doubt used to receive blood. It is curious to remark here a question connected with the theories started in former days by those who denied this; since the straits to which they were driven for a refutation of the Catholic arguments, show us how feeble their hypothesis was; whilst from the replies made to their views we may glean a fresh argument against the similar theory advanced in our own day by the reviewer. Fahetti, in his *Inscriptt.*,\* relates that a person, whose name he purposely abstains from giving, had publicly ridiculed his credulity, and laughed at him for professing to believe that the layer of red matter which encrusted the inside of one of these vases was what remained after the blood had dried up. According to this opponent of Fahetti, the red coating was nothing more or less than the effect of the rain-water, which had become discoloured in its filtration through the various soils through which it had passed, and had in consequence, on drying up, deposited on the surface of the glass a thin layer of the colouring matter it had itself acquired. After urging in reply, that it was impossible for rain-water to find its way into a phial embedded in the hardest of mortar; after observing that, even supposing that it really did penetrate there, it would never dry up as long as the water continued to filter,—Fahetti advances another argument, which is of great value. Some time previously he had submitted to Leibnitz one of the glass vessels, with the request that the philosopher would put the red crust to the test of a chemical analysis. In a letter to Fahetti, Leibnitz thus communicates the result of the experiment: “*Frustum phialæ vitreæ ex cemeterio Callixti allatum rubedine tinctum examinavi nonnihil, ut facilius discerni posset, cujus ea generis esset, et utrum, ut physici hodie loquuntur, ex regno animali, an potius minerali esset profecta; et venit mihi in mentem uti solutione salis ammoniaci, ut vocant, in aqua communi, attentare an ejus ope aliquid a vitro separari et elui posset. Id vero subito et supra spem successit. Indeque, nata nobis merito suspicio est, sanguineam potius materiam quam terrestrem seu mineralem quæ vi corrosivâ prædictâ tanto tempore altius in vitrum fortasse descendisset, nec lixivio tam subito cessisset.*”

\* Cap. viii. p. 555.

No more need be said to show that the sacramental-cup theory is untenable. The true use of the phial, insinuated by Prudentius, was corroborated by Boldetti's discovery of the bloody sponge; and Leibnitz tested and ratified the accuracy of the label marked by some rude hand on the mortar, whilst still moist around the slab that concealed the martyr's remains.

But against the concordant voices of ancient poet and modern antiquarian, against the conspiring testimony of the unlettered Catholic fossor of the catacombs and of the Protestant philosopher of the laboratory, the reviewer seeks to maintain his position by help of the authority of M. Raoul-Rochette. It is not a little remarkable that one who so rightly appreciates the results of the labours of recent antiquaries like Padre Marchi and Cav. de' Rossi, as the reviewer does, should in this case contemptuously slight their opinions, and swear only by the name of Raoul-Rochette. If, as he confesses, these able men have regenerated Christian archaeology, and established it on a new and scientific basis, one would have imagined that their views on a matter of such importance were entitled to at least an equal amount of attention with those of the French author. Raoul-Rochette moreover, although by no means without merits of his own, nevertheless does not occupy such a position among sacred antiquaries as to counterbalance the deference due to men like the Cav. de' Rossi. The reviewer appeals to a passage in this writer's *Tableau des Catacombes*, to which I shall presently invite attention; after remarking that, in the preface to the Brussels edition (1837) of that very work, the editors feel it their duty to caution the reader against placing implicit confidence in the opinions expressed by the author in the matter of ancient Christian art. According to them, the head and front of his offending is, that having adopted a certain theory on the relations between early Christian and pagan art, he is not satisfied with proving that the former borrowed from the latter figures and ornaments which were purely pagan in origin, and employed to convey pagan ideas, but that he amplifies this fact, and exaggerates it by reasons more or less solid. Hence, although he frequently exhibits ingenuity in his comparisons, "we believe," say the editors, "that the reader will do wrong by always trusting to the assertions of M. Raoul-Rochette; for he often hazards extraordinary statements without supplying proofs for them, or he cites authorities which in no way lend him any support." Though the reviewer contrasts in his paper the very recent school of antiquaries with those of an older period, with a result highly favourable to the

former, yet in the same breath he follows the authority of those whom he condemns in preference to those whom he justly applauds. He blames eminent Catholic scholars for having "allowed themselves to be carried away by their pre-conceived notions into a wide field of exaggeration," and in the next line pins his faith upon a man who is accused of torturing arguments to make them suit his theories, of making assertions without proofs, and of citing authorities that say nothing in his behalf! But there is something still stranger; the reviewer declares that he agrees with Raoul-Rochette in stating that the vessels in question may be supposed to represent the sacramental cup; and yet I do not believe that Raoul-Rochette expresses any such opinion. The reviewer does not quote the passage of the work in which he discovered the opinion which he shares; but, from the context, and especially from the coincident use of *PIE ZESES*, I am convinced that he refers to the following:

"The painted glass vessels are amongst the most important objects of Christian antiquity collected in the Catacombs. Without speaking of the ones formed like the 'lacrymatoria,' and which, according to the common sentiment of the Roman antiquaries, served to collect the blood of the martyrs, and which on that score have acquired so much religious importance under the name of *ampolle di sangue*,—there are others in great plenty of the shape of a *patera*, or undercup, which were placed on the exterior of the sepulchre as objects of ornament, or as marks to recognise the graves. . . . The most probable opinion as to the use made of such glasses by the Christians of Rome is, that they served for the celebration of funeral banquets, or *agapes*, which were held in the Catacombs themselves. Hence the inscription most generally found on this sort of glasses, and which is composed of Greek words, rendered in Latin characters: *PIE ZESES*, or *PIETE ZESETE*, i.e. 'Drink, live;' or some other equivalent formula, relating to the same order of ideas,—such as, for example, 'Dulcis, anima, vivis,' or this, 'Bibe et propina;' the signification of all which inscriptions, though in appearance profane, ought to be taken in a mystic sense, and referred to the motive of these sacred repasts."\*

Now what can be clearer than that M. Raoul-Rochette distinguishes in this passage two different classes of glass vessels; the first, which he says, according to the common opinion, served to collect the blood of the martyrs, and are known by the name of the "*ampolle di sangue*;" the second, those glasses which were shaped like an undercup or saucer, and were placed outside the tomb as ornaments or means of recognition? Of the first class he professes that he does not

\* *Tableau des Catacombes*, chap. v. pp. 389, 90, ed. Brus., 1837.

intend to treat; of the second class, with the inscription *PIE ZESES*, he does speak, and describes them as having been used in the *agapes*, or in the funeral repasts. Now the whole question between the reviewer and me is not, whether the second class of glasses were used as sacramental cups or not, nor whether they are sufficient tokens of martyrdom or otherwise. The Church does not make use of them as signs to determine whether the remains at whose tomb they were found belonged to a martyr or not; all discussion with respect to them is beside our purpose. Hence I abstain from showing that they were not chalices, and that the inscription which the reviewer calls sacramental is but a phrase connected with the *agapes*, and not with the Holy Eucharist. I am concerned solely with the first class, the vases of blood, or "*ampolle di sangue*," which the Church regards as safe and sufficient signs of martyrdom, but which the reviewer asserts to be unsafe and insufficient. The Church declares that they contain the blood of the martyrs, the reviewer denies it: the Church supports her statements with proofs of all kinds, historical, monumental, and chemical; the reviewer maintains her statement to be hasty and improbable, and substitutes for it his own, which he proves by a testimony that has never existed, and which, if it did exist, would be of very little weight. Although he may not have studied Raoul-Rochette with enough of "accurate research" to understand his meaning, I must admit that he has devoted sufficient time to the study of his writings to catch from him the defect which the Brussels editors lay to his charge, viz. a facility of making extraordinary assertions without proofs, and of quoting as proofs authorities that in no way favour his views.

So much for his first reason; the second is, that the notion of collecting in a bottle the blood of dead martyrs is childish and impracticable, and not spoken of by contemporary writers. Had he said that such a notion was childlike in its simplicity and in its tenderness, I should willingly share his views; but childish no one can call it who is at all able to understand the feelings with which the early Christians regarded the martyrs' blood, or to appreciate the reasons that influenced them thus to preserve it. Is that a childish impulse which has moved mankind, in every age and country, to place around the bier of the departed the badges of the honourable offices they had filled, or the memorials of the brilliant deeds they had done when alive? And if not, how can it be childish to place near the martyr's grave the token of his martyrdom, or to adorn it with the trophy of his victory? Surely it is not because the triumph is immeasurably more glorious than any

mere human triumph can be, that it becomes foolish to celebrate it in the fashion after which all men celebrate what they esteem a mighty victory. The more so, since in the case of the martyrs such a celebration would not be an idle ceremony, as it is generally among men, intended to serve little else than as a pageant, but an act full of deep and significant meaning. There were many reasons of great weight which contributed to recommend this practice, and to maintain it when once introduced. First, the blood which was shed by the martyrs, in their passion, was a mark and a memorial of their illustrious victory. Hence St. Ambrose,\* describing the invention and recognition of the bodies of St. Gervasius and Protasius at Milan, believed that he had said enough to prove that they were the genuine remains of martyrs, when he said that their blood was visible in the tomb: "The tomb is wet with blood, the drops of the victorious gore are visible." And again, "I found the proper tokens—the bones all entire, and a great quantity of blood." And St. Gaudentius of Brescia† is still more explicit, speaking of the martyrdom of the same saints and of St. Nazarius: "whose blood we possess, desiring no other proof. For we have their blood, which is the witness of their passion." A second reason was the intense veneration felt by the faithful towards the blood poured out for Jesus Christ, on account of its marvellous efficacy and virtue. St. Augustine says,‡ that even pagan nations converted to the faith "venerated with Christian affection the blood of the martyrs, which through diabolical frenzy they had spilled;" wherein he clearly, although incidentally, shows how deeply rooted was that veneration among the faithful, since he calls it by excellence "*Christian*" veneration. The feelings that dictated it are suggested by St. Cyprian:§ "Heaven is thrown open to our blood, before our blood hell yields submissive; our blood is both the fairest title to glory and the most perfect crown." And more eloquently still, St. John Chrysostom:|| "Have you not frequently beheld at day-break the sun rising and sending forth rays as it were of gold? Such did the bodies of the saints appear, when, like golden rays, streams of blood flowed from them, and lighted up their bodies with greater brilliancy than the sun lights up the heavens. At the sight of this blood the angels rejoiced, evil spirits shuddered, and the devil himself trembled. For what was seen was not mere blood, but saving blood, blood worthy of heaven, blood which with its never-ceasing irrigating streams

\* Lib. vii. Epp. n. 54.

† Serm. in ded. Basil. SS. 40 Mart.

‡ De Civ. Dei, lib. xviii. cap. 50.

§ De Laude Martyrii, n. ix.

|| Hom. 74.

renders fruitful the fair trees of the Church. The devil saw this blood and trembled, for he called to mind the blood shed by the Lord: it was for that blood this was shed." Thirdly, they were induced to keep the blood of the martyrs constantly before their eyes for the sake of the lessons its silent eloquence conveyed. According to Tertullian,\* the blood of the martyrs was the seed from which new Christians sprang; because it taught the endurance of pain and death with more persuasiveness than Cicero, or Seneca, or Diogenes, or Callinicus. And St. Maximus of Turin† deduces from it an argument for the faith, saying, "Let us learn, then, that it is very dangerous to dispute about the truth of that religion which we see confirmed by the blood of so many martyrs. It is a matter attended with great peril if, after the oracles of the prophets, after the testimonies of the Apostles, after the wounds of the martyrs, you presume to discuss the ancient faith as if it were a novel one."

It is no wonder, then, that a practice recommended by so many grave reasons should have been universal on the part of the Christian people. From the many historical records of its occurrence, I now proceed to select a few to show how false it is to say that contemporary writers make no mention of such a usage.

In the genuine acts of the martyrdom of St. Cyprian,‡ we read that, just as the executioner was about to deal the fatal blow, "the weeping brethren spread out before him linen cloths and handkerchiefs, lest his sacred blood should be absorbed by the earth." In a Ms. belonging to the basilica of Sta. Maria in Trastevere, mentioned by Bol-detti, we find a very striking instance of the lengths to which the desire of preserving the martyrs' blood was sometimes carried. According to this account, after the death of St. Adrian and his companions, several devout matrons "collected in linen and purple cloths the blood that flowed from the bodies of the saints, and some of them placed it in their bosoms, whilst other most illustrious matrons purchased at the price of great sums of gold or gems and precious ornaments the garments worn by the executioners, and which were soaked in the blood of the holy martyrs." To these pious women at least, it was not an impracticable thing to collect the martyrs' blood. Again, in the acts of St. Cecilia we read that when her neck had been thrice smitten through with a sword, all those who had been converted to the faith through her instrumentality gathered up in cloths the precious blood that flowed from her wounds: "All the

\* Apcl. sub fine.

† Serm. 83.

‡ Apud Ruinart

people who had become believers through her wiped away the blood with soft cloths ;” these very same cloths were discovered many years afterwards, still bathed in blood, by the side of her body, when Pope Pascal I. transferred it from the Cemetery of Callixtus to her basilica in Trastevere, as is declared in that pontiff’s epistle ; and at a still later period, in 1599, Cardinal Sfondrati, Bosio, and others, found them still marked with her blood, when her tomb was reopened by the authority of Clement VIII.

This practice is also mentioned by Prudentius, whose testimony is most valuable on all questions connected with the cultus paid to the early martyrs. In his *Peristeph.* (hymn. de S. Vincent.) he thus describes the conduct of the faithful who were present at the passion of that saint :

“ Coire toto ex oppido  
Turbam fidelium cerneret,  
Mollire præfultum thorum,  
Siccare cruda vulnera.

Ille ungularum duplices  
Sulcos pererrat osculis,  
Hic purpurantem corporis  
Gaudet cruorem lambere.

Plerique vestem lineam  
Stillante tingunt sanguine,  
Tutamen ut sacrum suis  
Domi reservent posteris.”

And in the same work (hymn. 10) he describes how the mother of the boy-martyr Barula, “ rendered superior by grace to the weakness of sex and maternity, lovingly collected the blood of her butchered son :”

“ Puerum poposcit carnifex : mater dedit  
Nec immorata est fletibus : tantum osculum  
Impressit unum. Vale ! ait, dulcissime,  
Et, cum beatus regna Christi intraveris,  
Memento matris, jam patrone ex filio.  
Dixit : dein cum ferit cerviculam  
Percussor ense, docta mulier psallere,  
Hymnum canebat carminis Davidici ;  
Pretiosa Sancti mors sub aspectu Dei :  
Tuus ille servus, proles ancillæ tuæ.  
Talia retexens explicabat pallium,  
Manusque tendebat sub ictu et sanguine  
Venarum, ut undam profluam manantium  
Et palpitantis oris exciperet globum  
Excepit, et caro applicavit pectori.”

Again, in the same work (hymn. 11) Prudentius describes the martyrdom of St. Hyppolitus, which was represented in a

painting placed over the sepulchre wherein the martyr's body reposed. It may be observed, that the circumstance of all the details in this hymn having been depicted in a popular sketch of this martyrdom, removes all doubt as to the general prevalence of the custom among the faithful. He first narrates how the Christians carefully collected the scattered limbs of the martyr, and then describes the earnest solicitude with which they gathered up, by means of sponges and linen cloths, the drops of his blood with which the ground was sprinkled :

“Palleolus etiam bibulus, siccantur arenæ,  
Ne quis in infecto pulvere ros maneat.  
Si quis, et in sudibus recalente aspergine sanguis  
Insidet, hunc omnia spongia pressa rapit.”

I will conclude this series of testimonies with the account of an interesting discovery made by Boldetti, from the facts contained in which our readers will be able to form an idea of the manner in which the martyrs' bodies are extracted from the Catacombs.

“It having been arranged,” says this author,\* “to open the excavations in the beginning of November 1717, the workmen were by me dispatched to the farthest part of the vast Cemetery of St. Priscilla, situated at the distance of three miles from Rome, in the vineyard of the Sigg. Antonini, which vineyard is the last on the left-hand side of the Salerian Way. Having set to work in the lower part of the cemetery, in order to clear away the earth which choked up some of the paths, they found in one of these paths divers sepulchres of holy martyrs, marked on the outside with vases of blood, but without any inscription that could make known the names of their occupiers. On the 2d of December I proceeded to the same cemetery, for the purpose of making a recognition of the martyrs, and of extracting their sacred relics ; and with me came the Abbate Gustavo G. F. Lohrman, canon of Ste. Maria in Trastevere ; the Abbate Raimondo Binetti, late Maestro di Camera to the Ven. Cardinal Tommasi ; and Sig. Giovanni Batt. Antonini, the owner of the vineyard, with various other persons. After the recital of some devout prayers, and after the examination of several sepulchres of martyrs, whose remains we deposited in the caskets intended for that purpose, we at length came to examine another grave on which, near the martyr's head, we found a small vessel of blood, somewhat broken on the outside, and fastened into the *tufo* with mortar. The sepulchre was closed with four tiles ; and in the mortar between the first tile and the *tufo* we found a metal instrument like a stylus, about the length of a man's hand, and with a spherical bending at one end ; its shape, however, gave us no clue to decide whether it was an instrument of torture, or had served for some other purpose.

\* Osserv. lib. i. cap. xxxvii.

It being certain, from the presence of the above-mentioned vase of blood, that the body was really that of a martyr, in the presence of the persons already named, one of the tiles, namely, the last but one towards the foot, was removed with a pickaxe, and immediately we beheld near the end of the grave a large glass vessel shaped like a jar, with a wide neck and mouth. The other three tiles, to the satisfaction and growing devotion of the bystanders, were then removed; and that done, before any thing was touched, we with all diligence and attention made the following observations: First, that this bottle had once been coated with straw, like the flasks now in use, for some bands of this coating still remained round its body, the rest having fallen on the bottom of the sepulchre and on the martyr's feet; and although this straw still retained the shape in which it had twisted, it was of an ashen hue, and when touched crumbled into dust. We observed besides, that when the tiles were being put in their places, in closing the grave after the interment, the bottle was overturned, so as to have its neck and mouth over the saint's feet; and the blood, of which it was full, was poured over the feet and all along the bottom of the sepulchre, whence we gathered it up all hard and dry. We also found in a dry state the blood that had remained in the neck and mouth of the bottle; and as the bottle was almost round, and only half of its contents spilled, what remained inside was seen all collected and hard in the end of the bottle, which rested on the ground. . . . Continuing our examination of the body, we perceived that its head and face, as far as the collar-bone, was covered with a fine cloth, the threads of which were still distinguishable, although the linen itself was so rotten that it fell into dust at the first touch. Using every possible precaution, we raised up some pieces of this covering, and distinctly perceived that it was quite bloody, fold after fold still retaining the traces of blood; but as it immediately crumbled away, it was not possible to preserve even the smallest portion of it. We immediately came to the conclusion that this cloth had been used by the Christians, either to collect the martyr's blood, or to wipe his wounds, and was then placed over his head in the grave, according to the custom of ancient times. . . . The rest of this sacred body was so injured by time, and by the condition of the place where it lay, that when touched it was like soft dough: wherefore, having diligently collected the bones, and placed them with the two vases in a casket, which was instantly sealed, and having sung a psalm, with other prayers prescribed for such occasions, we entoned the *Te Deum* and conveyed all the caskets out of the cemetery."

Notwithstanding the specimen of Protestant criticism which I have examined in this paper, I am not insensible to the improvement observable in the attitude of recent Protestant writers towards the results of Catholic antiquarian research. There exists on their part a readiness to accept these labours, even though undertaken at Rome, as good and

useful; but this readiness only carries them half-way. They are willing to subscribe to conclusions which chime in with their own peculiar views, and even to praise the accurate scholarship of the men who collect and classify the facts from which these conclusions are deduced. But when from facts equally authentic conclusions are drawn which are at variance with their peculiar doctrines, then, in defiance of the learning they had extolled, and with wonderful inconsistency, they refuse their assent. In vain do you urge, that, if certain authorities be trustworthy in their general statement of facts, if there be fixed rules such as suit the nature of the subject, according to which we are to guide our reasoning upon these facts, it is folly to accept one class of conclusions as accurate and true, and at the same time slight or refuse another class derived by a similar course of reasoning from facts stated on the same authority. We have seen in the reviewer an example of this mode of proceeding; since, although an admirer of a system of archæological reasoning, and conceding the trustworthiness of those who collect the data on which it is employed, nevertheless, in defiance of all this, he has recourse to the weakest of arguments to escape from a conclusion which displeases him.

When from the remains of the ancient Church the Catholic antiquary recalls to life a dogma or a discipline which is familiar to the Protestant, his work is styled noble, and his conclusions irrefragable; but when he deduces a proposition unpleasing to Protestant prejudice, then he is told that his art has led him astray, that the things he teaches are but creations of his imagination. He will be allowed to restore to life the figure of a St. Agnes, but he must leave the lily of her vow of purity to moulder in the Catacombs; he will be allowed to place before us a St. Cyprian, but the lessons which St. Cyprian taught of communion with Rome must be left behind in the silence of the sepulchre. And thus sacred science is lopped and mutilated by the very men who are loudest in their condemnation of prejudice and onesided views.

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#### A PLEA FOR BORES.

THERE are two stages in authorship; the first when the supply creates the demand, the second when the demand creates the supply. Before authors existed, the world went on happily enough, working, and thinking, and brooding, and talking;

at last the inner fire of a man burst forth in oratory or poetry. The people tasted; the taste was created, the demand arose, and the supply was forthcoming. The first was the natural growth, the second the manufactured fabric. Both are born almost at the same time; the second follows the first, as the shadow the substance. Both grow together to a certain point, till the culminating period of a national literature, when the substance begins to wane, and the shadow to wax; till literature, instead of being the spontaneous heaving of the volcanic soul, becomes a calculated marketable produce, a literary stock-taking, or a statistical dilettantism.

It is now thought a disgrace to letters that any thing should remain undescribed. As the Royal Geographical Society, whose object it is to mark on its map all the rivers and mountains of the globe, feels so deeply the stain of allowing any portion to remain blank that it will persuade Franklins and Livingstones to risk their lives to map the pole or the interior of Africa, so it is with the confraternity of writers. Their great aim is to melt down all things into words, and to put them into print; to allow no department of nature to remain undescribed; to have a book about every branch of the knowable registered in their collection. Each school of writers in its own sphere is charged with the solemn duty of exhausting the ground it covers, as Sir Emerson Tennent has exhausted Ceylon. No school is more alive to this high vocation than novelists and tale-writers; none have laboured more heartily to describe every actual and every imaginable state of persons or of society; flirts, poor relations, gipsies, snobs and gents and gentlemen, have all found their prophet. But I don't know whether any one yet has undertaken to describe the *bore*.

I do not much wonder at this omission. Good description, says the Arab proverb, is that which turns the ear into an eye,—which brings the reality home to you, and makes you feel as if you were in its presence. It is an art which can make pleasing even the most horrible and most tragical events; we like to see them represented, even though they harrow our feelings, for the pain soon goes, and the beauty and interest of the representation remain. So with things comically disagreeable, as the snob and the gent: they would be intolerable travelling-companions; but it is amusing to travel with them in fiction, as they are served up by Thackeray or Albert Smith. The essence of the snob or gent does not require time to develop; it may be exhibited as well in five minutes as in five hours; we only have as much of him as we like, and we leave him when we are tired of him. But

the bore presents a difficulty which none of these characters partake. The essence of the bore is his tediousness, his length ; abstract him from time, and nothing is left of him. You may be duly shocked with the rascality of Iago, or the offensiveness of the snob, in a half-hour's reading ; to be properly bored requires time.

Suppose that a genuine and complete bore has been duly decanted into a book ; the problem would be, to find interest for the reading public in this book. How to exhibit the bore, so as at the same time to bore and interest the reader, is like the mediæval problem of the vessel that was to contain the universal solvent. Dissolving every thing, it would of course dissolve the bottle, dissolve the table, the floor, the foundation, and bore a hole for itself down to the centre, where it would be confined, not by the surrounding matter, but by the force of gravity. So would it be with the book of the bore ; it would soon slip out of the circulating-libraries, would project itself into space, and fly away into night. "It is very difficult," says the author of *Loss and Gain*, "duly to delineate a bore in a narrative, for the very reason that he is a bore. A tale must aim at condensation ; but a bore acts in solution. It is only in the long-run that he is ascertained. Then indeed he is felt ; he is oppressive ; like the sirocco, which a native detects at once, while a foreigner is often at fault. *Tenet occiditque*. Did you hear him make but one speech, perhaps you would say he was a pleasant, well-informed man ; but when he never comes to an end, or has one and the same prose every time you meet him, or keeps you standing till you are fit to sink, or holds you fast when you wish to keep an engagement, or hinders your listening to important conversation,—then there is no mistake, the truth bursts on you, *apparent diræ facies*, you are in the clutches of a bore. You may yield, or you may flee ; you cannot conquer. Hence it is clear that a bore cannot be represented in a story, or the story would be the bore as much as he."

This is perfectly true if the bore is brought to bear upon the reader ; but there is another way of exhibiting the bore, namely, in his relations to the other persons of the narrative. I do not see why it need bore the reader to find the hero detained by the button, and held till he is fit to sink, till he has missed the train, or broken his engagement with the heroine. The feelings proper for the occasion would form a good subject for a scene. Even the bore himself need not be a bore to the reader. I suppose that Coleridge's "ancient mariner," with his skinny hand and glittering eye and interminable tale, which he forces the wedding-guest to hear while he should

be feasting in the hall with the bride, fulfils nearly every condition of the description I have quoted. A still more striking instance is Socrates, who was so intolerable a bore in the eyes of the young men whom he questioned and turned inside-out in the market-place as a spectacle to their companions, that his death was mainly brought about by their vindictiveness. "A man," says Halifax, "that should call every thing by its right name, would hardly pass the streets without being knocked down as a common enemy." The indiscretion of the bore, however annoying to the object of it, may be made very diverting to the spectator or listener.

I have said that the substance of the bore is time and tedium. But if time is not a substance, how can it be the bore's substance? I confess the difficulty. At the first stroke of the word "bore" upon the ear, nothing can be plainer than its meaning: not thinking, I understand it; thinking, it fades from my view. A vague mystery is all that remains. The bore is undefinable; like evil, he has no substance; he is nothing and nobody. He is not even a quality; he is a mere relation: not substantial, like one of Lamb's poor relations, but ideal, like Terror, the Furies, or Fortune. It is a man's self, says Juvenal, that makes Fortune a goddess; it is the listener that makes the bore. Bore is only a relative term; and the relation is by no means constant. The same person may be a bore to me, and the reverse to you. Not that I have a sense the more, and you a sense the less, so that boredom is invisible to you, as colours to a blind man; or that the quality of the bore resides, not in the man who is called the bore, but in the eye of the man who calls him so; but because the substance is divisible into active boreishness and passive boreableness, placed as attributes in two distinct persons, who are, as it were, the father and mother of the nightmare which is called the bore. Like knows like, says philosophy; with the lead in my head I weigh the lead in yours. As a man's *I*, so his *thou*, says Lavater. If there was no bore in me, I could perceive none in you. Thus, as materialists call the soul the harmony of the bodily members, so do I, who deny the substantive existence of the bore, call it a discord growing into existence as two predisposed persons approach each other, and fading into nonentity as they separate. When two such persons come together, their spirits "mix as mists do;" and from their union a third is born, a somewhat unseen but felt, oppressive but evanescent, the unstable product of an accidental relationship, like the froth, or the spray, or the roar, which is the fleeting offspring of the temporary union of the winds and the waves.

We must inquire, then, among what people the bore is to be developed. As far as I am aware, there is no word in any language but the English that is precisely equivalent to "bore." I think I have met with the *thing* on the Continent, but not with the *name*. I can find no such word in the classics; curiously enough, there is an old Greek fable, well-nigh lost, but restored by a poet whose heathenishness gave him a kind of prophetic insight into such matters. This fable, interpreted on the principles of Bacon, in his *Wisdom of the Ancients*, seems applicable to the bore. In Shelley's drama of *Prometheus*, Civilisation, in the person of the hero, is discovered hanging nailed to a Caucasian rock, till the signal of his delivery is given by the fall of Jupiter. The agent in this revolution is a strange nameless being, the offspring of Jove and Thetis, unseen and impalpable till he enters the body of Demogorgon, or the Democrat. The application seems plain. It is the generation of the bore, described by some of the last surviving courtiers of the *ancien régime* of the golden age. What can be more apposite than Jove's words to Thetis?

"Two mighty spirits mingling, made a third  
Stronger than either, which embodied now  
Between us floats, felt, although unbeheld,  
Waiting the incarnation, which ascends  
(Hear ye the thunder of the fiery wheels  
Grinding the winds ?) from Demogorgon's throne."

The bore floats between its parents as a mere relation, till it is incarnate in the democrat, who destroys the old aristocratic society. It is, as it were, an importation from America. It is a senator of the great republic introducing dismay and dissolution into a London dinner-party by his speeches, endless and pedantic, his conversation, pompous and extravagant, and his questions, impertinent and importunate. When Sidney Smith met Daniel Webster at a London dinner-table, he was surprised to find him a mere holder-forth, and pronounced him "too slow for our market." If he passed as a great man across the Atlantic, it must be remembered that the Americans have no name for the bore.

The meridian of the bore's power synchronises, according to the fable, with the moment of the greatest development of a peculiar kind of civilisation; not that of Mercurius, the god of the electric telegraph and the Stock Exchange, *qui nuntiis præest et lucro*, as Plautus says; nor that of Apollo the rhymmer, the god of poets and authors; but that of Prometheus, the thinker, the politician, the inventor. It is of this peculiar civilisation that the bore is the complement and

the perfume. Luxury goes before, the bore follows; "the flowers march in her van, musk in her rear." In other civilisations bores may exist, but they are not felt; the organisation is not as yet sensitive of them.

For this reason, I am not surprised at finding no name for bore in Germany. Not that the thing is wanting, for it exists, no doubt, in full virulence, but the sense to perceive it. The greatest student of German literature in this country, Mr. Carlyle, declares that he has been insufferably bored by the Prussian historians; and he constantly tells us how stupid they are, in order to remind his readers how amusing he is himself. Yet there are, doubtless, Prussian historians whom the simple public of Germany thinks as amusing as Mr. Carlyle. Their friends might argue that this is a proof of their intellectual superiority. We are not proud to think of the generation of members of parliament who thought Burke the greatest bore in the House. When Plato gave a public lecture to a mixed audience of educated Athenians, they could not stand it, and gradually sneaked off, till the only listener who remained at the end was Aristotle. Perhaps the civilisation of Germany is that of Apollo; but it is strange that no German seems even to have the idea of bore. The French civilisation is mercurial, so far as Mercury is the god, not of commerce, but of the tongue. Talk is the business of a Frenchman, just as wealth is the aim of the English devotee of Mercury. The Frenchman is the tyrant of talk, and despises the man of silence. Like Warburton, he has a rage for saying something when there's nothing to be said. You shall sooner want ears than he tongue. He is big with the grand mission of keeping up the ball of conversation; he is not particular about his topics. From his earliest age, it is the duty of his tutor to train him for this vocation. Rousseau tells us how at a dinner-party the one *petit bon-homme*, who generally sums up in himself all the parental affections of a French household, is made *babiller* and *débiter mille sottises*, to the edification of the company, who forgive all for the one or two *mots heureux* which the little man lets fall. What nation with a right idea of "bore" could endure this *méthode française*? Not that I really think the Frenchman a bore; he is empty, and therefore gets sick of his own company; but he can make play with a neighbour, whoever it may be, as he can make a dinner out of nettles with a little salt and pepper. He has a good-humour which requires a vent, and sours by inaction; he is also vain, and wants food for his vanity. This makes him anxious not to leave an ill impression. "Vanity," says Sir Humphrey Davy, "is always

an agreeable quality, the most exquisite and odorous essence of selfishness, almost always connected with good-nature and good-temper."

But I cannot deny that to some Englishmen the French are great bores. Sterne was terribly tired of his residence at Toulouse. "I believe," he writes, "the groundwork of my *ennui* is more the eternal platitude of the French character, —little variety, no originality in it at all,—than any other cause, for they are very civil; but civility itself in that uniform wearies and boddens one to death." And again, "The insipidity that there is in French characters has disgusted your friend Yorick."

That, with all their tact and sense, the French have no word for *bore*, I attribute to their making talk a part of the business of life; whence the offences against the rules of conversation become something more serious than mere boring. That which is part of the day's work is not properly susceptible of bore. The bore makes his appearance, not in the business, but in the relaxations of life. He does not intrude into the English counting-house or Exchange, any more than he does into the French *salon*. But he is the blight of enjoyment, wherever the notion of enjoyment is that of the educated Englishman. The bore is the dark spot in our Caucasian or Promethean luxury; he is the shadow that darkens that solitary silent day-dream which is the ideal of happiness to some men. "How delightful," said some one to Fox, "to lie on the grass with a book in your hand all day!" "Yes," answered Fox; "but why with a book?" This one saying aptly symbolises the disposition most susceptible of being bored.

To enjoy silence, you must either be empty or full. The empty man can wait as patiently as a spider. A Cingalese will squat for three days before your door to obtain a sight of your face. Such a man is incapable of being bored; a feeling unknown to the contemplative Oriental, and to all natives of the sunny climes, where mere existence is a pleasure, and there is a sweetness in doing nothing. The full man likewise enjoys silence, but he also resents intrusion. His delectation is what divines might call morose. He sits in his easy-chair, and watches the fire, or smokes his cigar, and lets the thought course through his brain as it happens. In this mood all intrusion is a bore. Thus Socrates, the prince and the martyr of the company of bores, was so well satisfied at times with his own company, that falling into a reverie one morning when he was standing in the sun, he was found in the same position next morning. Nearly all old men will sit and

think in the same manner; but they are not bored by intrusion; they rather like the interminable talk of other old men, which would bore a younger man to death. Hope is the food of solitude, and therefore young men like to be alone: memory is the food of the old, and may be enjoyed in company; therefore old men like society. To be bored, a certain youthfulness of mind is requisite, a tendency forward, like that of hope; but there must not be the hurry of business or of very serious action; here the annoyance of interruption is something much stronger than mere bore. To be bored, there must be leisure, accompanied by that weakness of will which is a sign of a man's having no imperative business. When the will is little, wishes are many; it is the strong will which stifles weak wishes. Against the strong will boredom has little power. It is when the will is weak, vacillating, and only half-determined, through the consciousness of having submitted to bonds that are not strong in themselves,—when it can say, *umbræ me prohibent*,—that the wishes run riot in the chamber of imagination, and the feelings acutely resent an importunate interruption. It is not will, but imagination and feeling, that is sensitive of bore: “Pity me, but do not speak to me,” says Shakespeare's Cleopatra. The feeling of the impossibility of escape would lead to resignation; the feeling that it is only uncourteous to run away aggravates the irritation. We know that the infliction is small, and that if we would be rude and rough, we might at once extinguish the poor bore; but our feelings will not allow us to take such strong measures, and we punish our feelings for thwarting us. We make ourselves sheep for the wolf to eat. We take the mad-dog's medicine, “patience perforce,” and sigh for the by-gone days, when it was true “that when the brains were out, the man would die.” Possessing a weapon that would finish the intruder in a moment, we do not use it. We lend our ears to the bore, and quickly learn a new interpretation of the saying, *bis dat qui dat cito*—he gives double that gives too easily. We know well enough that every man is prince of his own; that if another comes to rob me, whether of my goods or my time, we are equals and may fight for it. But courtesy and gentlemanly feeling forbid such violence. I yield an inch, and soon find the inch grown to an ell: if I had refused to yield, I should have escaped. Thus the capacity for being bored is something special, the result of a refined social system, where custom has given the light links that bind men in their intercourse with each other the strength of cables.

As for the power of boring, it is found in all grades of

society, and in every circumstance of life. But in strict propriety, the term "bore" is not to be applied to the rude rustic, or the vulgar snob, who irritates and interrupts you. The true bore is himself a delicate product of high civilisation. He is not one of those social bullies who carry things with a high hand; not like Shakespeare's Don, "his humour lofty, his discourse peremptory, his tongue filed, his eye ambitious, his gait majestical, and his general behaviour vain, ridiculous, and thrasonical;"—for such a one may be fought with his own weapons. Neither is he a fool. When you find that a man is a fool, you may evade him; if you cannot, he is the sharper of the two: if the mud walls of his stupidity refuse to be breached by the light batteries of hints; if he still goes on, duller than a great thaw, a mile longer-winded than a parliamentary report, mumbling his news, which you either don't care for or know beforehand, speaking as though he had only himself to listen to, with his bland inanities, frivolous platitudes, and watery sentiment, forgetting that you are subject to the sound of the clock;—such a bore, if he is a fool, may be dealt with according to his folly, and evaded or disposed of; but a fool has not material to be a thorough bore. The real difficulty is to get rid of the bore who is not a fool. The gentle enthusiast, intent upon some trifling matter, who sets abroach the barrel of his knowledge and lets it run to the lees, discussing details that make you go to sleep standing, that "play round the head, but come not near the heart," like a cloud of gnats on a summer evening, and who is a practical exemplification of the text, "the grasshopper shall be a burden;"—the indiscreet inquirer, like Adam Smith, who was so greedy after knowledge that he would never talk in company of what he understood; for "the greatest clerks are not the wisest men" in practical matters, and sometimes forget that in conversation the exchange should be at par;—the holder-forth, who speaks his reasons "full solemnly," and prosed as if he were possessed with the devil of exposition, which, like other devils, walketh in dry places;—and, worst of all, the unseasonable joker, the inveterate punster, so much more painful than the proser, because the last only requires patience, the other, as Burke says, harasses the spirits:—how are these to be treated? Besides their positive boring qualities, they have all of them the conviction that enjoyment is impossible alone; they all think, with Lavater, that existence is self-enjoyment by means of some object distinct from themselves. They are warmed in your presence, and they think you must be warmed in theirs—for he that is warm himself thinks all men so; they amuse themselves, how can

they bore you? They never think that existence may be also self-torment by means of an object distinct from ourselves, still less that they may possibly be that object. All this makes it so tormenting to have to do with a bore, especially if it be a woman, an azure female that talks you dead, or a person in weak health, a cripple whom it would be cruel to beat with his own crutches, or one who is for any reason an object of compassion. With this kind of bore it is impossible to use rough measures; he is no criminal; he has no ill intention; he does not mean to offend—if he did, he would soon take flight when he saw signs of your repelling him; for the readier to offend, the sooner offended. If you are cool with him and hold your tongue, or answer with fewness of words, as if you were in a hurry to be silent, either he will not perceive your abruptness, and will be charmed with your silence,—as Madame de Stael pronounced a man who had been introduced to her as a *savant* a most delightful converser, though he had not spoken a word, and was deaf and dumb,—or else he will think you in low spirits, and will try to cheer you up, probably with the effect described by Aristophanes—“his fooleries give me such an accession of gravity, that I seem a year older each time I see him.” No carrion will kill such a crow as this. That which would drive most men off draws him the closer; with all his sense he is blind to the clearest hints:

“Some, to whom heaven in wit has been profuse,  
Want as much more to turn it to its use.”

Men are therefore reduced to find means to neutralise the sense of boredom, just as they try to neutralise the gout, which is another product of luxury. The real Epicurean tries to escape bores and gout, not only by avoiding them, but by avoiding the sense of their being what they are. This he does either by becoming utterly *blasé* and inattentive, or by thinking of other things, knowing that *cæci sunt oculi* (and ears deaf) *cum animus res alias agit*; or, better still, by observing and collecting what amusement he can get from the bore. As we are told that there never was a sermon which a man might not pick good out of, that even in the flattest, which seems altogether to want sense,

“God takes the text, and preacheth patience;”

so in the conversation of the bore; with a little patience and observation you may derive plenty of amusement from it. I do not mean in the way of quizzing. Quizzing, says Burke, is a system of terrorism; the ruin of all social inter-

course. It is one of the rough-and-ready, not to say brutal, ways of getting rid of the bore, which the refinement of civilisation discredits, as it discredits drunkenness and swearing. You need not be observing that in all he says he shows where he has been last, and proves that he has sold himself to fetch and carry nonsense for a host of reluctant acquaintances; a volunteer of the same order as the organ-grinder, who undertakes to furnish us with music unbidden, not because we want it, but because he thinks himself furnished and will vent or vend it. You need not note how he palms off his inventions, forgetting that it is more criminal to make another talk nonsense than to do it in proper person. You need not be thinking how every man, a little beyond himself, is a fool; or, in your despair, quote against him the line, *labitur, et labetur in omne volubilis ævum*,—he flows, and as he flows for ever will flow on. You need not indulge in reflections at his expense: such as, “he must be a fool indeed, whom I think a fool while he is praising me;” or that “light burdens, borne long, grow heavy.” These reflections are, no doubt, true and apposite, but they spoil the purpose of the bore.

In order to escape the feeling of bore, consider, first, that as nature has imposed upon us many disagreeable necessities which we must make the best of, so has she divided the human race into those who have more tongue than ears, and those who have more ears than tongue. Of the former kind are bores; of the latter, those who are bored. There is no doubt that thought is higher than talk. Carlyle, I think, says, “speech is human, silence is divine.” Now nothing is given to us without something to compensate; “*alibi diminutum, alibi redditum*,” says Erasmus,—what is given here, is subtracted there. “Don’t learn too fast, Jack, or you will have more to do,” is the schoolboy’s version of this truth. The more is given to man, the more he must give; the higher his activity, the more he must suffer; he must accept the capacity of being bored as a natural and inevitable consequence of a cultivated intellect. It is not a very high price to pay. The bore consumes but little of our time; one pair of ears can draw dry a hundred tongues. The real consumption of time, the real expenditure, is in our own temper, which we permit the bore to ruffle, and which effectually stops our energy till we have smoothed it again.

Consider next, that the bore is only impelled by his good nature; it is his slaver kills, and not his bite. As Burke says, “in general, when a man offers you his story, it is the best thing he has to give you.” The kindly way in which

that philosopher tolerated the bore is a moral lesson. The great man was patient of little ones, as a mother is patient of her baby. He knew that weak heads are like weak stomachs, and must throw off at once what they have just taken in; but he did not think this a reason why the heads themselves should be thrown off. He knew that news floats on the surface of the gossip's mind like oil on water; it cannot incorporate; he thinks it a pity to waste it; where should it be stowed away but in somebody's ears?

Consider lastly, that as we tolerate the pastry-cook's kick-shaws and sugar-plums in consideration of the hot soup he gives us in winter, and the cool ices in summer, so the bore may be well tolerated for what a judicious observer may pick out of him. There are foolish sayings which wise men might be proud of, that have been sifted out of the talk of bores. Unless Joe Miller had listened to sleepy sermons he could not have culled their flowers; as, "How lucky it is that death comes at the end of life, or how should we prepare for it?" and "How merciful is Providence in making great rivers run by great cities!" One of the most foolish things I ever read was a journal of a residence abroad, which the author submitted to me for my opinion. Yet there were good things in it; such as, "Chapter vi. *Sunday at Pau*. Sunday at Pau is easily described; Sunday is just like a week-day." And the wonderful preliminary to the author's departure from Pau: "We partook of a hasty breakfast, consisting of ourselves alone."

Each of these methods of treating the bore neutralises our sense of his being what he is; we destroy for the time our sensitiveness to the infliction, without the least unkindness, and without any loss of amusement to ourselves. By this toleration, too, we learn to think better of our fellow-creatures; we find that no man is so stupid but what something may be learned from him; and that people oftener want something taken away, than something added, to make them agreeable. They bore because they would be too agreeable, and make themselves fools in our eyes; just as we think the lover a fool whom we see making himself more agreeable than human nature will permit. It is a very good rule, that "you should never be clever but when you cannot help it." The worst feature in any bore is his affectation,—the ambition of seeming what he knows he is not. Though, certainly, it is no high ambition to be a mere gossip. "Difference of taste is only difference of skill," says Dr. Johnson. He does not reckon his skill very high who is content to make himself

“The summer pilot of an empty heart  
Unto the shores of nothing.”

If I have pleaded for the talking, and not for the printing, bore, it was for fear of seeming to plead for myself; but charitable folks will estimate the merits of the bore in print by the pains he has taken to please them, and will judge of his trouble in writing by their own trouble in reading. We honour him who goes dinnerless himself to give the poor a dinner; why not also the writer who remains “sleepless himself to give his readers sleep”? This explains and justifies the partiality of our religious public for heavy writing. Mothers do not love least their dullest children; and there is a feminine weakness in our bosoms to which great authors have not been ashamed to appeal. Horace invites our sympathy for something he calls “*nuper sollicitum quæ mihi tædium*,”—lately an anxious bore to me; Wordsworth claims our compassion for his “mild offspring of infirm humanity;” Dante ushers one of his *canzoni* into the world with the ticket, “*Tu non sei bella, ma tu sei pietosa*.” Like Mr. Dickens’s last story, “it is not beautiful, but it is sentimental;” so it touches a pensive public to the heart, and they drop the tear of their compassion on the dust of its aridity, and turn its chaff and bran, not into wholesome bread for themselves, but into loaves and fishes for the author. Other bores, like Robert Montgomery and Mr. Tupper, have found a shorter cut to the hill of their ambition,—the way of puff; long-winded themselves, they go the way of kites; they ride on the wings of the wind, and their deity is

RUDE BOREAS.

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## Correspondence.

### VOLUNTEERS AND RECRUITS.

SIR,—The volunteer movement, with its slow beginnings and rapid developments, appears to be one likely not only to last, but also to become adequate for its main purpose of deterring foreign powers from undertaking an English invasion. It cannot be doubted that the movement is eminently constitutional; for it is a mere development of the principles of our law, which is so largely administered by an unpaid magistracy, which constitutes every subject a policeman against a felony or a riot, and which gives no remuneration to those who undertake the legislative functions of Parliament. With an unpaid legislature, magistracy, and police, why not also have, if

we can get it, and if it will effect its purpose, an unpaid army to boot?

But while our military strength is being so largely increased by private coöperation with the State, there seems to be no idea that our naval preparations can be forwarded by similar means; I do not mean by volunteer sailors, but by associations which would assist in manning the navy. It would be no new thing in our history; even still there exists a society, which began in a panic, and whose original purpose was to fit out landsmen volunteers and boys for the royal navy. There was an invasion panic in 1755, when a formidable squadron and army were assembled at Brest, ostensibly for a descent on England. Jonas Hanway the philanthropist then turned his attention to the best mode of keeping up our breed of seamen. The Act of Queen Anne, which obliged every master of a vessel of thirty tons and upwards to take one or more apprentices from the parish, had proved inoperative, and Mr. Hanway had failed by his writings to induce the masters to comply with the law; so he called a meeting of merchants and shipowners at the Royal Exchange, and proposed that they should form themselves into a society for fitting out landsmen volunteers and boys to serve on board the king's ships. The proposal was received with enthusiasm; a society was formed, and officers were appointed, Mr. Hanway directing the entire operations. The result was the establishment, in 1756, of the Marine Society; an institution which has proved of real national advantage, and to this day is of great and substantial utility. Six years after the society was formed, 5451 boys, and 4787 landsmen volunteers, had been fitted out by the society and added to the navy; and to this day it is in active operation, about 600 poor boys, after a careful education, being annually apprenticed as sailors, principally in the merchant service.\*

There has been abundant discussion within the last year on the problem of finding a sufficiently numerous body of sailors to be ready for any sudden emergency. It has been proposed that the boys whom the country feeds, clothes, and educates in workhouses should be brought up with an eye to military or naval life, and should be drafted into the Queen's service. This proposal has been improved on by the substitution of reformatories for workhouses; and the amendment has received considerable support from several masters of reformatories, who declare that they have smuggled several of their juvenile penitents into ships (the young scapegraces would never be accepted openly), where they have proved themselves to be the smartest and sharpest of boys, far surpassing, for the requirements of naval life, the tame mediocrities that are picked up in the smooth roads of respectability.

On mere psychological grounds, this view is exceedingly probable. Ever since the asylum of Romulus, it has been held as a commonplace that the nucleus of a strong and enterprising community is a class of men with temperaments that run into extremes,

\* *Self-Help*, by Samuel Smiles, p. 169.

—into the extreme of vice or the extreme of heroism,—and that sometimes unite the two, like Sir Walter Raleigh. They are not unimpeachable, well-conditioned citizens, that push on the bounds of civilisation, but buccaneers and filibusters, vikings and gold-diggers. It is the scapegrace element of civilised states which, unless it can find adventures abroad, becomes the “dangerous class” at home,—the class that lives on its wits, and is contrary to all men, and is especially disgusting to the sleek regularity of a monotonous civilisation. Mr. Mill, the apostle of individualism, acknowledges the similarity, even the specific identity, of the *prononcé* character which he admires, and the ill-regulated character which civilisation loathes and casts out. The originality that is chafed by the conventionalities of settled society has no other resource *in that society* than the eccentricities which society will not deign to distinguish from crimes. But give originality a favourable outlet, and it will soon find its place. It is partly because society gives them no other gangway, that a portion of our adventurers in course of time feel driven to adopt the line of crime. If they were not within, but on the outskirts of society, they would be, I will not say morally better, but politically in their place; they would have a genuine work to perform, a work every way adapted to their temperament. Originally, I believe, the French Zouaves formed a corps into which hardly any but men with bad characters were thrust: such men are naturally dare-devils, for they have characters to gain; and if they were to lose the only respectability that remains to them—their courage—they would be mere outcasts. They are thus put on their mettle; and of their bravery, which holds the same place in warfare as charity in Christianity, they make a cloak to cover the multitude of their sins,—to cover, I say, and palliate, not necessarily to root out; they do not at once give up their felonies, but in spite of them they become a reputable body, they even acquire the highest name in the army, because they are the best fighters: this first of military virtues makes their villany respectable, and they thieve and cosen by way of recreation in an easy facetious manner, which ought to reconcile the farmer to the destruction of his turkeys, and the cabman to the loss of his fare and to his broken head. If such things must be done, let them be made as pleasant as possible. Our sailors perform feats quite as questionable in the purlieus of Portsmouth, and we only think them very jolly dogs. However, I must not wrong the Zouaves; under the terrible pressure of their glory, the sense of respectability is growing in them, and they are becoming more conventional in their morality. Men like the first Zouaves are now too disreputable for their refined and rectified corporation; so under them another loose corps is being formed, more dare-devil than they, who will soon take their place; and then our old shaven and turbaned friends will become as sober and sedate as the line. Thus has this terrible corps proved itself to be a natural reformatory, self-improving, in which the men move altogether, always tending upwards in the scale, not altogether through outward

training, but through an inward development ruled by the necessities of their position and their own interests. There is no doubt that the frontiers of our immense empire afford scope enough for a natural reformatory on these principles. As the true supernatural reformatory is a Trappist convent, so the natural reformatory is naval and military service, with plenty of adventure, such as is only to be found on the frontiers of civilisation, in places where there may be the strictest discipline, but where the honour and glory within reach may prove enough to steady the character and to compensate for the deficient ballast of moral principle. The reformation of criminals is in great measure intrusted by the State to private care, or at least to that of the different religious communions; all alike feel the difficulty of providing for the reformed criminals that are about to leave their hands. Surely in our present dearth of defences, an association like the *Marine Society* might find means to equip them by twos and threes for joining services of adventure and peril, to the benefit both of the State and of the individuals.

Another idea has struck me with regard to the equipment of volunteers. The Government, in providing rifles free of expense, has admitted the principle that the country should bear some of the cost. At the same time, it has been found that some who would be the most valuable recruits, such as gamekeepers, are backward in joining on account of their not being able to afford the loss of their time. While this is occurring, one of our old national taxes is on the point of abolition,—a tax which as simple payment hurts nobody, and which is only grumbled at because it forces the poorer minority to pay for the religion of the richer majority as well as for its own. But give the tax a national object, and no one would dispute it. Now if one class of men has a greater interest than any other in keeping England from foreign meddling, it is the clergy of the Establishment; a week's dominion of a foreign power would suffice to tumble them down for ever: the land would remain, the funds might rise again, trade might revive; but the tithes, once in other hands, or appropriated to other uses, would never return to their present owners. Besides, the National Establishment has a sort of traditional connection with the volunteer movement. There was a time when every man in England was obliged by law to have a long-bow, to be one of those mediæval marksmen who did such execution at Cressy and Agincourt. The only living memorials of those times are the churchyard yew-trees from which the parishioners cut their bow-staves. The Establishment could make no cheaper nor more graceful offering to the volunteer fund than the church-rates; they would provide for the continued existence of the movement, and would prevent its being a mere temporary expedient; they would equip from five to twenty men in every parish in England, without any appreciable burden to the country, and without the political risk of a standing army. My proposition may look wild, but it seems to me to be both reasonable and feasible.

## THE TEMPORAL POWER.

SIR,—The demonstrations which have been provoked in almost every part of the Catholic Church by the alarm felt for the safety of the Pope's dominions, abundantly prove that the preservation of the temporal power is believed to be necessary, and that the possibility of its abolition has not been seriously contemplated by any Catholic competent to speak or deserving attention. This is a very important fact, as it seems to me; for the general consent and agreement of all Catholics, especially of all authorities amongst us, on this head, is a pledge for the duration of the temporal power, and a sign that, however menacing the aspect of affairs may be, and however virulent the attacks of enemies, there is no chance of their succeeding. For it is not to be believed that heretics and infidels could be the first to understand and to execute God's designs for His Church. To a Catholic this is enough, I imagine, to determine his hopes and his conduct at the present crisis. But though it is practically sufficient and satisfactory, it is no solution of the historical problem as to the relation between the temporal and the spiritual power. It may be that the moment is not favourable to the discussion of so great and difficult a question; and it may be thought that it is better not to enter on an inquiry in which no certainty and no unanimity can be expected, and that we ought not to discuss what it is our duty to defend. If that be so, I should not wish this letter to appear. I write only in the belief that it is really to the advantage of our cause that we should proceed, not blindly, or taking for granted things which we do not understand, but fully informed, and conscious of the design and nature of the institution which, to the utmost of our power, we are resolved to uphold.

I am not aware that it is matter of dispute among historians that, in the middle ages, the Pope could not have been free if he had not been a temporal sovereign. The long and determined conflict respecting the investiture of Bishops shows the greatness of the danger which threatened the Church from the feudal system; and it proves also that if the Pope had not been perfectly independent, he could not have vindicated the freedom of the episcopate. He could only be in the position either of a vassal or a suzerain. At one time it was even thought that the freedom of the Church could only be secured against feudalism by making all princes her feudatories; and in the empire and in other places the liberty of the clergy ultimately rested on a species of sovereignty. The independence of the Pope for a long time depended both upon his rights and his power as a sovereign, and it was repeatedly attacked and preserved by the sword. But when half of Europe had thrown off its allegiance, and the modern states increased so enormously in extent and in military force, the dominions of the Holy See ceased to be a real source of power, and their safety was committed to the public law of nations. Against Protestant powers, who were restrained by no respect for the spiri-

tual character of the Pope, his feeble armies would have been no protection. But when the immunity, which in Catholic ages had always been conceded in the long-run to the Head of the Catholic Church, was no longer recognised, and the fear of sacrilege ceased to be his safeguard, a substitute was afforded by a new political system which Protestants as well as Catholics accepted. When religious reverence and military power could no longer serve for his defence, a political principle took their place, which has been a more efficacious motive with Protestants than with Catholics. For France and Spain and the Empire have all made war in Italy against the temporal power of the Pope; but he was never menaced in his earthly crown by the enemies of his spiritual authority. Some such design was entertained by the revolutionary Calvinists in France; but it was soon abandoned, and was never adopted by any other Protestant community or any Protestant prince. The Holy See was sacred in their eyes because its dominion rested on the same rights as their own. It was an authority which they were politically interested in preserving. It was out of respect for the rights of legitimate authority that James I. refused to assist his daughter's husband to wrest the Bohemian and the Imperial crown from the head of a Catholic prince; as, in later times, Metternich objected to the emancipation of the Greeks for fear of infringing on the rights of the Sultan. Of this community of political interests between the Church and the states Clement XIV. speaks in an Encyclical Letter of 1769:

“Magna est inter divinæ ac humanæ potestatis jura conjunctio. . . . Quos igitur instruendos in Christi lege suscepistis, mature divino præcepto imbuendos curate: fidem regibus sancte esse servandam ab ipsis incunabulis percipiant, parendum auctoritati, legibus obsequendum non solum propter iram, sed etiam propter conscientiam. Cum ita populorum animi fuerint opera vestra excitati, non solum ut regibus dicto audientes sint, sed etiam ut eos colant, ac diligant, tum optime et civium tranquillitati et ecclesiæ utilitati, quæ inter se disjunctæ esse non possunt, consuletis.”\*

The temporal power of the Popes served as a protection to them, in the exercise of their ecclesiastical jurisdiction, so long as Catholics were committed to its preservation from motives of religion, and Protestants from motives of policy. It is evident that if either of these securities fails,—if the bonds of religion are loosened, or political principles abandoned,—instead of a double security, the temporal power will be a twofold source of peril, and a new era will be at hand, in which the Roman States must stand towards the Church

[\* “There is a close relationship between the laws of God's government and those of man's. . . . Take care, therefore, to make those whom it is your duty to instruct in religion learn God's commandments betimes. Let them be taught from the cradle that they must keep inviolate their allegiance to kings; respect authority; obey laws, not only for wrath, but also for conscience-sake. When you have brought the popular mind not only to observe the king's decree, but also to feel a hearty loyalty to him, you will have done the best possible service to the peace of the state and the progress of the Church—two things which are inseparably united.”—Ed.]

and towards the world in a position utterly different from that which they held in the middle ages, or even in more recent times. In an age which acknowledged the doctrines of legitimacy and of international law, they were the corner-stones of the European system; they will bring down upon the Church a political in addition to religious hostility in a revolutionary age. If at one time they made friends for the Pope among those who did not recognise his sacred character, under other circumstances they will add to the number and the strength of his enemies. It cannot be said that the temporal power must at all times stand on the same footing. I should wish, therefore, to propose, for the consideration of those who are competent to deal with so difficult an inquiry, these questions: Does not the institution of the temporal power rest on external and changeable causes, which have not always existed, and which may not exist always? Has not the progress of infidelity in religion, and of revolutionary ideas in politics, already brought about a considerable modification of the circumstances which have been generally adduced to account for the necessity of maintaining it? And should not the events of the last years induce us to entertain the question, whether the Roman States are sure always to fulfil their former purpose, under all conceivable circumstances of the world?

December 15th, 1859.

C. C.

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#### ROSMINI AND GIOBERTI.

SIR,—A writer in your last Number, who is an Italian, it appears, and a distinguished theologian, has objected that in an article entitled "Rosmini and Gioberti," I had identified the theory which establishes "*Ens creat existentias*" as a primitive intuition of consciousness with the philosophy of Italy. Your respected correspondent has mistaken me. I am quite aware, having spent six years in Italy, that the philosophy of neither of the above-named writers is universally encouraged; quite the contrary. But considering that their writings have mainly contributed to the revival of the Scholastic Realism, I ventured to call them and their adherents a "school;" and considering further that no other Italian writers in philosophy have made themselves felt in the world to the same extent, and during the present period, I ventured to call them the "Italian School." This title was meant, therefore, to designate, not the number of adherents their teaching may have acquired, but the country in which that teaching originated.

This is all that I am necessarily called upon to say; but since your correspondent evidently intends his strictures upon Gioberti for my edification, and aims at me through him, I do not shirk the controversy, provided my respected antagonist will fight me on level ground; for he mounts the high horse, and argues down at me. He contrasts what he calls the "true philosophy of Italy,"

which reaches the ideas of God and creation out of nothing, "by a consecutive process of reasoning," with the "spurious wares" of Gioberti, in which these ideas are put first instead of last. But how can I argue with one who considers certain views, merely because they are not the reigning views, nor his own views, nor perhaps his friends' views, as spurious wares? I cannot, I dare not match, on my side, this lofty confidence. I confess to an anxiety, even while I write, lest I should over-state, misstate, or mistake, somewhat through human frailty; or, worse, lest I go wrong altogether, and lend my feeble efforts to damage the cause of truth. Arguing, therefore, at a great disadvantage, I shall merely lay claim to that blessed *privilege of doubting* which, as to matters not of faith, nor self-evident, is always the right of every child of Adam, and sometimes a duty which we owe to our own weakness. If I fall in this case, my hurt will not be serious—not so serious, at any rate, as that of my adversary would be, whom any considerable blunder would bring crashing down from a pinnacle. I put the following objections, therefore, as merely reasonable doubts, against the position of your correspondent.

Supposing, then, that all the living Italian authorities,—and I know of none whose names sound loud enough to raise an echo,—supposing, I say, they all decide in an unqualified manner that "*Ens creat existentias*" is in no sense a primitive intuition of consciousness, I still doubt whether it follows as a matter of course that they are right and that Gioberti is wrong. It is not so very long since the sensationalism of Condillac was considered the "true philosophy of France;" but who now, either in France or elsewhere, believes in the sensationalism of Condillac? Besides, the formula "*Ens creat existentias*" may be misunderstood, as the "*Cogito, ergo sum*"\* of Descartes was misunderstood, and as the whole drift of Hume's philosophy was misunderstood.†

Secondly, I doubt if the main position of Gioberti, properly understood, be not far more consistent with the philosophy current in Italy than my opponent is disposed to admit. He accuses that writer of beginning at the wrong end; he says, that to start with the axiom "*Ens creat existentias*" is a mistake, and that in Italy it is taught that this axiom supposes the knowledge of existing things and their relations—"especially of the *Ego!*" But has not my respected opponent misunderstood Gioberti? For my part, I thought the question at issue between the two grand schools of philosophy regarded the origin (*origo*), not the starting (*exordium*) of our knowledge. I thought it was agreed that our knowledge started

\* Descartes' axiom, "*Cogito, &c.*," meant that the "*Ego*" is only known as conscious. He was supposed to have intended it as a proof of his own existence.

† Hume exploded Locke's philosophy by pushing it to its consequences; but these consequences were attributed to him as though he held them, whereas he was a sceptic—had no philosophy of his own. Sir W. Hamilton corrects this mistake in his *Lectures*, and in his *Notes on Reid*.

with *sense*, which puts us into contact with the world of objects around us; and I certainly understand Gioberti to say that we have no *definite* knowledge prior to sensible experience. As to the order in which we know objects, I should have thought no general rule could be given on the subject, since it must be different in different individuals according to circumstances; that one man would know that there is a God, the Lord and Creator of the universe, sooner than another; but that of course all knowledge must suppose the *Ego*, or knowing subject. The question, I take it, is this: whensoever we *do* know, and whatsoever objects we know, to distinguish that part of our knowledge which is due to and justified by the object given in experience from that which is due to and justified by the subject knowing. I thought it was the answer given to this question which had generated the different schools on the origin of our knowledge: that some derived, or at least justified, all our knowledge by experience; that others maintained that necessary truths, like the *principle of causation*, cannot be accounted for by experience; and that these latter are divided again into those who make necessary truth a mere law of our thought, and those who attach to it a reality independent of our thought. If I am mistaken in this view of the case,—which all my readings in philosophy seem to justify,—I have made a sad blunder in my estimation of Gioberti; but if my opponent be mistaken, his mistake altogether disqualifies him from judging how far Gioberti's teaching is consistent with Italian teaching. With regard to Gioberti's copula "*creat*," that writer considers it identical with the principle of causation absolutely considered; and the same principle of causation absolutely considered is the proof of creation given by St. Thomas Aquinas.\* Now this principle, though of course it supposes experience, is held to be *à priori* by a very considerable body, indeed by the vast majority, of philosophers. Is it not one of those *eternal truths* which St. Thomas identifies with the "*Lumen Intellectuale*"?† I mention St. Thomas, because his authority is immense in the schools of Italy. But what did St. Thomas think of those philosophers who, following Plato and St. Augustine, "*qui doctrinis Platoniorum imbutus fuerat*,"‡ based their philosophy on the Absolute manifested in necessary truths, and in the light of that idea descended to the contemplation of creatures? He tells us (adopting the words of St. Augustine), "that if they who are called philosophers have perchance said things which are true and agreeable to our faith, such are *to be reclaimed from them to our own use, as from usurpers*:"§ and again, that some things are known in the *principle of cognition*, "*sicut in sole videntur ea quæ videntur per solem*" (Plato's own illustration); that the intellectual light which is within us is a certain participated resemblance of the Divine Light, in which are contained the *eternal reasons of things*. He legitimated both methods,—the method of invention (*via inventionis*), "by

\* 1, xlv. 1.

† 12, qu. lxxxiv. art. 5.

‡ Ibid.

§ Ibid.

which, through temporal things, we come to the knowledge of eternal things;" and the synthetical method (*via judicii*), "by which, through eternal things already known, we judge of temporal things."\* Nor does he allude here to truths known by revelation, but to *necessary truths*, in the philosophical sense of the word, in reference to an opinion about the "scientificum principium animæ quo cognoscit necessaria." But enough; I do not want to say with M. Hauréau† that St. Thomas is a realist; but merely to make it appear, that if St. Thomas respected the philosophy of Plato, the Italians ought to respect the philosophy of Gioberti.

One more doubt, and I have done. It refers to the authority of St. Bonaventure. My opponent objects that in his *Itinerarium* the Saint follows the realistic method, because there he speaks not as a philosopher but as a theologian; but that in his scientific works he follows the other method, and argues from creatures to God, as for example: "Cum nos non cognoscamus Deum nisi per creaturas, nos non nominamus Eum nisi per nomina creaturarum."‡ Now I know it matters little which method is followed; and that Fenelon, who certainly is a realist, follows the conceptualistic method. But what was my astonishment, on verifying the passage, to find that *these are not the words of St. Bonaventure*, but what "QUIDAM VOLUERUNT DICERE," in support of a position of which he says, "SED HÆC POSITIO NON VIDETUR STARE."§ Has it indeed come to this? Has my opponent culled a text at random from his author, without reading the context; or chosen one of those cut-and-dried specimens out of some miserable compendium, to aim at my poor but painstaking essay? Far from saying that we only name God by the names of creatures, St. Bonaventure says that some of the names which we give to God "habent oppositum in omni creatura, ut ÆTERNITAS ET IMMENSITAS."|| That we only name God by the names of creatures would directly contradict his conclusion, viz. *that some of the names which we give to God are transferred from creatures, some not*. He admits, indeed, that we only know God *through creatures*; and that he might do as a realist; but he expressly denies that we only name Him through creatures: although we only know God *through creatures*, yet we may know more of Him than creatures tell us, and name Him by that more. This is St. Bonaventure's opinion about the matter.

\* 12, lxxix. art. 9.

† Hauréau maintains that, in such passages as those quoted, St. Thomas preserves an element of the Platonic realism; though no one more successfully refuted those *realised abstractions*, the *per se bonitas*, *per se sapientia*, &c., which are the weak point in scholastic realism. Hauréau's opinion on this subject ought to have weight, because his own views are nominalistic, and St. Thomas is the hero of his book, save when the Saint platonizes. I have not endorsed that opinion (though I certainly do not wish to contradict it); for it seems to me that St. Thomas tacitly qualifies the statement of St. Augustine (Hauréau, *De la Philosophie Scholastique*, tom. ii.).

‡ Lib. i. Sent. xxii. quæst. 3.

§ See Note at the end.

|| Ibid.

I have not tried in all this to prove my own, but merely to throw doubt on my adversary's position, and, if possible, to shake his faith. Who knows if my doubts may not excite in his mind a healthy doubt? If he be right, such a doubt cannot harm him, but, on the contrary, will tend to confirm him in the truth; and if he be wrong, the doubt will be of immense advantage. Doubting in religion, where God speaks, is very wicked; but to doubt in philosophy may be an excellent thing. "There is a great difference (says Malebranche) between doubting and doubting. We doubt through passion and brutality, through blindness and malice, and finally, through fancy and the very wish to doubt; but we doubt also from prudence and through distrust, from wisdom and through penetration of mind. The former doubt is a doubt of darkness which never issues to the light, but leads us always further from it; the latter is a doubt which is born of the light, and which aids in a certain sort to produce light in its turn."\*

M.

## NOTE.

The context of St. Bonaventure.

"CONCLUSIO. *Non omnia nomina quæ de Deo dicantur translative censeri debent, cum quædam propriè dicantur, licet nonnulla secundum similitudinem de Ipso verificentur.* Resp. ad Arg. AD HOC VOLUERUNT QUIDAM DICERE quòd quædam sunt nomina quæ Deus Sibi imposuit, quædam quæ nos Ei imposuimus. Si loquamur de nominibus quæ Deus Sibi imposuit, cum ipse se propriè intelligat, hujusmodi nomina sunt propria, et talia dicuntur esse, *Bonum*, et *Qui Est*. Unde Dionysius videtur velle quòd illud nomen, *Bonum*, solum sit proprium et principale. Damascenus quòd illud nomen, *Qui Est*, solum est proprium et principale. Si autem loquamur de nominibus quæ nos Ei imposuimus, *sic cum nos non cognoscamus Deum nisi per creaturas, nos non nominamus Eum nisi per nomina creaturarum*;† ideo solum translative, sive quia propriùs et priùs conveniunt creaturæ: sive quia prius imposita sunt creaturæ, quamvis non propriùs conveniant creaturæ. Et hæc est translatio quædam, quamvis, propriè loquendo, sit translatio, quando propriùs conveniunt iis a quibus transferuntur, ut ridere hominibus propriùs quam brutis. SED HÆC POSITIO NON VIDETUR STARE. CUM ENIM NOS COGNOSCAMUS DEUM TRIPLICITER, SCILICET, PER EFFECTUM, ET PER EXCELLENTIAM, ET PER ABLATIONEM, constat quòd omnibus his modis contingit Deum nominare."

\* Quoted by Sir W. Hamilton, lecture v. vol. i.

† These italics only are mine, to indicate the passage quoted against me.

## THE THEORY OF PARTY.

SIR,—To me, as a Catholic and a foreigner, the Numbers which I have seen of the New Series of the *Rambler* have been particularly welcome, because, in its general design of bringing into closer communication with each other the Catholics of different countries, and of seeking by the exchange of opinions to increase their agreement as to ends and means, the review seems to me to aim at satisfying a great desideratum of the day. The unity of our Church is her glory and her strength. To preserve that unity in doctrine, and to promote it in liturgical matters, is primarily the business of the clergy, above all, of the episcopate. The union of Catholics in things not essential, or not immediately connected with the exercise of religion, and especially in questions belonging to the political domain, seems, on the contrary, rather to pertain to the free, combined efforts of all educated men. How far the distinctive tendency of our time towards centralisation and generalisation, with respect both to nations and individuals, is justifiable and useful ; how far particular circumstances require to be considered, and existing facts to be regarded,—such questions, and many others affecting the progress of religious life, can be gradually illustrated and made clear only by means of a thorough discussion among those who are interested in them. Nations must learn, like individuals, from each other. We are forced inevitably to the conclusion that every race is called to lay upon the common altar its particular offering ; and that the real harmony, which is the end of all labours in the pursuit of the true, the good, and the beautiful, can only be realised provided unity be not lost in diversity or variety in uniformity, but that they combine with each other, in order, by a healthy action and reaction, and by mutual encouragement, to keep all forces in constant play. To this result nothing can contribute more largely than the boundless increase of means of communication by all the inventions which are justly the pride of our age, and by which the Church has acquired for the fulfilment of her universal mission an instrument whose power no imagination can fathom, and which has already supplied abundant compensation for all that is wanting to our generation in comparison with others. What power of faith must it not have required to remain faithful to that mission in the midst of all the contrasts and divisions of the middle ages ! Now that the ocean is bridged over, the Church extends her hand and her word in the space of a minute farther than was formerly possible in years. All that is required is the will and the deed. *Surge igitur et fac, et erit Dominus tecum.*

I should be anxious to base on these general observations some special remarks on several former articles in the *Rambler*, and especially on the controversy respecting that revival of Gothic art in which I have taken a very active share. For the present, my attention is directed to an article in Part III., on the "Theory of Party."

The occasion of my reflections is an article in the *Saturday Review*, in which the *Rambler* was spoken of in a way which was enough to make its conductors uneasy, when they compare it with that series of disgraceful attacks on the Papacy, the priesthood, and the institutions of Rome, of which an article in the same Number, on the "Pope's Subjects," affords a shameful example. Such praise from such a quarter must compel the Catholic to whom it is addressed seriously to examine his conscience. Nevertheless, it is not without diffidence that I venture to suggest my doubts. Though for more than ten years I have been engaged in the party conflicts of our parliamentary life in Prussia, during which the questions of the relation of Church and State, of one confession with another, and of political parties with religious belief, have been so constantly discussed, that there is hardly a point which they offer that remains unexamined; yet I feel how difficult it is to apply our continental experience as a standard for judging English affairs, with the details and the connection of which I am but superficially acquainted. I know that such questions as these are not to be decided on abstract principles, but that the principle must often yield according to circumstances. I beg, therefore, that what I say may be considered simply as *rationes dubitandi*, not as the expression of my fixed conviction respecting the tactics to be pursued by the Catholic members of parliament.

The introductory portion of the article contains remarks on the necessity of fixed party formations in general, which no man of practical experience can call in question. My objections begin at the passage (p. 340), that all members of parliament "must range themselves with tolerable permanence into two fixed armies, and no more." I do not believe that this is in the nature of parliamentary government. On the contrary, I believe that it would inevitably lead to the supremacy of a mere numerical majority, and consequently to the ruin of any higher organisation of political life. It is true, that if the sentence is to be understood as you have explained it in the next line,—or if we are to represent to ourselves the third party as a highway robber, turning now upon one party, now upon the other, solely for the sake of booty, or making the most profitable compact which the circumstances of the moment admit of with one party to-day, and with the other to-morrow, so that its resources should be perfidy, treachery, and intrigue,—doubtless it must then be condemned. To make so criminal a sport of all the highest interests of the country, can only lead to its ruin, or at least to the disgraceful bankruptcy of the party that attempts it. But that does not appear to me to be the only alternative which we have to consider. I believe that it is not only possible, but advisable, to form a party between or above the existing parties; sometimes honourably combining with them, sometimes promoting an independent policy by making use of the dissensions of the other. I believe that, especially in countries which are not Catholic, but where Catholics constitute an imposing minority, such a policy is positively

a necessity for them, as there is otherwise a serious danger that their influence will be neutralised or made subservient to hostile purposes. For the formation of a healthy party, I believe that it must rest on a certain agreement of principle. Where can this be found in a higher degree than among those who are sincerely attached to the same faith? A real Catholic is distinguished, not only in his external religious practices, but in all his leading views of social life, of history, of the ends of mankind, and of the means most adapted for attaining them,—unquestionably, therefore, in politics,—from the followers of other religious systems. He has his own peculiar starting-point and his own peculiar aims. He is bound to carry his confession of faith into all the relations of life. If any body doubts this, let him cast a glance at the enemy's camp. I will concentrate into one sentence all my objections to this proposition of the *Rambler*; that is, that it would only be right and practicable when our adversaries, who are stronger than ourselves, begin virtually to acknowledge its truth. I say *virtually*, because friendly words, such as the *Saturday Review* bestows on us, are of little value so long as the actions of Protestants do not agree with them. If we may judge by the words and actions of English statesmen, this is certainly not the case. The No-Popery cry is the groundwork of their policy. In the face of distinct facts, of information which is readily accessible to them, they sympathise with Garibaldi against Pius IX., with mutiny and rebellion against the most ancient and venerable of authorities, they believe in priests who are the outcasts of the Church, eagerly collect every lie which accuses the clergy, and coalesce with their own most dangerous enemies, provided they are also enemies of the Catholic Church, and instruments to deal her a blow withal. For this purpose every weapon comes handy to them. Every symptom of dissaffection towards the Holy See, wherever it may appear, is promoted and encouraged. In this respect, if I am rightly informed, all parties are alike, though Lord Palmerston may be a little worse than others. Under these circumstances, I cannot understand how Catholic members can identify themselves with either party in questions which either directly or indirectly affect foreign policy. In England less than in any other country, can home interests be disconnected from foreign relations, or can escape their influence. But, independently of this, experience forbids us to expect that either of the great parties will consent without compulsion to recognise the equal rights of Catholics in matters of legislation and government, or will even be disposed to treat them with fairness. If this be so, why should not your public men be perpetually reminded of the necessity of pursuing the ways of right and justice?—by the presence of a Catholic party, whose leaders should incessantly keep them in that road with all the power of the votes they can command, and at every declamation concerning misgovernment in Austria and Italy, concerning nationality and tolerance, Mortara and Madiat, should remind the declaimers of the adage, *Medice, cura teipsum*, and should advance a claim to those philanthropic sympathies, in the first place, on be-

half of themselves and of their brethren in faith. It is true that this may be done by every Catholic member in his own name ; but every body knows what right is worth without might, and it is a lesson which all experience teaches, that only the union of forces gives strength. Men of the greatest ability and strength of will become gradually weakened in the midst of great parties, and at last are absorbed by them. When you say (p. 343), "Freedom such as ours must always be accompanied by a certain restlessness," and "Parties are necessary to educate statesmen," I would ask why Catholics in particular must forego the opportunity of educating their statesmen in a party of their own, and of obtaining complete liberty by means of party action. Why should they not exercise "the watchful control of opposition" from their own point of view, of course "by honest means" ?

This brings me to the distinction (p. 345) between social and political questions, of which I do not deny the truth and the importance ; nor do I doubt that most of the grievances of Catholics are of a social and domestic character. But if their removal is to be expected from time and the course of events, I can only share the expectation on condition that Catholics on their part shall zealously contribute to its fulfilment, and shall take advantage of every opportunity to act, and to consolidate themselves, in order to regain inch by inch the ground of which they are unjustly deprived. *Fortes fortuna juvat.* "*Aide-toi, le ciel t'aidera.*" But for this end the representatives of the people in parliament must take the lead with a good example. Reserve on their part may be taken for indolence or cowardice, or even for the result of selfish calculation ; and this would necessarily weaken the activity of the Catholic people, and would diminish their interest in parliamentary life, and in elections. Assuredly it is not right to bring into discussion matters of religious interest ; but at the same time they are not to be timorously avoided. It is needful that the ears of our adversaries should gradually grow accustomed to the sound of Catholic truths, and that they should abandon the belief that our just demands can be baffled by silence. He that is in possession of power is always tempted to overlook the right which is on the other side. Obviously it is to his advantage to do so. If Catholics have once actually obtained equal rights, the rest may be safely left to the natural progress of things, to the course of history, and the free competition of daily life. But so long as this fair trial is not granted, whilst sun and wind are unequally distributed between the combatants, it is necessary constantly to point out this inequality, and to omit no fair and loyal means of removing it. One who is reduced to defend himself grasps at every weapon, in order to get rid of his assailant by any means. I do not think that it is true to say, that in England "the distinction between Catholics and Protestants has fallen out of the political into the social order." On the contrary, as I have said, opposition to Catholicism, not perhaps chiefly on English ground, is the substance of the policy of both Whig and Tory statesmen. Should they

succeed by revolutionary or diplomatic means in wounding the heart of Catholicism in Rome, they imagine that in England and elsewhere it will then expire of itself. English Catholics cannot expect of their government that it will exhibit for Pius IX. the same sympathy as for the sultan of Turkey or Morocco; but they are able and bound to insist that the resources of the country, to which they contribute their portion, should not be applied to the destruction of the Papacy by encouraging the revolution in the Roman States. As soon as on the other side there is no such thing as a specially Protestant policy, we, for our part, shall gladly give up any thing like a distinctive Catholic policy. But as things now stand, the latter is produced by the former, and the Catholics find themselves in a defensive position. It is the duty as well as the right of every patriot to warn the government of his country from the ways of unrighteousness, and prevent it, as far as possible, from pursuing them. For my part, I am persuaded that not the liberty only but the safety of England are endangered by the blind antipathy of her statesmen for the Catholic Church. I may refer for a confirmation of my view to the words of Count de Montalembert, who is certainly as deeply interested as any man in the safety and the freedom of England: "*Mais un jour viendra, bientôt peut-être, et toujours trop tôt au gré des amis de la liberté et de la civilisation, où elle apprendra quelle insigne folie elle a commise en rangeant contre elle, à côté de toutes les animosités, de toutes les rancunes, de toutes les jalousies qu'elle excite, et que chaque jour elle aggrave, les justes ressentiments et les filiales douleurs de cent millions de Catholiques.*" Against the grovelling want of principle and awe for might, which is penetrating all departments of public life in England, are the Catholic members not to form a firm alliance among themselves, or to stand up as one man on every occasion? If they are willing to do this, they must join in a narrower circle, in a separate party, otherwise they will be absorbed by the great parties, or disabled by the rules of party organisation. I deny that the essential character of an independent opposition necessarily consists, when parties are nearly balanced, in conspiring to render any ministry insecure that should not adopt the proposals of a faction for government measures (p. 349). I might appeal to the example of the Catholic fraction in the Prussian Chamber of Deputies for a proof that an independent opposition is compatible with perfect loyalty towards the government, as well as the other parties. It is only necessary that the Catholic deputies should demand nothing for themselves, but only justice for their cause; that they should acknowledge and promote what is good and true, from whatever side it may come; that they should not speculate on a ministerial crisis; above all, that they should keep free from the fatal system of pessimism. Both in the storms of 1848, and in all later times, the Catholic members of all German parliaments have on the whole preserved their patriotism unimpugned; and the Catholic fraction in the Prussian Chamber has certainly nothing to reproach itself with on this score. In order to possess

influence, Catholics must not neglect that which gives their adversaries strength,—unity in all things which can serve to strengthen or to assist their religion. Though it is true that “a Catholic does not know every thing because he knows his catechism,” this certainly does not prove that a Catholic may ever forget the fundamental truths of his catechism, in order to live not only in peace but in alliance with those who are continually attacking them. If it were true, which I much question, that “Catholic principles have about as much to say to most of your technical legislative questions as they have to algebra, grammar, and geography ; that budgets, tariffs, and reform (?) no more require Catholic principles for their solution than they require phrenology” (p. 351),—it would at least be necessary to wait until our adversaries acknowledge this for Protestantism, and no longer find in every question of the day,—above all, in questions of power,—an element which they can use for their own ends. A Catholic party may disappear on the day when those who hitherto have opposed the interests of the Church in parliament accept the principles laid down by the *Rambler* as binding on themselves, when they learn, in short, on their side, that *politician* is the substantive, *Protestant* the adjective. So long as this equality does not exist, let the Catholic minority remember the maxim, *Vis unita fortior*. Although a Catholic party can neither be Whig nor Tory, Conservative nor Radical, it does not follow that it must be on unfriendly terms with all these parties,—for this simple reason, that it is essentially defensive in its character ; and its aid must be sought by each of the other parties, and in all questions where no religious element is involved it must amalgamate with one of them. If it is true that “society must be changed before your social condition can be improved,” I believe that this desirable change can only be brought about, provided Catholics courageously raise up their standard against the others, in order that in all classes of society men may become used to see Catholic rights, Catholic ways, and Catholic habits asserting and developing themselves. Too long have the faithful of almost all countries consented to live by tolerance, in subordination and submission, and have left to their enemies the public voice, and the supreme direction of the government, the parliament, and the press. So long as we consent to be led, we must obey.

Permit me to assure you that I am conscious of perfect freedom from animosity against strangers in faith, that I have never uttered an uncivil word against Protestants as such, that I consider every oppression of conscience as absolutely pernicious. It is precisely because I believe that the time has come for open competition to prevail both in faith and reason,—that is, between systems of belief and of secular opinion,—and because I have confidence in the power of truth, that I desire that Catholics should also ride into the lists with visors open and with serried ranks, and should not hold the office of varlets and squires in the tourney. I would also add, that I am far from attributing to the mass of the Protestant people of England

the responsibility of the unworthy conduct of the press towards the Church. It is not possible that the good sense, or the common sense, which is the peculiar attribute of your countrymen, should not be shamed and disgusted by the absurdities and the injustice with which men seek to outrage a religion whose history is half the history of the world, whose followers are hundreds of millions, which was the religion of their own forefathers, and by the rancour with which they endeavour to bring down contempt and hatred upon her, which is only to be explained by the adage, *Odisse quem læseris*.

I had more to say on this and other topics, which I must keep for another time, or I fear that you will stop reading before I have stopped writing.

Cologne, November 1859.

A. REICHENSPERGER.

[There is no public man on the continent of Europe to whose opinions on the questions discussed in the above letter we should listen with greater attention and respect than those of our correspondent. With great part of his remarks we cordially agree. Where we differ from him, it is on no question of judgment, but on a question of fact; we doubt his conclusion as to what ought to be, only because we are not convinced by his statement of what actually is. That Catholics cannot enter into coalition or into opposition with either party on principle, is our firm conviction also. Herr Reichensperger concludes from this that the political must be coincident with the religious party, that all Catholics ought to form it, and that it ought to be formed all of Catholics. In order to establish this point, it would have been necessary to prove what he has only affirmed; and we deny that religion is a sufficient bond of political agreement among Catholics, and a sure source of political hostility to them among Protestants, in this country. The very same problem, on as large a scale and as conspicuous a scene, has occupied the political career of our correspondent. He would add to our obligations, and to the service he has already contributed towards a Catholic theory of party, if he would furnish us, in a future communication, with the detail of his own experience, and describe the course of policy by which the problem, which is of all others practically the most important for us, has been solved, under circumstances very similar to our own, by the Catholics of Prussia.—ED.]

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## Literary Notice.

*The Historical Evidences of the Truth of the Scripture Records stated anew, with special reference to the Doubts and Discoveries of Modern Times: the Bampton Lectures for 1859.* By George Rawlinson, M.A. (London: Murray.) The great significance of Dr. Newman's Essay on Development was, that it showed his disciples how to treat Christianity as a fact, not as a theory. "It has been long enough in the world," he begins, "to justify us in dealing with it as a fact in the world's history. Its genius and character, its doctrines, precepts, and objects, cannot be treated as matters of private opinion or deduction;" it "must be ascertained as other facts." While, on the other hand, "the hypothesis has met with wide reception in these latter ages, that Christianity does not fall within the province of history; that it is to each man what each man thinks it to be, and nothing else."

Mr. Mansel, in his *Bampton Lectures*, has continued the tradition, by criticising our thought, and proving that it is absolutely without the power which this hypothesis assumes for it, and has for his pains been savagely assaulted both by rationalists and mystics, who perceived that in criticising reason he was setting bounds to the private judgment in matters of religion. What Mr. Mansel has so ably done in general for the whole ground, the Bampton lecturer of this year has undertaken to do in detail for a part of it. "Christianity," he begins, "is in nothing more distinguished from the other religions of the world than in its objective or historical character." Both in the Jewish dispensation and in the Christian "we find a scheme of doctrine which is bound up with facts; which depends absolutely upon them; which is null and void without them; and which may be regarded as for all practical purposes established, if they are shown to deserve acceptance." Though neither Mr. Mansel nor Mr. Rawlinson appear to contemplate the history of doctrine as part of the evidence, their principles must lead them to see that the only way of solving the problem, which of the present rival bodies of doctrine, each claiming to be true, is the real representative of the faith held in the first, second, or fourth century, is, to treat the doctrine like a philosophical tenet, and to trace its continuity in the same way as we trace the continuity of a philosophical school, by exhibiting its unity of idea under the changes of language which the development of human thought has forced it to assume. This is Dr. Newman's method; it is historical, not dialectical; it gives the rules for experimental investigation and proof, not for *à-priori* deduction. Both Mr. Mansel and Mr. Rawlinson sometimes permit themselves to speak as if they did not understand this; as if they considered the theory of development as a set of rules for the human mind in its creation and modification of revealed doctrines; and as

if they thought that the historical evidences, as distinct from the doctrines of Christianity, were the only legitimate objects of religious thought.

Mr. Rawlinson's book is one solely of evidences, as much so as Paley's *Horæ Paulinæ*. As the brother of the celebrated Sir Henry Rawlinson, the interpreter of the cuneiform inscriptions of Assyria, he has enjoyed unique opportunities for elucidating all those passages of the Old Testament where the history of the Jews touches the history of Assyria, Babylon, or Egypt. While the historians and prophets of the Jews were writing the national chronicles that are preserved to us in the books of Kings and Paralipomena, Ezra, Esther, and Nehemiah, the scribes and priests of Assyria and Egypt were writing their national chronicles in cuneiform and hieroglyphical inscriptions, which have either been buried till a few years since, or which it has only lately been possible to interpret. Thus we have three independent lines of tradition; and now when they are confronted, they are found not only to tally, but to be full of those remarkable and striking incidental coincidences which are always considered the clearest proofs of veracity and genuineness, because most impossible to forge. Mr. Rawlinson has treated this part of his subject with a knowledge that none but he and his brother could bring to bear upon it.

This, however, only applies to three of the eight lectures; the three last are occupied with a restatement of the evidences for the historical veracity of the New Testament, in which nothing new is brought forward; but the old is clearly and forcibly put. And the two first lectures are concerned, one with a general view of the subject; the other with the Pentateuch, and the veracity of Moses. In the second we consider Mr. Rawlinson decidedly feeble. He illustrates Horne Tooke's saying, "If a man has a single fact or observation to communicate, he writes a book on the whole subject of which that is a part." We cannot conceive how it is an evidence of Moses' account of the creation, to prove that the narrative agrees with the best profane authorities; that Berossus' account of the creation is in harmony with Scripture, and that the scriptural history of the deluge is similar to that both of Berossus and Abydenus. The difficulties which are felt with regard to these events are drawn almost entirely from the physical, not from the historical, sciences. A comparison between Moses and profane authorities assimilates the former to the latter quite as much as it does the latter to the former. The creation was an event witnessed by no man; if described, otherwise than by scientific induction, it must be by revelation; if Berossus has a proximately true account of it, it remains to be explained how he, as well as Moses, comes to be a channel of revelation; it must be discovered whether he is an independent witness; if he is not, he proves nothing; if he is, he only introduces the difficulty we have just mentioned. If both Berossus and Moses incorporated an older tradition into their writings, then the inspired origin of this tradition has to be shown before it can be assumed to be a proper

revelation. These questions are not touched by Mr. Rawlinson : we consider them capable of a solution completely favourable to religion ; but we must own that Mr. Rawlinson's second lecture suggested to us many more difficulties than it solved.

As he has rather gone out of his way to grapple with Genesis, he might have done the same for the books of the Machabees and for Judith. But he only says, "I am not concerned to defend the historical accuracy of the books of the Machabees ; much less that of Judith and the second Esdras, which seem to be mere romances." The Church of England reads the two former books for instruction, as true, if not inspired. The lectures would have been more valuable if they had been considered. It is *conceivable* that Judith may be a mere parable, like the history of Dives and Lazarus, or the Good Samaritan. By all means let us have the historical evidence for and against it duly and fairly sifted ; for this, unlike the Mosaic cosmogony, is a question on which historical argument and research may throw considerable light.

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## Contemporary Events.

### HOME AFFAIRS.

#### 1. *Catholic Policy.*

As the period of parliamentary action approaches, the question discussed in our September Number obtains more pressing importance. What ought to be the position of Catholics among political parties? or rather, by what principle is their conduct towards them to be regulated? In examining the theory of party government, we arrived at a negative conclusion,—that an essentially Catholic party, such as that which was led by Montalembert in France before 1848, and such as has subsisted since that year in Prussia, chiefly under the guidance of the eminent man whose letter appears in our present Number, is, under our present circumstances, impracticable; whilst, at the same time, to attach ourselves in a body to either of the predominant parties would be suicidal. We separated ourselves, therefore, from the policy which was adopted by the English and Irish Catholics in parliament in 1832, and from the policy which was attempted in 1852. Our views were resumed in the words: "The Catholic politician must learn that *politician* is the substantive, *Catholic* the adjective. The consideration he enjoys will depend on the depth of his political powers; it is only after he is a useful member absolutely that he can expect to be a useful Catholic member." Before proceeding to the consideration of the practical consequences of our statement, that political success depends on a political system, we may obtain an illustration of our meaning from the events which now occupy the thoughts and the fears of the Catholic world. The filial reverence and attachment felt for the Holy Father, and the belief that the dangers which environ him are promoted, if not caused, by enmity to the Church, have provoked a very general and imposing declaration of opinion in favour of the pre-

servation of his sovereign rights. Yet it is astonishing how seldom the question has been put on its right grounds, and how rarely its political nature has been understood. With the great majority of Catholics in France, England, and Ireland, religious feeling has prevailed at the price of consistency, and of the power which consistency alone gives over political ideas. In other cases politics have prevailed over religion. The latter is exemplified in a letter of Mr. Martin S. Lawler, which was read at the Killarney meeting, and expresses the views of a whole class: "As a liberal in politics, I entertain such a profound conviction of the right of every nation to regulate its own affairs, as between the governed and the governors, that I cannot lend the aid of my humble voice to a movement which must contemplate interference with the political rights of a foreign people." This is consistent. Here is a man who believes in the right of insurrection, who sees no wrong in the Tuscan or Lombard revolution, who would probably apply the same principle nearer home, and who is unwilling to blow hot and cold, and to weigh the acts of the Pope's subjects in a different balance from those of their neighbours. He starts from a false premise, and arrives logically at a false conclusion. But the false premise is shared by others who come to a right conclusion, but in such a way that their advocacy of it is illogical and powerless. In France we have seen some striking instances of this. Many of those who now denounce the policy which endangers the stability of the Papal crown, gloried in the invasion of Lombardy, and were blind to the peril with which that flagrant crime menaced every throne and every right in Europe. The *Correspondant* declared that it was not necessary to break with the modern system of ideas; that the theory of the sovereignty of the people was recognised

by the public law of Europe, and was good political doctrine; and on this revolutionary ground attempted to resist the acts of the revolution. In a letter to the *Times*, Mr. Ball implicitly acknowledges the same view; for he "fully admits that the people of Romagna have just the same right to seek the amelioration of their political condition as the subjects of any temporal power." But the attempt to defend his position on no principle at all originally broke down, and gave an opportunity for a very fair reply. To conciliate Liberals, Catholics abroad and at home have too often given up principles of their own, and have adopted the false system of their opponents. The attack on the temporal power has brought to light the danger of such conduct. The defenders of the Pope, as well as his opponents, may learn a lesson of Bishop Moriarty: "I was within earshot of the Sardinian cannon when they were driving the Austrians before them at Mantua; and though I could not approve of an aggressive warfare, yet I could not help rejoicing in their success; and when I stood amid that forest of marble spires which crown the Cathedral of Milan, and looked at the great wall of the Alps spanning from the Mediterranean to the Adriatic,—when I sailed on those enchanting lakes embosomed in an earthly paradise only less beautiful than the bright heavens reflected in their waters; I asked myself what business had the Austrian stranger there? (*Loud cheers.*) Yes, my friends, I would be glad to see Italy for the Italians; but as long as I preach the Gospel I cannot sanction rebellion, unless where tyranny is excessive. Put down revolution. Pius IX. will lead the way, as he did before in the path of liberal and enlightened reform, and you will have the Italian people free, happy, and contented."

It would be well if Catholics hearkened to the political utterances of such a teacher. Unfortunately the audience seem to have heard in silence the condemnation of revolution and aggressive warfare, and to have received with loud cheers the passage about the "Austrian stranger."

It was formerly the boast of Eng-

lish parties that they were equally attached to the constitution. The state was considered almost equally safe whether Whigs or Tories were in power. They differed as to what was to be done, not concerning what already existed. It was no discredit for a man to choose his party by personal attachment. No political principle was involved on either side. Burke relates of himself how "it was his fortune, unknowing and unknown to the then ministry, by the intervention of a common friend, to become connected with a very noble person;" and how, almost by accident, he became a follower of the Rockingham Whigs, without apparently examining whether their opinions altogether agreed with his own. Pitt, the friend of Parliamentary Reform and of Catholic Emancipation, was long the idol of the Tories, and the leader, not of the Tories only, but of the great majority of the Whigs. More than once he was on the point of holding office jointly with Fox. At that time both parties had much in common; they both took their stand on the basis of the revolution of 1688, and of the settlement which followed, after the disappearance of the Jacobite party. In the party conflicts of the day no great principle was at stake. The French Revolution brought forward into public importance a theory which had prevailed till then chiefly in Unitarian meeting-houses, and which was immediately adopted by a number of public men whose religion for the most part was not very remote in its character from that of Price or Priestley. The appearance of the revolutionary opinions immediately effected a new division of parties, and showed that the former division had a different cause. One party adopted substantially the system of the revolution, which, in the shape of liberalism, philosophic radicalism, or enlightened Toryism, now prevails. The other party remained faithful to the old habits and traditions, and to the old contempt for a political system. The consequence was, that in spite of the splendid success of their foreign policy, their negative conservatism was gradually conquered by the theories of progress, and at last the hollowness

of their system became so ludicrously manifest, that their own leader undertook to carry the measures of their opponents. This is substantially their position now. They have this year attempted to execute with Reform the manœuvre of Sir Robert Peel with Emancipation and Free Trade. Consequently nobody can be a Tory from principle, because Toryism is the negation of principle; whilst to profess oneself a Liberal of the present day, is to accept the teaching of Bentham, and the revolutionary principles of Fox and Grey. But if this system is wrong, the opposite party have no other. They adopt the colours of the Liberals; defend, like them, democratic reform at home and democratic revolution abroad; and differ from them, not by opposition to their principles, but by the want of energy and power with which they pursue them. Mr. Disraeli as a reformer, and Lord Malmesbury as a diplomatist, do not differ very widely in principle from Mr. Gladstone and Lord John Russell; but they carry out their views, with equal sincerity perhaps, but with less consistency and good-will; so that the opinions which in 1792 men of all parties combined to proscribe, all parties now accept, and no man's real sentiments are shown by the side on which he sits. In order that irony might be added to the serious injury which this confusion of opinion entails upon the state, a government was formed consisting of the soundest Conservatives and of the most radical Liberals, and took the name of Liberal Conservative. We recall these facts for the purpose of showing, not that the Catholics as a body would be degraded by an alliance with either of the two great parties, but that, while on one side there are false views of policy, and on the other no particular definite views at all, the error requires to be met by truth, the false system by a sound one; that is to say, that as the true principles of our government, and of all government, are not represented in the parties of the present day, it is the direct and pressing interest of the State that a party should be formed for the purpose of restoring their influence. We demand it for the sake of the State; we desire it still more for the sake of the Church.

Political principles are as definite and as certain as those of ethics, of jurisprudence, or of any other science. It is no more lawful to forget them than to forget the precepts of morality; and it is a contradiction to suppose that religious interests can supersede or set aside either one or the other. They must be defended through the true principles of policy, and not independently, still less in defiance, of them. If it were lawful to do what is politically wrong for the sake of religion, the early Christians might have risen against their persecutors. Clearly, therefore, religious interests do not overrule political duties, and the course of all Christian history has tended ever to bind them more closely together. The necessary conclusion which we draw from this observation is, that what is politically right, not what seems advantageous to religion, must be our guide in public life. We may derive great benefits for religion from the influence of doctrines which Catholics abhor—such as the modern theory of religious indifference and toleration; or we may agree in principle with a party which in detail acts in hostility to our religion. The former was the case in the French Revolution of 1848; whilst the latter is true respecting the government under the old king of the Conservative Protestants, the *Keuzzeitung* party in Prussia, who oppressed the Catholics at home out of Protestant zeal, but were clamorous, as Conservative statesmen, for the preservation of the Papal power. But two things are very common, and are wholly unjustifiable: to betray our natural political convictions for the sake of obtaining advantages for religion, and to associate for the same purpose with a party whose objects are widely different from ours. It is not a Catholic proceeding to admit no bond but that of religion between the members of a party, for religion alone can instruct us only as to its own interests, not as to what is politically right. It is as little a teacher of political as of medical science. Such a party, therefore, would be guided by interests, not by principles, and would fall into the common fault of all parties by aiming at a particular, not at a general, good, and seeking

not the advantage of the state, but of a party in the state. Now it is allowable for parties to differ as to the proper mode of realising the general good; it is not allowable to substitute another purpose for it. Religion is a bond of union for action in definite cases where it is engaged. In other cases the only legitimate bond of political action is *idem sentire de republica*. We can conceive the existence, even the necessity, of a Catholic party in a society which is disorganised, or in despotic or revolutionary countries where there is no other security for public law and order, where society, in short, is at war with the Church. But in every well-organised community, where order reigns and freedom in some measure subsists, all the elements on which order and freedom rest are at the same time implicitly allies of religion, and afford a field and an opportunity for her influence. In all such states there is common ground for those who are Catholics, and for those who are not; a foundation on which to build a policy which is not confined to Catholics. Where the Church possesses acknowledged rights and liberties, she is not reduced to her own resources. It is only when struggling for her existence that she must rely on them alone. In civilised countries she has principles to appeal to which her foes are bound to acknowledge, and she can trust to other powers besides her own. It is neither true that a Protestant is incapacitated from entertaining true notions of public duty, or that a Catholic does not need them. On their existence the safety of the Church depends. Catholics are unable to defend her without them, and Protestants are precluded by them from being unjust towards her. She requires to be assisted by auxiliaries who are the product of her external influence. By herself she is insufficient for the establishment of a political party, because she has no definite, unvarying maxims peculiar to herself in the political order; she is universal, and parties are local and transient; she has to deal with every possible form of political life, since she encounters nations at all stages of their progress; and as she is universal, not only in her

mission, but in the truth which she preserves, she is degraded by the partial exclusiveness and onesided energy necessary for party warfare. She inspires no enthusiasm for any thing but herself, and has no means of enforcing unity excepting in her own doctrine. Dissension began among the Christians as soon as they were free; only while their existence was threatened could they be entirely unanimous. The extremity of danger silenced every variety of sentiment, and men agreed in one thought only when there was but one thing to hope for. But all questions that appear of secondary, not of vital, importance, admit of a diversity of opinion regarding them. Even in matters closely touching the position of the Church, where notions of policy could influence opinion, she has been divided into great parties. The two best and ablest prelates of the French Church, Bossuet and Fenelon, who lived in the same period and for years in the same town, and who received nearly the same education, nevertheless disagreed in one of the most important questions of doctrine; in the department of ecclesiastical government they differed widely as to the Papal authority, and in the domain of politics they were as far apart as it was possible to be. We have a striking lesson in modern France. The tribulations of the Revolution did much for unity; and when the remains of the last generation of Jansenists and of Gallicans had disappeared, the French Catholics may be said to have been more united than they had been for centuries. But a few years have elapsed and we find them divided in all things but religion into two most hostile parties. Of these, the smallest, ablest, and most compact, is composed of men of various shades of secular opinion. Count de Falloux is a legitimist, the Prince de Broglie is a *doctrinaire* of the school of Guizot, Count de Montalembert in his politics is an English liberal.

Political unanimity among Catholics nowhere exists, and its loss can hardly be deplored; for it could only result from a state of equal cultivation, which is not yet attainable, or from a general level of ignorance and mental torpor, which has long since

gone by. We do not, therefore, believe that what is called the want of union among the Catholics in public life is a great misfortune for the cause. No imperial question can be decided on religious grounds; and on religious questions political motives will hardly preclude unanimity. It would be a great dishonour to the Catholics if they were not united where their religion is concerned; but it would be a great discredit to their sense of public duty if religion united them on questions which do not affect it. The only thing that appears to us reprehensible is, that sort of party attachment which involves a reproach to all who do not share it. If Catholics sit on both sides of the House of Commons, recent experience proves that they have friends on both sides. Neither party is by its nature impelled to do us injury; neither is practically to be trusted as our friend. Parties when they are weak are guided by expediency, and make sacrifices to obtain the assistance of the most powerful ally they can find. When they are strong, and can afford to keep a conscience, they may be influenced by principle. Now, the strongest alliance which a party can conclude is not with the Catholics, but with their inveterate enemies. Party names do not signify things; and it is time that we should cease to be misled by them. The same name of Tories is given to the partisans of the Catholic dynasty and to the adversaries of Emancipation, to Bolingbroke and Eldon. The title of Whig is used to denominate those who sharpened the Penal Laws, in spite of the Tories, under William III., and who relaxed them, in spite of the Tories, under George III.; to Somers and Burke. It is wholly impossible, at the present day, to trust to the permanence of political sentiments in individuals as well as in parties. No question more distinctly divided the Whigs and Tories than the French war. There is nothing with which the Whigs are more clearly identified than with the opposition to it; or the Tories, than with the resolution with which it was prosecuted to its triumphant conclusion. It involved the fundamental question of the rights of princes and of subjects, and was regarded by at least a portion of both parties as a war of

principle. If we apply the test of the manner in which that policy is now judged to a conspicuous example, we shall obtain a remarkable proof of the confusion of party distinctions, and the softening down of antagonistic views. The two most eminent men who, within the memory of this generation, have entered the ranks of the opposite parties are unquestionably Mr. Gladstone and Lord Macaulay. One began life as an extreme Liberal, the other as a high Tory of the school of Peel; and Macaulay's review of Gladstone's *Church and State* exhibits, in amusing contrast, the wide diversity of their earlier opinions. A quarter of a century later, we find that they have undergone a remarkable change. The Whig has so far repudiated the traditions of his party as to speak as follows of Pitt's war policy: "Since he did not choose to oppose himself, side by side with Fox, to the public feeling, he should have taken the advice of Burke, and should have availed himself of that feeling to the fullest extent. If it was impossible to preserve peace, he should have adopted the only policy which could lead to victory. He should have proclaimed a Holy War for religion, morality, property, order, public law, and should have thus opposed to the Jacobins an energy equal to their own. . . . He went to war; but he would not understand the peculiar character of that war. He was obstinately blind to the plain fact that he was contending against a state which was also a sect; and that the new quarrel between England and France was of quite a different kind from the old quarrels about colonies in America and fortresses in the Netherlands. . . . It was impossible that a man who so completely mistook the nature of the contest should carry on that contest successfully" (*Encyc. Brit.* xvii. 738). Here we have the ablest of the Whigs rebuking Pitt for not having taken, in obedience to the exhortations of Burke, higher Conservative ground in his war with France. At the same time we find the most brilliant genius that Toryism has reared since Pitt, proclaiming the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people in language which a Whig of 1688 would have denounced as

revolutionary. "The government," said Mr. Gladstone, Aug. 8, "should not be prevented from protesting, with all that energy which the government of a free state can command, against a doctrine that would treat the inhabitants of the territories in question as the property of so many ducal houses, who might dispose of them, their families, their fortunes, and those of their posterity as they pleased, without any regard to that independent will and judgment which, as human beings, they are entitled to exercise."

We cannot rely on the interests or the fears of any party; but it is to these motives we appeal, if we take our stand only on Catholic ground,—if, that is, we take up a position to which no Protestant is bound to follow us. Our strength resides in principles which are not exclusively ours, on arguments which are as cogent with those who hate us for religion's sake as with ourselves, in the theory of our constitution itself. It would be as demoralising to ourselves as to those with whom we act, to make interest the basis, or concession the condition, of an alliance. Our agreement is not with a party, but with a system, which is no longer that of any party, but which many have professed to hold, and some have really followed. There were statesmen—Burke, Pitt, Grattan—who made sacrifices on behalf of the Catholic claims. One sacrificed his popularity, the other his power, the third his life. But others who were among our loudest defenders failed us when their sincerity was tested. Plunkett turned upon the Catholics on the question of the veto, Lord John Russell in the affair of the hierarchy, Mr. Gladstone in that of the temporal power.

If we cannot make a Catholic policy a mere question of interest, and can neither trust the friendship nor adopt the opinions of any party, all that remains for us to do is to put forth our own political ideas for those who, irrespective of religious disputes, are prepared to agree with them. Protestants will follow, if Catholics will lead. Tories are not unanimous for the oppression of Ireland, nor Whigs for the revolution in Italy. If we had a definite political system

of our own, if we succeeded in learning the lesson of our history and of the politics of other countries, men would not be wanting to give us numbers and strength. It is hopeless to insist on concessions to our claims unless we insist on the adoption of our ideas. The deserved popularity of several Protestant members in some parts of Ireland seems to us to announce the dawn of this maturity of political thought. We require a policy which shall be imperial, not simply Catholic or Irish, which shall embrace all the interests of the state, not only those of a section of the people. The Act of Emancipation has left us in a somewhat false position. It was an incomplete victory, because it was obtained by fear, not by argument. The spirit which had opposed it was defeated, but not overcome. It was a compromise as far as reasoning was concerned; and it has diminished the power, but not the hostility of our foes. This will go on so long as we take our stand on a settlement and not on a principle, and until the act of 1829 is regarded, not as a surrender of a portion of the constitution, but as an acknowledgment of its real spirit.

## 2. *Catholic Affairs.*

The interest of Catholics has been principally concentrated on the question of education at home, and on the revolution in the Roman states. The government have rejected the unanimous appeal of the Bishops of Ireland against the national system. The majority of the Catholic members have pledged themselves to support in Parliament the demands which have been rejected: the next session will show whether they will be able to obtain by parliamentary efforts, and by means of an Orange alliance, an object which the recess afforded no means of obtaining. It remains also to be seen what counter proposals will be made.

The affairs of the Catholic University have also been the subject of a meeting, and of a letter of the Irish Bishops, in which alterations and reforms are announced, and which may be expected to lead to a termination of the provisional condition in which the University has remained since

the retirement of its founder and first rector. The two interests are wholly distinct. The national system of popular education was accepted and adopted by the episcopate, because the principle on which it was founded, though false in itself, was not necessarily productive of injury or injustice to religion. But the whole institution of the Queen's Colleges was condemned, and they were from the first abandoned by the authorities of the Catholic Church. They are both false in principle and practically unsuccessful. In one form or another Catholics are compelled to insist on an alteration in the system. Either the colleges must receive a confessional character, or the Catholic university must be put so far on a footing of equality with them as is implied by the concession of a charter. If the University should succeed, the latter measure would effect both purposes. Few believe that it can succeed without such official recognition, and it is very doubtful whether its success depends on that alone. Soon after the appearance of the letter of the Bishops, the professors of the University voted an address to Dr. Newman, on the second anniversary, we believe, of his retirement from among them.

An almost universal and extremely active feeling of sympathy for the Sovereign Pontiff has been shown at innumerable meetings in Ireland. The Irish Bishops were the first to denounce, so early as last July, the really anti-papal character of the Italian war, and the great danger of the movement which it was designed to provoke; whilst it was only late in September that an influential portion of the Catholics of France awoke from their martial enthusiasm to a sense of the danger which menaced interests more precious than those of the Bonaparte dynasty. Accordingly, after singly and collectively publishing their views respecting the temporal power, the Irish Bishops have taken the lead in a series of more general and more popular demonstrations to the same effect. At these meetings their influence has, for the most part, been very fortunately and successfully exerted. Those who denounced the Italian war as a crime, committed by Catholic

powers, had a distinct and especial right to condemn as a political crime the movement which proceeded from it against the Papal power. This constitutes, to our minds, the significance of the demonstrations in Ireland. The Irish Catholics cannot be attached to English rule; they cannot be loyal from gratitude or love. It has been often a question whether they were loyal on principle; whether the feeling which is common to Catholics, to obey the authorities that God has appointed, was strong enough to balance the hatred which is equally natural against those who have oppressed their country and their religion. It has often been doubted whether the movement towards independence was founded on national or on religious motives; whether the Catholic religion was a link or a barrier between Ireland and England. The present exhibition of religious and political sentiment solves a problem which, to the attentive observer of Irish history, could not be doubtful. The fidelity of the Irish to their faith repels the English from them; but it imposes on the Irish themselves an unalterable though reluctant fidelity to the sovereign. This is the lesson taught by what has recently occurred in Ireland, and by the disgust with which those occurrences have been regarded in England. They have proved that the influence of the Catholic religion and clergy is the spell by which the union of England and Ireland is secured. There have been signs enough in different places to show that the laity would not have been equally unanimous and energetic in renouncing the doctrine that nations may be justified in overthrowing constituted authorities. Nothing but the great peril of the movement to religion would have prevailed on the people of Ireland so distinctly to acknowledge the principle which is the foundation of all civil society. The revolutionary policy of England abroad is dangerous to the monarchy itself; and the declarations of loyalty to the Holy See are declarations of loyalty to the British crown. "The applause given to rebellion," says Bishop Moriarty, "by those who stand on the steps of the throne, may be very embarrassing to us, who must

inculcate, in spite of adverse prejudices, the great duties of submission and allegiance. . . . How comes it that every voice which is raised throughout Ireland in reprobation of those measures is supposed to proceed from some one hostile to the present ministry? Why is the expression of our sympathy denounced as an act of disaffection?" And he makes a felicitous allusion to an historical parallel: "At the close of the last century, when the French Directory was fanning the flame of rebellion in Ireland, and sending a fleet to invade our coast, it was engaged in an impious and unprovoked aggression on the Papal territory, and was actually consigning Pius VI. to a dungeon in Valence, where he died in captivity."

We cannot but consider that, for the above reason, there is something durable in the agitation in defence of the Pope. Mingled with it there have been, as in every popular and enthusiastic movement, proposals of an utterly impracticable kind; and the practical result which was really aimed at, the overawing English opinion, will be compromised by the total misconception which has been displayed of the real manner in which such an effect upon the minds of Englishmen is to be accomplished. For the attainment of their real purpose, all these speeches will hardly do as much good as harm.

In England the Catholics have displayed the same spirit in a different way. After the clergy had adopted, in nearly every diocese, addresses to the Holy Father, the laity deemed that the time was come for them to declare themselves. As the Catholic population is too small for meetings in different places, it was proposed at first that one should be held in London; but the difficulty of securing a large attendance at the present season caused this scheme to be set aside. A declaration of opinion was therefore drawn up, which has received a sufficient number of signatures to constitute it the authoritative and unanimous protest of the lay Catholics of England. It is as follows:

"We, the undersigned Roman Catholics of England and Scotland, mindful of that inviolable fidelity to

the Holy Father and the Apostolic See which we have inherited from our forefathers, together with a devoted loyalty to our gracious Sovereign, and a sincere attachment to the constitution of our country;—

Moved also by the wrongs already inflicted on the Holy Father, and the dangers which still threaten him;—

Seeing that a portion of his subjects have risen in unjustifiable rebellion against his authority, and at the instigation, and by the assistance, of foreigners and invaders, have deprived him of certain provinces which are still kept from him;—

Seeing that certain European governments, by the employment of money and troops, as well as by open encouragement and secret intrigue, have assisted this usurpation, while other governments, through fear or hostility, have witnessed the spoliation of the Holy Father without protest or opposition;—

Seeing that, in our own country, the person, the character, and the acts of the Holy Father have been assailed and calumniated, while his rights have been denied and his government denounced;—

Seeing that these denunciations and hostile manifestations have been so general on the part of the Protestant press, of many leading statesmen, and of other public characters in our country, that our silence might expose us to the imputation of complicity with such proceedings, or of indifference to the Holy Father, or of timidity in the exercise of our right to make known to the government, the legislature, and the public, our views and feelings on matters of public concernment,—

Have resolved, in discharge of our duty to the Holy Father, to our country, and to ourselves, on publishing the following declaration:

First, we declare that, while we have no doubt of the permanency, so long as time shall endure, of the Head of the Catholic Church as the successor of St. Peter and the Vicar of Christ upon earth, it is not to be endured by Catholics that the Sovereign Pontiff should be the subject of any temporal potentate; and further, that the preservation of the temporal sovereignty of the Holy

Father is of the highest importance to secure the independent exercise of his supreme spiritual power.

Secondly, we declare that the forcible abstraction from the Holy Father of a portion of his dominions, is in principle an assumption of the right to deprive him of the whole, and would afford a pretext and a precedent for the entire abolition of his temporal power.

Thirdly, we declare that, by recognising the discontent and disaffection of a portion of the population of the Romagna, encouraged as it has been by foreign influence and aid, as a sufficient justification for depriving the Holy Father of those provinces, a principle is sanctioned subversive of all order, authority, and government, and destructive of peace, religion, and society.

Fourthly, we declare that among the cases in which the tyranny, oppression, or misgovernment of any sovereign have ever, at any time, been deemed to justify his subjects in renouncing their allegiance, nothing can be found on which to base a justification of the present rebellion in the Romagna.

Fifthly, we declare that, on the evidence of facts, and on the testimony of all competent and impartial witnesses, we believe that among living sovereigns there is none who has deserved more than the Holy Father the character of a benignant, enlightened, and paternal ruler, and that his benevolent endeavours and intentions to promote improvements in the administration of his states have been, and are, impeded by the conduct of those very persons, both within and without his dominions, who attempt to justify the present rebellion by the allegation of misgovernment.

Finally, therefore, and for the above reasons, we protest against the wrong done to the Holy Father by depriving him of his territories—we protest against the wrong done to all Catholics by the attempt to compromise the independent exercise of the Pope's spiritual power, of which his temporal sovereignty is the safeguard,—we protest against the rebellion of a portion of his subjects in the Romagna as unjustifiable; and against the aid given to

them by foreign incendiaries, and by invaders from neighbouring states, as well as by European statesmen and rulers, as injurious to religion, and dangerous to the peace of the world and to the security of all governments. Further, we protest against every infraction of the Holy Father's rights as an independent sovereign,—we protest against any assumption on the part of any other state or ruler, or of any Congress of states, to dispose of the Holy Father's territories, or to impose upon him any conditions against his own will, being persuaded that both justice and expediency dictate that any changes in the laws or administration of his dominions should be left to his own unfettered judgment and unquestioned benevolence. Especially, we protest against the power or influence of our country being used, whether in a Congress of European states or separately, in favour of the Holy Father's rebel subjects; or to despoil him of his dominions; or to interfere with his independent sovereignty, by imposing any conditions upon him. And we hereby make known our determination to resist and resent, in the spirit of the constitution, any such course on the part of the responsible advisers of the Crown, to whatever party in the state they may belong."

The extreme length of this document gives an opportunity for ignorance, malevolence, or timidity variously to interpret many of the propositions it contains. There is no authority amongst us, as in Ireland, which can enforce at least the semblance of political harmony. A definite statement of the sacred right of authority, such as is contained both in the speech and in the pastoral of the Bishop of Kerry, would probably have deprived the declaration of a great number of adhesions. The absence of such a statement deprives it, in our opinion, of all political weight and importance. So far as the disposition to sympathise with the Pope is concerned, it is merely a matter of ecclesiastical interest. It expresses a political design only in the determination to resist and to resent, in the spirit of the constitution, any interference on the part of the government with the temporal sove-

reignty. It is hard to say how this determination can ever take effect. Should the government adopt the course which is here most justly denounced as contrary to the interests of the country, and to the interests of every Catholic in it, it will be open to them to continue the agitation out-of-doors. If an election takes place whilst the Italian question is pending, their influence will be used in accordance with their declared opinions. So far as it expresses the designs of the English Catholics who are in parliament, it will scarcely strike terror into the enemy's camp. Their opinions were not doubtful, nor are their numbers formidable. We know not which of them will sign the declaration, and which will not. But it is hardly possible to doubt that they will be unanimous to oppose, by every constitutional means in their power, a policy hostile to the integrity of the Roman States and to the temporal authority of the Holy See.

### 3. *National Defences.*

An English general and an English admiral have published their opinion that nothing but a victory of our fleet could make it impossible for the French to land in a single day 200,000 men upon our shores. It has often been said, that steam has bridged the Channel. Hitherto it was supposed to keep all our neighbours at a safe distance, and we were considered to have a great advantage over those countries which are separated from a great military power by barriers so feeble as the Rhine or the Pyrenees. But as matters now stand, the Channel brings us in reality nearer to France, and makes us more exposed to invasion, than if we had the Rhine or the Pyrenees between us. For the roads which traverse mountains and rivers can be fortified and guarded; but the sea can bring an enemy to our shores on a dark night, without warning, at any point. It has long been known that our insular security was thus destroyed, that the advantage which our position gave us over continental nations was lost, and that we should have the same military requirements as they. So long as a pacific mon-

arch reigned in France, during the period of internal confusion, and whilst men believed the Emperor when he said that the Empire is peace, little was done to accommodate our resources to the new state of things. It required a sense of immediate danger, a strong momentary pressure, to induce the country to recognise the necessity of so important a change, and to trust henceforward to its strength and not to its position. Our army was hitherto dependent upon our colonial necessities; and the force kept at home was only as much as was required to feed the colonies. But we have arrived at the moment when our force must be determined by that of our neighbours, and when it must be able to defend our own country, not only its remote possessions.

The Italian war enables us to estimate with sufficient accuracy the military strength of France. By the end of May 175,000 men had been sent to Italy; and besides the garrisons of Rome and Algeria, there remained 148,000 soldiers in France. A few months later a hundred new battalions would have been organised. With this force it would have been impossible to carry on the Italian war and to meet the Germans on the Rhine. It must be remembered that the military resources of France no longer bear the same proportion to those of the rest of Europe as during the former wars. Fifty years ago the population of France was 100 per cent greater than that of England; it is now only 20 per cent greater. At the Restoration France had 30,000,000 inhabitants, and the four great powers 108,000,000. Now the population is 36,000,000 to 170,000,000. Moreover, during the first empire, the soldiers of other countries swelled the ranks and the fame of the French army. The only campaign in which the Emperor had none but French troops under his command was the campaign of Waterloo. The national wealth of England increased during the peace 59 per cent, of Prussia 64, of Russia 40, of Austria 34, of France 19. We must reckon that the Emperor will have an army of 200,000 men if he invades England; that he will do so is the universal belief of the French people, and very gene-

rally their hope; and that the design has been entertained does not admit of a doubt. After the Italian war the army was not properly reduced, but a certain number of men received furloughs on condition of returning to their standards at a fortnight's notice. The horses were not sold, but let out to the peasants. The gunboats were sent round from the Mediterranean to the Channel ports. Iron plates to cover ten frigates have been ordered of an English house, and another has received an order for 2500 guns, to be supplied within the year to a foreign power. The experience of the Italian war having been unfavourable to the accuracy of the rifled cannon, an attempt was made to construct the Armstrong gun. Two men in Sir W. Armstrong's employment disappeared, and carried the drawings to France. It was found, however, impossible to make them good enough to compare with ours, and the government made great efforts to obtain a supply from Mr. Whitworth, whose new gun requires only one man to work it, and is said to carry three miles with unexampled precision. But the French offers were refused, and Mr. Whitworth has received orders from the English government. For the Chinese war the French have purchased steam-transports in England, instead of using their own. During the period when the press was supposed to be free in France, immediately after the Emperor's triumphant return, the country was filled with pamphlets against England. Mr. Drummond, in a pamphlet which exhibits more than his usual eccentricity of mind, and ends with a *cæterum censeo* against the Church, has given extracts from a great number of these. When the official supervision of the press was restored, the responsibility of the government was necessarily resumed along with it. The prefects were then instructed, in a letter intended to appease the British public, to moderate the language of the press towards England. This has been the advantage which the Emperor derived from the temporary relaxation of his policy towards the press. He is able now to represent the animosity against England as the popular sentiment, which

nothing but his authority can control. Every thing has been done to prevent our arming. A proposal of disarmament on both sides seemed only an insult after the similar suggestion last spring. Four Liverpool merchants, men whose names are so obscure as to cause a suspicion that they were set on by France, having written to ask the Emperor for an assurance as to his intentions, an answer was returned, November 30th, so vague and unsatisfactory that it appears to have been written with the hope of persuading nobody who was not as foolish as those to whom it was addressed.

"On the one side, you are possessed by the imaginary trouble which appears to have seized your country with the rapidity of an epidemic; and on the other, you reckon on the loyalty of him from whom you desire a reply. It was, however, easy for you yourselves to give it, if you had calmly examined the true cause of your apprehensions: that cause you would have found only in all those rumours created among your fellow-countrymen by the obstinate propagation of the most chimerical of alarms; because, until now, under whatever circumstances, there has not been a word or an act of the Emperor which could permit a doubt of his sentiments, and consequently of his intentions, towards your country. His conduct, invariably the same, has not ceased for one moment to show him as a faithful and irreproachable ally.

That what he has been, he will (I declare it to you in his name) continue to be—witness again to-day the approaching community of perils to be shared at a great distance by your soldiers and ours.

Thus, henceforth, fully reassured, oppose an error too much spread. Great nations should appreciate, but not fear, each other."

The writer reckoned that his correspondents had not read Montesquieu, who may supply us with a rejoinder to these taunts: "*Il n'en est pas de la consternation d'un peuple belliqueux, qui se tourne presque toujours en courage, comme de celle d'une vile populace, qui ne sent que sa foiblesse*" (*Grandeur et Décadence des Romains*, iv). Neither the

government nor the country have been stopped by these artifices in their preparations for defence, but care has been taken to give no needless offence by a too open participation on the part of Government in the volunteer movement.

Parliament voted for this year 229,557 men for the army; of these, 106,902 are for Indian service. Deducting these and the troops on colonial service, depôts of regiments abroad, and non-combatants, the total force of the line for home service amounts to 73,591.

Embodied militia, 24,645. The whole force of militia which Government is empowered to raise, is 120,000: of these, besides the force now embodied, there are 31,000 in training and fit for service. There are, moreover, 10,000 pensioners and 10,000 yeomanry.

The total available force in the kingdom amounts, therefore, to about 150,000.

Our fortresses require nearly 70,000 men to garrison them, but of these of course only a portion need be regulars. For immediate action in the field, in case of an emergency, where yeomanry and pensioners would be useless, there remain 60,000 trained soldiers, or about the force which Piedmont or Bavaria could send into the field. We should be obliged, if an enemy suddenly landed, to offer battle between the south coast and London, with about two-thirds of these, or 40,000 men. Now Austria lost Solferino with 133,000.

But whereas it is the character of an absolute government to be powerful in attack, but incapable of a protracted defence, a free country which has preserved its own rights is unfitted to attack those of other states, but has greater resources for defence. "The youth of the country," said the Registrar-General in his September report, "are growing at such a rate as to add a battalion to its strength every two or three days." The militia may be increased by 65,000 men. The regular army at home is to be raised to 100,000 men, by an addition of 26,000. The rapid increase of the volunteer movement will render a great number of troops of the line available in the field. Supposing the rifle-corps to relieve

the army of half the garrison duty, 34,000 more regulars would come into line. In the spring, a general might therefore take the field with a force equal to the largest which is likely to invade us, namely, 60,000, whom we can even now concentrate on a given point without diminishing the garrisons or calling home a single soldier from abroad—34,000, allowing the fortresses to be defended one half by volunteers, or by the militia yet to be raised—26,000 being the addition which is proposed for the army, in all 120,000 men. This leaves 106,902 for India, 45,364 for the colonies, 34,000 for garrison duty, 65,000 militia, which the Government has the authority of parliament to raise in addition; 60,000 volunteers being the amount at the present time. In case of war, next summer England would be able, without extraordinary exertions, to have under arms 152,266 men on foreign service, 34,000 soldiers of the line in garrison, 65,000 additional militia, 60,000 volunteers, 10,000 yeomanry and 10,000 pensioners, besides an army of 120,000 men in the field,—altogether 450,000 men, exclusive of the native army in India.

Important alterations are likewise taking place in the organisation and discipline both of the army and navy. Flogging has been subjected to such restrictions as to deprive it of what was offensive; and the pay, which remains in the army at the rate fixed in 1797, will be raised. The position of the militia towards the regular army is to be modified, and the recruiting system reformed. In the navy a regulation has been introduced which is to do away with impressment, by offering enormous advantages to seamen who will volunteer for the naval reserve. Its chief provisions are as follow:

"A volunteer must not be over thirty-five years of age.

He must within the ten years previous to his joining the reserve have been five years at sea, one year of that time as an A.B.

A volunteer will at once receive an annual payment or retainer of 6*l.*, payable quarterly.

He will, if he fulfils his obligations and is in the reserve the requisite time, receive a pension of not less than 12*l.* a year, whenever he becomes

incapacitated from earning a livelihood, or at sixty years of age if not previously incapacitated.

His travelling expenses to and from the place of drill will, when necessary, be provided.

He will, during drill, receive, in addition to the retaining fee, the same pay, victualling, and allowances, as a seaman of the fleet.

He will, if called out on actual service, receive the same pay, allowances, and victuals, and have the same prospect of promotion and prize-money, as a continuous-service seaman of the fleet, and he will on joining receive the same clothing, bedding, and mess-traps.

He will, if wounded or injured in actual service, receive the same pension as a seaman in the navy of the same rating.

He will be eligible to the Coast-Guard Service and Greenwich Hospital.

A volunteer must attend drill for twenty-eight days each year; he may do so, so far as the convenience of the public service will admit, at a time and place convenient to himself; but he cannot in any case take less than seven days' drill at any one time.

He must not, without special permission, proceed on a voyage that will occupy more than six months.

He must appear before some shipping-master once in every six months, unless he has leave to be abroad longer, and he must report every change of residence and employment.

In order to earn a pension, he must continue in the reserve as long as he is physically competent to serve, and

he must also have been in the force fifteen years if engaged above thirty, or twenty years if engaged under thirty. In reckoning this time, actual service in the fleet will count double.

Volunteers may be called upon for actual service in the navy by royal proclamation. It is intended to exercise this power only when an emergency requires a sudden increase in the naval force of the country.

A volunteer may in the first instance be called out for three years. If there is then actual war, and he is then serving in one of her Majesty's ships, he may be required to serve for two years longer; but for the additional two years he will receive 2*d.* a day additional pay."

Such are a part of the preparations which have been called forth by the sense of insecurity, and by which our military strength and organisation will be considerably changed. An actual war with France would lead to still greater changes, and they would extend to every part of the State. We cannot feel safe, for we do not feel that we have deserved immunity from the calamities of war. We have more reason to fear the consequences of the political quiet of England than the political necessities of France. They have earned retribution for her policy in the Italian war, which she was bound and able to prevent; and for her insane and criminal alliance with the revolution by which her chief enemy holds his power. The words of a French minister, last March, may yet come true: "*L'Angleterre paiera les frais de la guerre.*"

## FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

1. *State of France.*

"I do not wish," said Guizot, "to depreciate my country; but I wish it possessed two things which I found in England,—a Christian people, and strong institutions." The direct influence of religious sentiment on the political life of a nation is almost forgotten in the public opinion of this country; and the moral bearings of the state of society, and its influence on the fate of the country, are commonly overlooked. Now the family is the point where society most directly exhibits the influence of religion; and the spirit that animates it necessarily governs the State as well. Marriage is the common ground on which the State, the Church, and civil society meet; where natural and supernatural life combine with each other, and where we can best measure the power of religion in the State. The condition of society is so nearly connected with the policy of governments, that it is important to examine some of its aspects in France, and to touch, however lightly, on the singular and melancholy spectacle which the French people presents—alone among all civilised nations. A historian, who might have been one of the greatest, if he had not become nearly the most obscene, of French writers, has exposed truly the religious reason of the destruction of domestic society in the educated classes, and the economic cause of its ruin among the lower orders. Both are peculiar to that country: "Si nos lois de succession ne faisaient la femme riche, on ne se marierait plus, du moins dans les grandes villes. Les femmes sont élevées dans un dogme qui n'est point le nôtre." This is true; but it should be observed, that formerly religion was no cause of separation, for it was almost as completely extinct among women as among men. It is the revival of religion, chiefly among women,—and the number of nuns is 36,300, whilst that of monks is only 6000,—that has altered this of late. Of the peasant proprietor our author says: "Par un travail furieux, aveugle, de très-mau-

vaise agriculture, il lutte avec le vautour. Cette terre va lui échapper. Plutôt que cela n'arrive, il s'y entertera, s'il le faut; mais d'abord surtout sa femme. C'est pour cela qu'il se marie, pour avoir un ouvrier. Aux Antilles, on achète un nègre; en France, on épouse une femme. On la prend de faible appétit, de taille mesquine et petite, dans l'idée qu'elle mangera moins. . . . Elle s'attelle avec un âne (dans les terres légères), et l'homme pousse la charrue." Thus, on the ground alike of religion and economy, the two most irresistible forces are allied for the demoralisation and destruction of French society.

The result of this combination of moral and physical causes is, that although it is in the nature of things that a multiplication of means of subsistence should be followed by an increase of population, yet, for the last few years, France has arrived at a condition in which marriages are less frequent, children less numerous, and the people diminished both in strength and numbers. During the ten years from 1841 to 1850, the average annual number of marriages was 280,330; but in 1847 it was only 249,797. In 1851 there were 9000 less than in the preceding year; and in 1852, 8000 less than in 1851. The average of births fell in consequence; from 962,812 for the years 1841 to 1850, to 949,164 for the four following years. Taking the whole period since 1850, there appears for the first time an excess of deaths over births,—the average being 921,764 births, and 992,764 deaths. In this period, therefore, the population of France has reached the turning-point, and has ceased to grow. In 1805 the annual increase was 1.21 per cent; in 1821, 0.31; in 1831, 0.69; in 1841, 0.42; in 1851, 0.22; and in 1856, 0.14. During the whole period of peace the French people increased in numbers more slowly than any other of the European nations. From 1825 to 1846 the increase per geographical square mile was: in England, 136; in Belgium, 136; in Holland, 59; in Lombardy, 80; in Bohemia, 73;

in Prussia, 68; in Piedmont, 50; in Naples, 49; in Scotland, 34; and in France, 32. Altogether the increase of the great powers since the territorial settlement in 1815 amounts, in Prussia to 70 per cent; in England to 41; in Austria and Russia to 34; and in France to 20. Other nations, such as Spain and Germany, have declined in numbers during certain periods, and have recovered the loss; and in the middle ages all Europe was depopulated by the Plague. But there are signs which indicate that the French people are in a decline from which there is no recovery. The proportion of illegitimate children is the least of these signs, for it is not authentically greater than in other countries. In 1800 there were 48 to every 1000 births; in 1810, 59; in 1820, 74; in 1830, 76; and it has not since increased. But the proportion of children to every household has diminished. In Prussia (1849) there were 492 persons on an average to every 100 families in the towns; 512 in the country. In Belgium (1846), 459 in towns; 497 in the country. In France (1853), 395 in the country; 358 in towns; 299 in Paris. The average number of children to a marriage has varied in France as follows: 1781-1784, the average was 4·3; 1801-1805, 4·4; 1821-1825, 3·9; 1831-1835, 3·19; 1842-1851, 3·21; 1851-1854, 3·14. So that in ten families, where there used to be on an average 44 children, there are now hardly 31. The subdivision of the soil has nearly reached the climax beyond which it will cease to supply a livelihood to the owners. Hence the country people flock to the towns in order to seek, in the employment of others, a subsistence which their land no longer affords them. Since 1851, all the large towns have greatly increased in size; in five years Paris increased by 305,000 inhabitants; and the population of no less than 53 agricultural departments has diminished in the aggregate by 430,000 inhabitants during five years. Between 1850 and 1854 the number of landholders increased by 263,893. Landed property is now so subdivided, that the average portion of each proprietor is hardly half an acre (23 ares, 33 centiares); consequently three millions

of landowners are too poor to pay direct taxes, and five millions and a half pay less than five francs. Eighty years ago, Arthur Young declared that a law forbidding further subdivision of land had already become necessary. The demoralisation in France is closely connected with the economical condition, and the necessity of despotic government rests on both. They form the basis of all speculation concerning the policy of France. It is hard to exaggerate the danger which threatens Europe from a nation which, in spite of its moral corruption and its political imbecility, is still so great in arms.

The chief events in the internal history of France have been the failure of the attempt to increase the liberty of speech after the Italian victories, and the rigour with which the manifestations, even of Catholic opinion, have been repressed.

Nov. 2. The Duke of Padua resigned the Ministry of the Interior to M. Billault. Greater severity began immediately to be used towards the press. The *Courrier du Dimanche*, the *Correspondant*, the *Ami de la Religion*, the *Univers*, received warnings. Count de Montalembert, Count d'Haussonville, and others, were proceeded against by the government; M. de Girardin's pamphlet was suppressed for some time; M. Vacherot's book on Democracy was forbidden. No government which does not tend to freedom can tolerate the free discussion of its acts. Liberty of speech cannot subsist where more essential rights are not respected. The imperial government is not founded on opinion, but on necessity; and recommends itself, not by what it is, but by what it does. It has no party which is attached to it on principle. "J'ai rompu," says Prince Napoleon, "avec les Rouges; les légitimistes m'ont en horreur; les Orléanistes me détestent; et quant aux Bonapartistes—il n'y en a pas." A power thus constituted is often obliged to maintain itself by acts which are in themselves no part of its policy. The natural compensation which despotism affords to those who are under it, is military greatness. It substitutes the influence of the state for the happiness of the nation, and obtains power in the place of freedom, and

glory instead of honour. It is by this means that the Emperor has made the army the surest support of his throne.

Recent events have deprived him of the support of the clergy, whom he long endeavoured to make the other pillar of his power. The danger to the Pope by the insurrection in the Romagna, which at any moment the Emperor could crush as easily as he had excited it, occasioned in the pastorals of the French Bishops the first determined and general effort to influence his policy by general opinion. He has been induced thereby to do all in his power to prove that he is not to be so influenced, and to show to the Church that he is not in need of her support. Every power created or preserved by an independent force, believes that the force on which it depends may destroy it; and seeks accordingly to emancipate itself, and to destroy the influence of its ally. The newspapers were forbidden to publish the pastorals of the Bishops; subsequently it was decreed that they were not to enumerate the names of those who issued them; finally, they received orders not to speak even of foreign Bishops who did the same. So that the clergy, by their honourable and courageous act, merely provoked a defiance. It is clear that the Emperor believes he has a certain method of recovering their aid when it becomes necessary to him, by throwing on England the odium of encouraging the insurrection against the Pope; and by undertaking, in order to gain the Catholic sympathies he has lost in Italy, a war with Protestant England, after having tried to win the revolutionists by a war with Catholic Austria.

## 2. Austrian Reforms.

1. Oct. 21. Baron Hübner was replaced, as minister of police, by Baron Thierry. Hübner was popular; and his retirement was caused by a difference with Baron Bruck, the minister of finance. Each offered to resign, and the Emperor accepted the resignation of Hübner. It was hitherto unusual for a difference of opinion among themselves to cause the retirement of any of the minis-

ters, or even to become known to the public. Men of the most opposite opinions administered separate departments without discussion or communication with each other. The ministry did not form a unity; and under Metternich and Buol there was no council of ministers. Each reported separately to the Emperor; each had his own organ, and could exercise a control, so far as his own office was concerned, over the official organ of the government, the *Wiener Zeitung*. Schwarzenberg was president of the first council of ministers, of which he had the entire command. It was a natural result of the situation, in which the empire had to be reconstructed by united councils; and the position of the young Emperor, who owed the throne to some of the new ministers, made it easy for them to form themselves into a united and powerful body. Under Count Rechberg this plan has been revived, and the strongest sign of its action is the retirement of Hübner. His successor, Thierry, was formerly in office, but has lived in retirement since the death of Schwarzenberg.

The occasion of the difference between Bruck and Hübner was the publication of the accounts of the national loan of 1854. The sum had been fixed by the Emperor at 50,000,000*l.*, and the minister of finance had, on his own responsibility, in the absence of any public control, exceeded that sum by 11,157,130*l.* The minister of police refused, it is said, to impose silence on the press on this subject, and declined to remain in office with so arbitrary a colleague.

The financial question has been the occasion and means of obtaining the liberties which most European nations have enjoyed; and in Austria it seems that the financial difficulty is likely to lead to similar results. The necessity of establishing a control upon the Exchequer was brought home to every body by the discovery of the vast sum by which the limits fixed for the national loan had been exceeded in consequence of the Italian war. Another financial operation of Baron Bruck, undertaken to supply funds for the war, was still more fatal to Austrian credit. He

levied a five-per-cent income-tax on the interest of the national debt. This measure, by which the state obtained only 400,000*l.*, was ruinous. The funds fell from sixty-four to forty per cent between April 22 and May 2. Last year a commencement of economical reform had been attempted; for the first time since 1848, there was no extraordinary supply demanded for the army. Altogether a saving was effected of 1,622,450*l.* But the Italian war followed, and brought matters to a crisis.

During the reign of the Emperor Francis Joseph the resources of the empire have been greatly increased; but the expense of the administration has grown with equal rapidity. In 1848 the income amounted to 12,212,735*l.*, and the expenditure to 16,723,800*l.* In 1858 the income was 28,254,072*l.*, and the expenditure 31,503,710*l.* The deficit has amounted every year, on an average, to 4,500,000*l.* The civil service cost, in 1847, 3,200,000*l.*; in 1857, 7,500,000*l.* The police cost 200,000*l.* in the first year, 1,000,000*l.* in the latter. Until 1849 the department of justice cost annually about 500,000*l.*; in 1850 it mounted at once to 1,100,000*l.*, and is now above 1,500,000*l.* Public Instruction has risen, in the same period of ten years, from 230,000*l.* to 560,000*l.* The ministry of commerce increased its demand from 1,000,000*l.* to 2,230,000*l.* Roads cost 660,000*l.* in 1846, and 1,300,000*l.* in 1856. Exclusive of the expenses of the late war, the public debt, which amounted in 1848 to 66,600,000*l.*, has risen to 173,300,000*l.*, and the annual interest from 3,300,000*l.* to 8,600,000*l.* Nevertheless the public debt of Austria is smaller in proportion to the physical resources, and even to the population of the country, than that of most other states. In England it amounts to more than 420 shillings a head; in Holland, 348; in France, 242; in Belgium, 176; in Sardinia, 148; in Austria, only 86 shillings.

It is felt now that this state of things cannot continue without leading to the ruin of the state. A commission was appointed in October to revise the system of taxation, which is founded on an obsolete computation. The land-tax, for instance, has not varied for many years, dur-

ing which the value of land has greatly altered, as well as the requirements of the state. But a severe system of economy is the most necessary step to bring income and expenditure on a level. Hitherto each minister made his demand for the necessary supplies; and the minister of finance had to procure them as he could. For ten years it never happened that the expenditure was kept within the original estimate. The war department, in particular, made extraordinary demands.

*November 11.* The Emperor announced to the minister of finance his determination that the expenditure of 1860-61 should not exceed the revenue of the state; and he appointed a commission to examine the budget, and propose the necessary reductions. The report is to be ready in March, and the proposals submitted to the council of state and to deputies of the nation. By this important measure a new system is inaugurated: the expenditure is to be determined by the income; and the estimates are to be settled by a commission, instead of being prepared separately by each minister. As the official body would give no security to the public, they are only to give the benefit of their official knowledge. The control is to be vested in the council of state, which thus obtains a new consequence, and a body of notables, who will be summoned by the Emperor until there are provincial estates by which they can be appointed. This is a great step towards the restoration of the finances and the credit of Austria; for it brings the financial administration under the control of public opinion and general interests.

2. Though we hear little just now of the Austrian Concordat, and though many think that it will never be carried into effect, and that the recent reforms indicate a change of policy and an abandonment of the principles on which it was founded, it is nevertheless true that all the acts of the new ministry confirm the policy and develop the natural consequences of that measure. Whilst the Conventions of Wirtemberg and Baden with the Holy See exhibit the influence of the Concordat upon the Protestant governments of Ger-

many, the statute for the Hungarian Protestants, and the settlement of the municipal law, display its action within the empire. And it is a remarkable sign of the broad and statesmanlike views from which it proceeded, and a great promise of its stability, that whereas the resistance to it has been founded chiefly on political grounds, its consequences have been more easily and more thoroughly developed in politics than in religion, and the analogous reforms of the State have been sooner accomplished than the reforms of the Church. The reason of this is, that whereas the benefits which it was fitted to bestow on religion depend upon the gradual execution of so many special provisions and details, which is a work of time, and one which the government itself is unable to perform, in the concession of the Concordat itself a principle was acknowledged and adopted by the government which was susceptible of the widest application in every department of the state, and by which the government was necessarily bound in respect of all other corporations. This is the principle of self-government; the notion that the power of the state is limited to certain definite functions; that all that lies beyond its immediate sphere is subject to different local authorities; and that in its own sphere the business of government is, for the most part, to issue orders, not to execute them; — in a word, that government, but not administration, is an attribute of sovereignty. The Concordat bestowed no privileges on the Catholic Church, but gave her freedom by acknowledging the limits to the authority of the state. For the Church in Austria was deprived of her freedom for the same reason that all other liberties were assailed, — in order to establish the absolute power of the Emperor. The establishment of the Josephine absolutism weighed on civil and religious liberty alike; and whilst it provoked an insurrection on behalf of the Hungarian constitution, and in Tyrol a rising against conscription, in Brabant it provoked revolution chiefly by interfering with the seminaries. The injury done in Church and State by the absolutist system had to be repaired, in Church

and State alike, by the adoption, in the reign of Francis Joseph, of the system of autonomy. The Josephine absolutism required, as the first condition of its triumph, the destruction of the independence of the Church; the political freedom which was inaugurated in 1848 could not exist until that independence had been first restored to her.

But a necessary condition of the recovery of this complete independence, the real security for the religious success of the Concordat, is that the principle on which it rests should prevail in all other matters, and that it should become an unalterable rule and precedent in all things. Then all other liberties will be its guarantees; and those who enjoy them will be pledged to its support. In isolation it would wither, and would prove a great misfortune alike to the Empire and to the Church. The provisions of the Concordat cannot be carried out in the Church until its principles prevail in the State. It is the isolation which has hitherto subsisted that has impeded so much the progress of ecclesiastical reforms.

The great unpopularity of the Concordat in and out of Austria, among Catholics and Protestants, has astonished many persons, and has deceived some. Considering that its primary purpose was to reform a Church which was perhaps the most demoralised in Europe, it is natural that those who found themselves included in the menace and in the need of reform should have protested loudly against it. The first opposition proceeded from the laity, to whom an ecclesiastical reform, in the shape of prayer, fasting, and almsgiving, was eminently distasteful. We have heard a celebrated historian of this country explain the spread of Puseyism among the clergy and its unpopularity among the laity, on the ground that it was an attempt on the part of the former to increase to the utmost their own power and importance. The common run of people in Austria did not understand the purpose of the Concordat better or otherwise than this. Religious reformation is by its nature most distasteful to those who need it most. This applies unfortunately, in some measure, to the lower orders both of the se-

cular and regular clergy. It placed them more immediately under episcopal control; and the Bishops, it was believed, were filled with an inquisitive and innovating spirit, very alarmingly opposed to that of the good old time. But whilst it appeared to the lower orders of the clergy merely an instrument to increase the power of the Bishops, the Bishops themselves were long the chief obstacles to its accomplishment; as long as the late Archbishop of Vienna lived, the thing was impossible. The Concordat was disliked by the Austrian Catholics, because it threatened destruction to the system in which they were brought up.

But the motive of political opposition was still more potent. No idea is more unpopular on the Continent at the present day than that of self-government. Foreign liberalism demands, not freedom, but participation in power. Now power increases according to the number of those who share it. No authority is irresistible, no tyranny boundless and hopeless, but that which is wielded by a majority over a minority. No despotism is more complete than that which is the aim of modern liberals. Now the principle of self-government does not divide the power of the State, but limits its extent. This is the medieval, Christian, Teutonic; that is the ancient, Pagan, Roman system of polity: the modern notion that independence is commensurate with nationality, a consequence of the principle of the sovereignty of the people, which was wonderfully slow in developing itself, has been since 1848 the chief instrument and auxiliary of the liberal and of the revolutionary party. It places the notion of national independence above that of individual liberty, and holds, indeed, the latter of no consequence as compared with the former; whilst the liberal doctrine subjects the desire of freedom to the desire of power, and the more it demands a share of power, the more it is averse to exemptions from it. This is the aspiration of nations which know not what freedom is. Where the people is sovereign, it wishes to exercise its sovereignty, not to be restrained in the exercise of it.

In the Austrian revolution the two

movements were combined. The constitutional party desired the utmost concentration of power, on condition that it should be wielded by a parliament; the national party desired the supremacy and independence of the several predominant races. Neither desired to set bounds to the power which it intended to constitute. Least of all was freedom understood by the old bureaucratic party, whose rule the revolution in great measure overturned.

In a word, the liberal parties in Austria, as in most places, are the chief enemies of liberty. Nothing proves this more remarkably than the fact, that the statute in favour of the Protestants has been received in much the same way, with as much opposition on religious as well as political grounds, as the measure which gave freedom to the Catholic Church. The rationalists among the members of both Churches disliked an act by which the Church would be reinvigorated and revived; on the other hand, the bureaucratic and liberal antagonism to self-government, to what is called a state within the state, has broken out with great violence on both occasions. In Austria religious liberty is not better understood than civil. So far from being really the wish of the Hungarian Protestants, it was as much dreaded by them as the Concordat by the degenerate mass of Catholics. On the whole, they were a completely degraded and demoralised body. The progress of rationalism and unbelief, which was great throughout Austria, was more rapid among them than among the Catholics. The Protestant revival, which has been as conspicuous an event during the last twenty-five years in Northern Germany as the analogous movement in England, has not penetrated among the Protestants of Hungary. Austria was totally removed from the moral and intellectual life of Germany until 1848; and Hungary has been little influenced even by what passed in Austria. In 1855, the newspaper which is the organ of the Protestant faculty of Heidelberg writes, "In Upper Austria pious clergymen and laymen are more often heard to complain of the internal decay than of the external oppression

of the evangelical church." In the same paper, three years later, an Austrian Protestant writes, "Ninety-tenths of the pastors and teachers of the Augsburg as well as of the Helvetic Confession are so degraded, that they do not know what is contained in the Bible, much less what they are called on to preach." So long ago as 1840, a report from Hungary in the chief Protestant periodical of Germany affirms, "that the Evangelical Church has not only unbelievers, but for the most part immoral persons, in her pulpits, — drunkards, gamblers, adulterers among them." The Protestant faculty of theology at Vienna refused last winter to allow a professor to lecture who belonged to the school of Strauss. The Upper Consistory, on the contrary, declared that these opinions are "in harmony with the principle of Protestantism, and a consequence of the historical development of evangelical science." In the report above quoted, of a Hungarian Lutheran, we read that, "with few exceptions, the Protestant nobility, which neither knows nor respects the doctrines of its Church, remains faithful to it only because it dreads the strict commandments of Catholicism. . . . It is not too much to say that not ten of these men are living who can pretend to know Christianity, or to have read the Bible. . . . They do nothing for the clergy, and give them no proof of their existence but by treating them rudely, insulting them in a thousand ways, and going to law with them. Consequently those pastors are best off where the landlord is a Catholic, and in whose home no Protestant nobleman resides. . . . Immorality and unbelief have reached such a height in many Protestant schools, that a father cannot commit his children to them without trembling. Many parents prefer sending their children to Catholic schools."

This is, perhaps, scarcely worse than might have been said of many parts of Catholic Austria. In both cases, it was the result of the decline of ecclesiastical discipline and influence. The Austrian government has made two attempts, on two different principles, to supply a remedy for a condition of things so deplorable and so dangerous to the state.

In 1791 the Protestant synods proposed a system of self-government, which never received the sanction of the government, because a part of the Protestant clergy intrigued to prevent it. In 1854 a Hungarian superintendency petitioned government against it, saying that "it is known by experience that the Protestant Church cannot constitute itself by its own means; that an agreement is not to be thought of; that at all times, in every question, there had been *quot capita tot sensus*: the object of their efforts was a well-ordered religious community, governed by a strict discipline, standing under the influence of H. M. the Emperor." An eminent Protestant divine of Prussia wrote last August, in a leading Protestant organ, "Let not the government expect the constitution of the Church from a general synod under present circumstances; it would only be the arena for the conflict of Magyar pretensions, and a renewal of the scenes of 1791: but let it bestow it by the authority which belongs to government from above; for the time for the perfect self-government of the Church is certainly not yet come." The project of 1791 was never executed; and so long as the Catholic Church was placed under the control of government, it would have been inconsistent to give the Protestants entire immunity. In 1849, when Hungary was reconquered by a Protestant general, Haynau, he proclaimed martial law, and subjected the Hungarian Protestants to the administration of the state, depriving them of most of their rights. Martial law was abolished in 1854; and Aug. 21, 1856, a law was proposed for the consideration of the Protestant ecclesiastical authorities, in accordance with the usual consistorial system of Germany. At the head of the whole Church was to be an ecclesiastical council, consisting of five members of each confession, appointed by the Emperor for life, to exercise the supervision in the name of the government, and to conduct the affairs of the Protestants generally. This law gave them greater freedom than they enjoyed in any Protestant state. The celebrated Protestant divine, Hase, of Jena, declared, "We, in Germany at least, should be very

agreeably surprised if Herr Von Raumer (Prussian cultus minister) were to publish a project of law for the government of the Church in as loyal a manner as Count Thun has done it in this instance, and in which the rights of the congregation should be as fully secured as in this imperial scheme." It had done all that could be done so long as the consistorial principle was maintained; and that element was maintained for the sake of the Protestant Church itself. Not only was the decline of faith and morals so notorious that eminent Protestant divines implored the Emperor to assume, as in other states, the office of Defender of the Faith, but the laity exercised an excessive control over the clergy. To meet this, the position of the clergy was raised, the presbyteries received jurisdiction in morals, the clergy were to preside in all ecclesiastical assemblies, the discipline of the Church was placed in their hands. This was the great objection on the part of the Hungarians to the plan. They rejected it, demanded a general synod to decide on their constitution, and in particular insisted upon the equal rights of laity with the clergy. Thus this constitution, which was admired and envied in Germany, and by which the believing minority of the Hungarian Protestants would have had their faith and their position protected against the rationalistic majority, fell to the ground. In a word, the Protestant religion would have been safer in the hands of a conscientious Catholic minister than in those of the Protestants themselves.

It would have been very difficult in the long-run to find a rule of conduct which would have been generally acceptable. If the government acted in harmony with the traditions and rules of Protestantism, it would have dissatisfied the majority; and in the political condition of Hungary, every such occasion would have been eagerly taken up. This danger is perhaps not lessened by the grant of complete independence; but politically, the project of 1859 was a gross inconsistency. The government, which left the Catholic Church to her own laws and guidance, could not assume a guardianship over the Protestant community. It might have been in

the true interest of the Protestants, but it was contrary to the policy of the state; it was consequently an act of wisdom and justice to give the statute of September 1859. It is only to be regretted that it was not given sooner. The moment, not the manner, of giving it, emboldened the discontented Hungarians to renew their opposition. It was a welcome instrument to the national party in Hungary, who were able to use the pretext of religion to promote their plans of independence. Many of the Protestant assemblies rejected the statute, and prayed the Emperor to recall it. The reply was, that it was definitive, and that they must make the best of it. The argument of the Protestants was, that in accepting it as a gift from the Emperor, they sacrificed their right to legislate for themselves. There was no complaint against particulars, but the general right was claimed. In the same session at which they gave this answer, the Protestants of Oldenburg decreed, that in their gymnasium in the town natural history was to be taught in Hungarian. Where this spirit of opposition did not prevail, the statute was accepted with gratitude. At Neusohl a remonstrance was proposed, but after a debate of six hours was rejected, and an address of thanks was carried. The same thing happened in many communities, chiefly those of the Augsburg Confession. This confirms the view we have taken, that it is on national, not religious grounds, that the difficulty is made; for the Lutherans in Hungary are mostly Germans, and all the Calvinists are Magyars. The patent is conceived in the spirit of the Concordat; and the paragraphs determining the relations of Church and State, education, the administration of Church property, criminal jurisdiction over the clergy, the support to be given by the secular arm to ecclesiastical arrangements, exactly correspond to the similar paragraphs of the Concordat.

The Protestants are to carry out the provisions of the statute in their own way, and to be governed by their own laws. They have what they have wished for, though against the advice of the best divines of orthodox

Protestantism. Whether it will be to the advantage of the Protestant religion, or of those amongst its nominal professors who are really its enemies, is very uncertain; at any rate, the government has done its duty, and the Concordat has borne its fruit. It was demanded in the name of indifference; it has been granted, like the Concordat, on the principle of true toleration. True toleration consists in this, that where several churches subsist together, each shall be protected by the state in the exercise of its self-government, and enabled to live according to its own laws. Real liberty confers on the religious community the protection of the state. This is completely contrary to the theory of indifference, by which freedom of conscience is commonly justified. One demands freedom for the Church from the State; the other, freedom for the churchman from his Church. One guards religion, the other guards against it. One asks for immunity for religion, the other for immunity against religion. One is founded on faith, the other on unbelief. One is a product of political enlightenment, the other of religious decline. The principle of one is, that the conscience cannot be controlled by the state in matters of religion; of the other, that the state cannot have a conscience in matters of religion. Both are equally remote from the view which admitted penal laws; but while one protects existing religions on grounds of equity, not of indifference,—of political justice, not of religious agreement—the other ignores the rights of religious bodies altogether, and admits only those of individuals. The former is the Austrian principle, and the Austrian government is assailed by the partisans of the latter view. She acts in the name of freedom, and is assailed in the name of the revolution.

3. The same policy is exhibited in the measures which tend to the establishment of a system of municipal freedom, which is demanded both in the name of self-government and of financial economy. The increased expense of the administration of justice, of the police, and of the financial management, renders it extremely advisable to take off the

hands of the state and of its too numerous officials as much as possible of the labour and expense of these departments. Accordingly the notables of each province were summoned, in the course of October, to meet in their respective capitals, in order to propose measures suited to local requirements, by which a general, harmonious system of local self-government may be introduced. They were commissioned to consider how much of local affairs could be left to local authorities, and how much of the administration of justice and of the distribution of taxes can be committed to their hands. Next to the Concordat and the statute of the Protestants, this is the greatest step in the direction of decentralisation, and the hardest blow to the bureaucratic system. As in the former cases, the people have not shown themselves worthy of the confidence reposed in them, or capable of appreciating and exercising the rights placed within their reach. It is a common thing abroad to find village politicians who are ready to discuss the affairs of the world, and to criticise the foreign policy of their country, but who are incapable of attending to the interests of their homes, which they are accustomed to leave to the government, and to the scribes at the desk. The discussion of the municipal law has been received with apathy. This has been accompanied by the same motives of disaffection which have induced the Hungarian Protestants to refuse the rights which were offered them. At Esseg, the notables met October 24th; and dispersed the same day, after registering a petition for the restoration of their constitution. At Innsbruck, the notables of Italian Tyrol stayed away, to protest against their incorporation in the Austrian monarchy. Yet these meetings have not been fruitless.

*October 17.* The notables of Lower Austria met at Vienna, and determined at once to publish their debates; but after the experience of the first day, it was resolved that the reports of the debates should conceal the names of the orators, in consideration of their being unaccustomed to public speaking. The publication of their deliberations was intended to make up in some measure, by invit-

ing the coöperation of public opinion, for the absence of any mandate from the people. The proceedings of the other assemblies are not known in detail. At the conclusion of the labours of the assembly at Vienna, the president declared that they had furnished valuable materials for the government to use in preparing a law which should render one common principle applicable to the various provinces. A member replied, that they had spoken only their private opinions; that they had no authority from the people, and no legislative power from the crown; and that no arrangement would be satisfactory without a representation of the people in the several provinces.

That is now the great difficulty before the government. In no other way can both the legitimate and the insidious demands of the people be met. But every delay makes it more difficult to establish a representative system on the basis of the old institutions, and threatens to give it a more and more revolutionary character. The best thing is to build from the foundations. National representation without self-government is only a pretext for increasing the power and oppressiveness of the State. The Hungarians are still the great obstacle to the settlement of the new system in Austria; and in Hungary it is not the principle of democracy, but of nationality, that prevails; and it is not the revolutionists, but the so-called old conservatives, that keep up the revolutionary spirit. Every opportunity has been taken to make demonstrations of Hungarian patriotism. They endeavour to introduce the Hungarian language into the universities and schools; they reject the Protestant liberties because they are the gift of the crown, and the communal liberties because they are inconsistent with the old constitution, which they wish to restore. With ridiculous hypocrisy, the nobles who desire to recover their ancient supremacy, and to reduce the peasants once more to the level of serfs, appeal to the principle of national independence. In every way the restoration of the Hungarian constitution would be a retrograde step in civilisation; and this character is most visibly shown in the appeal to the theory of

nationalities. It is one principal result of the progress of mankind, that physical causes are gradually overcome by moral motives; that history is influenced more and more by mind, and is less dependent, as time goes on, on matter. The effect of this law on States is, that their formation is determined by political reasons, not by natural influences. The lowest influence is that of the earth, of geographical causes, as in the case of Egypt. The influence of blood is higher; but where that alone prevails, a State can hardly be a political body, for it can exist only by a political cause. A State exhibits political maturity when it represents a political unity, the predominance of some political purpose or system over national and physical barriers. Permanent conquest is a proof of this maturity, national claims are no such proof. We have in modern Europe instances of States formed in obedience to the principle of nationality, such as Belgium and Greece; but they have only a fictitious and artificial vitality; while Poland affords an instance of political deficiency leading to the destruction of a State which was held up by a courageous spirit of patriotism, as well as by the Catholic faith. In Hungary it is absurd to apply the national principle; for as far as nationality is concerned, Hungary is an epitome of Austria. The Hungarians are hardly 4,500,000 in a population of 15,000,000.

### 3. *The War in Morocco.*

The calculations of European diplomacy have been unexpectedly put out by the war between Spain and Morocco. It has furnished a new instance of the total and irreconcilable divergence of French and English interests and policy on almost every point, and threatened at one moment to aggravate the coolness which subsists between the two countries into a serious misunderstanding. This danger has, however, been removed; as the English government has declared itself satisfied with declarations which amount to defiance, and with a result of its interference which is equivalent to complete failure. But it is of more importance as announcing the presence of a new element in future

diplomatic combinations. It is the first serious attempt made by Spain, since the termination of her civil wars, to resume in some degree her old position among the great powers.

Since the accession of the Emperor Muley Soliman, in 1794, the Empire of Morocco has been in a very unsettled state. Several of the western tribes refused to acknowledge his authority, and the coast became infested with pirates. In the south also an independent state was formed, in one of the most cultivated provinces. By these rebellions the authority of the Emperor was much abridged, and his subjects have been troublesome neighbours both to France and Spain. The successor of Muley Soliman, Abderrahman, died in August, and has been followed by his son, Sidi Mohamed, who, after some resistance and confusion, has succeeded, not, indeed, in establishing his authority over the frontier tribes, but in obtaining the command of the capitals, Fez, Mequinez, and Morocco, of the army, and of the treasure. A portion of the army is said to be well armed and well trained. In case of invasion, the Emperor will look for support to many thousands of irregular horsemen, whom the religious zeal and warlike spirit of a population of nearly 8,000,000 may be expected to bring to his standard. It is said that a great deal of religious excitement has been awakened among the Mussulmans all over North Africa. The French posts and settlements on the frontiers of Morocco have been attacked, and signs of disaffection and turbulence have appeared even in the province of Algiers. A force under General Martimprey was sent against the offenders. The French took advantage of the disordered state of the empire of Morocco to execute vengeance for themselves. They neither declared war against the Emperor, nor asked him to punish subjects whom he was notoriously unable to restrain. He was not made responsible for his own weakness. The French expedition did its work without difficulty, and with no considerable result. Yet the French have long been supposed to entertain the design of extending their dominion over a portion of Morocco. After the battle of Isly, in 1844, in which the

present Emperor, Sidi Mohamed, was defeated by Bugeaud, it was proposed to annex the eastern portion of Morocco to the French possessions. After the manner of the French, one of their historians, Thomassy, speaking of certain events of the fifteenth century, prophesies that France will be necessarily called upon to represent Christianity in Morocco, "et à y combattre en soldat de la civilisation." And the learned Orientalist, Reinaud, tells us that the rights of France over Africa are not of yesterday; for when the Arabs overran the country from Tripoli to the Atlantic, they found it held by the patrician Gregory, who, the Arabian authors say, was a Frank. If, therefore, in the nineteenth century, the French resolve to extend their African dominion, they will but inflict upon the Arabs of Barbary well-deserved retribution for their attack upon a Frenchman of the seventh.

Such absurd combinations as these are common in the literature of Imperial France, and ought not to be overlooked. Some of the best histories have been written with the design of justifying past acts, or preparing future claims of the government. Such was Daru's *History of Venice*. Another bears the significant title, *Les quatre Conquêtes de l'Angleterre*.

The moderation of the French on this occasion is explained by the rise of a simultaneous quarrel between Morocco and Spain, which the French appear to have fomented, as it offered the twofold advantage of making Morocco an easier prey hereafter, and of nursing the Spanish army into a serviceable appendage of their own.

Early in the fifteenth century the Portuguese conquered a portion of Northern Africa, parts of which afterwards passed into the hands of Spain. With the exception of the important harbour of Ceuta, they are merely penal settlements. The whole population does not exceed 12,000. Of late years they have been constantly molested by the Moors; and the Sultan has been obliged, since 1845, to keep a force in the neighbourhood of Ceuta for the protection of the Spanish garrison. This did not prevent the Moors, last August, from upsetting the boundary stone which bore the arms of Spain. Redress was pro-

mised; but meantime the insults grew into open attack: August 23d and 24th the garrison had engagements with bodies of 400 or 500 Moors. The government again promised redress; but asked for some delay, in consequence of the death of the Sultan. The delay was extended finally to October 15th. The Spaniards demanded, not only that their assailants should be chastised, but that their territory round Ceuta should extend several miles farther from the town. The ultimatum of the Spanish consul was dated October 16th. For a prince in uncertain possession of his throne, whose right of succession was disputed by rivals and enemies, it was impossible to punish a fanatical horde for a crime in which hundreds had participated, and of which a Christian power, the traditional enemy of the state, was the victim. At such a moment, too, a surrender of territory was out of the question. Perhaps, if it had been possible, concession would not have been advisable. A national and religious war is very likely to strengthen the new Emperor; and by making the cause of his turbulent subjects his own, he is more likely to obtain their obedience than by a civil war.

But if the Emperor of Morocco was unwilling as well as unable to yield, the Spanish government showed still greater indisposition for a pacific termination of the dispute. The Sultan has declared that he would gladly have left the Spaniards to take the law into their own hands, and to inflict chastisement on the offenders. But an inglorious raid upon the pirates and robbers of the Riff would not have served the purpose of the Spanish government, which is in need of the brilliancy conferred by military success, more than of any material satisfaction. The settlement of the French in Algiers had a very similar origin to that of the Spanish war with Morocco. The government of the Restoration, weakened and dishonoured by the intrigues of the Chambers, sent the expedition against Algiers, under the Minister of War, for the acknowledged purpose of recovering popularity and influence at home. So well were the motives and effects of the expedition understood in France, that the news of the first

success led to a depression of the French funds; for the glory acquired by the most obnoxious of the ministers threatened to consolidate the unpopular government to which he belonged. The motives which guided the ministry of O'Donnell, like the ministry of Polignac, are founded on a just calculation. Military glory was the origin of most European monarchies, and is a powerful means of restoring them. To our age, the notion of a war, deliberately undertaken for its own sake, seems a crime; and a war in which an element of religious enthusiasm is recognised seems an act of insanity. Thousands who gladly hailed a war against Austria, because it menaced a power peculiarly Catholic, and ultimately threatened the head of the Catholic Church, are horrified and disgusted at the mediæval affectation of the Spaniards, whose martial spirit is accompanied by religious zeal. Catholics, to whom the crusades seem neither useless nor foolish, and who are as averse to the evils and vices engendered by peace as to the horrors of war, have some difficulty in sympathising with the feeling which condemns the warlike policy of Spain. It has already borne fruit in awakening the energy of the people, and directing it to a common national cause; whilst the parties which divided the Cortes have put aside their dissensions, to rally round the administration of the soldier, who promises to the arms of Spain a splendour which they have not enjoyed for near a hundred years. A successful war is a great matter of discipline and organisation in the nation which wages it.

The opposition of England, alarmed on account of Gibraltar, and of her commerce with the African barbarians, at the prospect of any extension of European power in that direction, has added greatly to the enthusiasm which the Spaniards display for the war. It not only promises military glory which may restore Spain to her place among the nations, but it serves as a protest against the interference of England, whose interference, even for the liberation of Spain during the Peninsular war, was always regarded with jealousy and suspicion. In two published despatches to the English mi-

nister at Madrid, Lord John Russell defines his ostensible reasons for being alarmed at the war :

"You are therefore instructed to ask for a declaration in writing, that if the Spanish troops should in the course of hostilities occupy Tangier, that occupation will be temporary, and will not extend beyond the ratification of a treaty of peace between Spain and Morocco. For an occupation till an indemnity is paid might become a permanent occupation, and such permanent occupation her Majesty's government consider inconsistent with the safety of Gibraltar."

"You will further state to his excellency that her Majesty's government earnestly desire that there may be no change of possession on the Moorish coast of the Straits. The importance they attach to this object cannot be overrated; and it would be impossible for them, or indeed for any other maritime power, to see with indifference the permanent occupation by Spain of such a position on that coast as would enable her to impede the passage of the Straits to ships frequenting the Mediterranean for commercial or any other purposes."

Other objections, partly friendly, partly hostile, are, that it makes Spain more completely a vassal of France; that in so formidable an undertaking success is very uncertain, and failure disastrous; that success, by draining Spain of colonists, would be fatal to her. The military arguments against the war are serious enough. It is likely to unite under the Emir the fighting men of many tribes, who reject his authority as a ruler in peace, but will follow the green standard of Islam to a Holy War. The *Moniteur de l'Armée* speaks of a force of 300,000 men; and it has been stated that France would give war-materials to Spain, and that England would do as much for Morocco. Both reports have been contradicted, and it is hard to say which is least likely to be true. Meantime Marshal Pelissier, who owed his Crimean command to his African fame, has been to Madrid, and is reported to be the author of the plan of campaign which the papers have published.

The *Saturday Review* brings against the war an argument so foolish as to

throw suspicion on the sincerity as well as the reasonableness of its opposition. "The French immigrants (in Algeria) feed on the civil and military expenditure; but the Spaniards support themselves on the soil. A Spanish Morocco would therefore be far more injurious to Spain than is French Algeria to France. The latter is merely a burden, but the former would be a dangerously-attractive field to the population of the conquering country." The Spaniards are therefore advised not to colonise, because they are good colonists; not to make conquests, because they would be flourishing; not to establish a source of wealth on the African coast, because of the barrenness of Old Castile. A flourishing agricultural colony in Morocco would be a great resource to the mother country. Great part of Spain has lost its productive power. The trees and the springs have disappeared, and cultivation has become impossible. The reason does not lie in the deficiency of the population. The population of Spain has increased with great rapidity, the finances are much improved, the resources of the country augmented. Spain is probably twice as thickly peopled as when, in the reign of Philip II., she was the foremost power in the world. She was never strong in numbers, and it used to be said that it was unheard of that 10,000 real Spaniards had ever appeared on a field of battle. The diminished population was a symptom, not a cause, of the decline of Spain. It has increased without producing any increase of power; and that must be sought elsewhere. But the purpose of the expedition is not to consolidate the Spanish power in Africa, but at home. The Emperor Napoleon has given the example of a vast and successful war, terminating in no acquisition of territory; and if the war ends, as it is likely to do, in promoting the advance of the French in Africa, the awakening of the national spirit of Spain by common sacrifices and common sufferings would be cheaply bought.

The fear of a growth of the Spanish power as an appendage of France is certainly occasioned by the plans of the French government. But the manifestations of the patriotism of

the Spanish people have never contributed to strengthen France. It is only by making her strong that Spain can be made independent. On every occasion on which the national spirit of the Spanish people has been vigorously aroused,—and during the last 150 years there are three instances of it,—it has been directed against France. We cannot but rejoice at the present attempt to revive Spain, both because her emancipation depends on an increase of her power, and because this movement, simultaneous with the pacific settlement of long disputes with Rome, promises an addition to the weight of Catholic influence in European councils.

*Oct. 22.* The announcement of war was received enthusiastically by the Spanish Cortes. The English government was appeased by the promise that Tangier, if occupied, will not be retained; and in Spain the warlike preparations were carried on with great vigour. The stormy weather delayed the passage of the troops, and it was not till Nov. 18 that a small force was landed under General Echague, who encountered no resistance at first.

*Nov. 22 and 25.* The Moors were repulsed with considerable loss. Shortly after this engagement O'Donnell arrived at the camp; and Nov. 30 a new attack by larger masses was again repulsed by the Spaniards, at the Serrallo, a ruined palace built by the Moorish Sultan in the fifteenth century, during the siege of Ceuta, which the invaders have fortified, three miles from Ceuta. The loss of the Spaniards up to the beginning of December amounted, according to their official report, to 88 killed and 644 wounded. The force engaged on the Moorish side on these occasions consisted of about 4000 men of the regular troops. They fought with an extreme fury and pertinacity, which give promise of a spirited resistance hereafter. No quarter was given on either side. It is said that there is now a force of about 160,000 men at the command of the Emperor.

*Dec. 9.* The rain had delayed the arrival of stores and ammunition, and the Spanish advance. They sent forward a corps on the road to Tetuan, when it was attacked by a much

larger force of Moors, and met with a loss of 280 men.

*Dec. 13.* The advanced guard was again unsuccessfully attacked on the road to Tetuan, and the arrival of a third corps enabled the Spaniards to advance in force.

The opening of the campaign has not strengthened the feeling in its favour, which seems to be nourished in great measure by the wish of defying England. November 29 and 30 several liberal papers, the *Discusion*, *Espana*, *Conciliador*, and *Leon Espanol*, were prevented from publishing articles hostile to the expedition.

In the Basque provinces, which under the old Spanish government were exempt from military service altogether, proof has been given that the love of liberty is not lost among them by refusing to submit to the conscription. The government has attempted to obtain an equal number (3000) of volunteers by an offer of 4000 reals a-piece.

#### 4. *The Revolution in Italy.*

The prolonged conferences, and the signature of peace at Zurich, did nothing for the pacification of Italy; and the revolution has proceeded in its course without encountering any external impediment. No Italian government has made the smallest attempt to arrest it. It has been organised by Piedmont, encouraged by England, tolerated by France, who, with an army of 40,000 men on the Po, was supreme in Central Italy; whilst Austria, absorbed by internal affairs, abandons her Italian interests to the keeping of her new ally, and awaits better times to assert her power and to restore order in the Peninsula. If little progress has been made in the settlement of liberated Italy, the obstacle has lain in the nature of the parties by whom it has been attempted. There is a positive and a negative element among them. One party is revolutionary for the purpose of obtaining unity, one for the purpose of establishing republican equality; one is Piedmontese, the other Red Republican; one is infidel, the other Protestant, tendencies; one instigated the assassination of Anviti, the other failed to punish

his murderers; one is the party of Mazzini, the other of Cavour. Whilst the sentiments and designs of the two parties were widely different, they agreed in the preliminary work of destruction, in which each was glad to be aided by the other. Their alliance in action is exhibited in the consent of Garibaldi, the arm of the Republicans, to serve under Victor Emmanuel, the soldier-puppet of the Liberals. But though these men, the instruments of abler intriguers, understood each other, the intellectual principals kept aloof, conscious of the dispute that was coming, and each eager to overcome the other. This is strikingly illustrated in a letter of Mazzini, which was presented to the King of Sardinia by Brofferio, and in which he speaks with not undeserved contempt, and with the consciousness of superior consistency and energy, of the policy of the Piedmontese statesmen.

"Audacity," says the tribune, in the spirit of Danton, "is the genius of strong minds in difficult times. . . . I write to you from Italian soil, where the persecution of a government which prates of freedom while treating with old ducal severity the exiles who have taught it that word,—where the errors of a deluded people and the cold desertion of men now in power, who were once my friends,—would almost compel me to believe that all feeling of a free conscience or a free future is dead in Italy. . . . You spoke of independence: Italy roused herself, and gave you 50,000 volunteers. But this was only half the problem. Speak to her of freedom and unity, and she will give you 500,000. . . . Ah, sire, do not reproach Italy for having given you no more; rather admire her for having thrown at your feet, without the shadow of a compact, the lives of 50,000 young men in the face of a programme so mutilated, so contemptible, and so illusory, as that which you placed before them. . . . But those who surround you did not desire it; they trembled before the people; they feared that increased action would give it increased consciousness of its rights, and that you would learn to understand it. . . . Do you know that your agents refused the initiative which the people of Milan offered to

assume a little before the commencement of the war; when, however, the Austrians were few in number, and might have been taken at a disadvantage? Do you know that they said to Sicily, when she was prepared to rise, and uneasy about the delays during the war, 'No; wait for the signal'? and the signal, for secret reasons, was never given. The insurrection of the South, increasing the ardour of the conflict in the North, would have established by a single blow the unity of the movement,—established in your name the unity of Italy; and none among the manœuvrers who pressed around you desired, or ever dared to desire, unity. . . . Seduced by the miserable policy of a minister who preferred the arts of Lodovico the Moor to the part of a regenerator, you refused the arm of our people, and in an evil hour you invoked, without any necessity, the weapons of a foreign tyrant as allies in the enterprise of our liberation. . . . Sire, sire, in the name of honour, in the name of Italian pride, break the odious compact! Are you not afraid that history will say, 'He traded with the enthusiasm of the Italians to feed his own dominions'? . . . Be it that you may wish to pass to eternal fame with posterity as the Life-President of the Italian Republic,—or be it that the royal dynastic idea may possess your mind,—God and the nation will bless and accept you; and I, a Republican, and ready to return and die in exile to preserve pure and intact to the grave the faith of my youth, shall exclaim with my brother Italians, 'President or King, may God bless you, and the nation for whom you have dared and conquered!'"

The Piedmontese party have hitherto succeeded in keeping the direction of the movement in their hands; but with the exception of Tuscany, where they enjoy an undivided and unquestioned rule, the opposition of the Republicans continually appears. The *Associazione Unitaria Italiana* at Milan issued a programme, in which the liberation of Italy was founded on the diminution of the parental authority, the abolition of standing armies, and the emancipation of women. Ratazzi only tolerated the society on condition that

the two last points should be abandoned. The attempt of the Modenese dictator, Farini, to punish the murderers of Anviti was unsuccessful, and rendered him unpopular. Thirteen persons were arrested; but many of them were liberated at the demand of their friends. The schism between the two national parties is chiefly kept alive by the French alliance, and by the question as to the degree of subserviency which is admissible. For two months the whole political movement in Italy has turned on these two points; and the dominant party is hard pressed between the claims of the revolutionary ally and the authoritative voice of France. Whilst the letter of Mazzini is the most important document that expresses the wishes of the former, the policy of France is announced in a letter of Napoleon to Victor Emmanuel, dated October 20th:

"It was necessary to conclude a treaty that should secure in the best manner possible the independence of Italy, which should satisfy Piedmont and the wishes of the population, and yet which should not wound the Catholic sentiment or the rights of the sovereigns in whom Europe felt an interest.

I believed, then, that, if the Emperor of Austria wished to come to a frank understanding with me, with the view of bringing about this important result, the causes of antagonism which for centuries had divided these two empires would disappear; and that the regeneration of Italy would be effected by common accord and without further bloodshed.

I now state what are, in my opinion, the essential conditions of that regeneration.

Italy to be composed of several independent states, united by a federal bond.

Each of these states to adopt a particular representative system and salutary reforms.

The Confederation to then ratify the principle of Italian nationality; to have but one flag, but one system of customs, and one currency.

The directing centre to be at Rome, which should be composed of representatives named by the sovereigns from a list prepared by the Chambers, in order that, in this spe-

cies of Diet, the influence of the reigning families suspected of a leaning towards Austria should be counterbalanced by the element resulting from election.

By granting to the Holy Father the honorary presidency of the Confederation, the religious sentiment of Catholic Europe would be satisfied, the moral influence of the Pope would be increased throughout Italy, and would enable him to make concessions in conformity with the legitimate wishes of the populations. Now the plan which I had formed at the moment of making peace may still be carried out, if your Majesty will employ your influence in promoting it. Besides, a considerable advance has been already made in that direction.

The cession of Lombardy, with a limited debt, is an accomplished fact.

Austria has given up her right to keep garrisons in the strong places of Piacenza, Ferrara, and Comacchio.

The rights of the sovereigns have, it is true, been reserved, but the independence of Central Italy has also been guaranteed, inasmuch as all idea of foreign intervention has been formally set aside; and, lastly, Venetia is to become a province purely Italian. It is the real interest of your Majesty, as of the Peninsula, to second me in the development of this plan, in order to obtain from it the best results; for your Majesty cannot forget that I am bound by the treaty; and I cannot, in the Congress which is about to open, withdraw myself from my engagements. The part of France is traced beforehand.

We demand that Parma and Piacenza shall be united to Piedmont, because this territory is, in a strategical point of view, indispensable to her.

We demand that the Duchess of Parma shall be called to Modena;

That Tuscany, augmented perhaps by a portion of territory, shall be restored to the Grand Duke Ferdinand;

That a system of moderate (*sage*) liberty shall be adopted in all the states of Italy;

That Austria shall frankly disen-

gage herself from an incessant cause of embarrassment for the future, and that she shall consent to complete the nationality of Venetia by creating not only a separate representation and administration, but also an Italian army.

We demand that the fortresses of Mantua and Peschiera shall be recognised as federal fortresses.

And, lastly, that a Confederation, based on the real wants, as well as on the traditions of the Peninsula, to the exclusion of every foreign influence, shall consolidate the fabric of the independence of Italy."

This letter gives, under the appearance of loyalty and of fidelity to solemn engagements, the most revolutionary and anti-Austrian interpretation of the settlement of Villafranca which it was capable of receiving. The two points most remarkable in it are the total silence respecting the Romagna, and the treatment of Austria, hardly consistent with the conduct since observed towards her, and which must be a fruitful source of future wars in Italy. The *Revue des Deux Mondes* very naturally regarded the motives of publication as not less interesting than the reasons for which it was written:

"As to the matter of this letter, it might be said that it is a friendly *ultimatum*; but how did it happen to be divulged? Is it that Piedmont, without good reasons, has declined the advice addressed to it? Is it that the Emperor is compelled to take the public as witnesses of the sagacity of the exhortations which were not heeded? Is it, rather, that the King of Sardinia has wished to show to his Italian friends the weight of the considerations which prevent him from acceding to his wishes? We had rather believe that the last supposition is the true one."

We may answer, that it is understood to have been sent to England for publication by the French Government, but in such a way that the communication should be attributed to Sardinia. In this manner it was intended that it should possess the greater weight and authority which belongs to a confidential letter to the king.

The immediate consequence of this *communiqué* was to hasten the

efforts of the Piedmontese party to effect a settlement of the Italian question in accordance with their own interests, which should be so decidedly the unanimous act of Central Italy, that it should not be revocable by the Congress. Till now the Piedmontese policy had aimed at protracting the general confusion, and preventing any settlement which should render the insurgent states independent of Sardinia, until the duration of the disorder should make even the most reluctant eager for its termination by the hand of Victor Emmanuel. But now that it was publicly known, without the consent of him to whom the letter was addressed, that Napoleon was resolved at the Congress to help Sardinia to no more than Parma and Piacenza, whilst the augmentation of Tuscany was supposed to mean that Piedmont was not to obtain any maritime addition, there was need of immediate action. In the last week of October the dictatorship of Cavour or of Carignan began to be spoken of; whilst the opposition of a portion of the revolutionists to annexation became louder all at once. Several newspapers received warning, or were suppressed, both in Piedmont and in Tuscany. A Piacenza paper said: "Central Italy must not be Piedmontised; for nothing is less suited to a free people than the laws and administration of Piedmont. . . . To exchange our laws for those of Piedmont, which is notorious for its administrative confusion, and for the incapacity of its functionaries, would be an abomination."

*November 7.* The National Assemblies met at Parma, Bologna, and Florence. At Parma, under the influence of Farini, the Assembly elected the Prince of Carignan to be their Regent.

*November 8.* The Assembly at Bologna resolved that the governor, Cibrani, who was unpopular because of his connection with France, should retire; that Carignan should be Regent of Romagna; that the Sardinian Constitution should be introduced; and that Farini should be Provisional Governor.

*November 9.* Farini, in accepting the office, published the following proclamation to the people of the Roman States:

"Europe knows you are Catholics, and that you belong to the Church, as well as the Catholics of all other nations; but, as Italians, you belong to Italy; and it is your duty to love and defend your country, and to seek its prosperity. You only ask for that which all civilised nations have sought for—namely, liberty of speech and conscience, and political freedom and equality. You also demand the application of those principles which form the basis of the public right of nations; the glorious chief of that people which shed its blood for our cause having invited us to become soldiers to fight for the independence of Italy, under the standard of Victor Emmanuel, and to become free citizens of our country. Europe knows that it can secure the peace of Italy by rendering Italy to the Italians. It is aware that we are ready to give the necessary guarantees for order throughout the country; but it also knows that the people of the Romagna, if forbearance and moderation should be of no avail, sooner than submit to the yoke, would be advised only by their duty to their country, and the pursuit of the path of honour."

The same day the Tuscan Assembly voted the Regency of Carignan, with only one dissentient voice.

November 10. The treaties of peace were signed at Zurich. Austria, it is said, refused to sign, if the Sardinian government accepted the Regency. It would unquestionably have amounted virtually to the annexation of Central Italy with Piedmont; and it would have been a step from which Piedmont could not retire. This was the answer of the Piedmontese to the Emperor's letter of October 20th. Napoleon telegraphed at once to Turin, "Vous devez refuser la régence;" and subsequently added a threat of an armed intervention in conjunction with Austria. This reply revived throughout Italy the indignation against the French Emperor which had been caused by the Treaty of Villafranca. Azeglio and Cavour were summoned to the deliberations of the Council of Ministers at Turin. Cavour strongly advised the king to accept the regency for his cousin, in defiance of the Emperor's command. He conceived that

it was impossible that he should violently undo his own work, and send an army against the revolution he had incited. Better than any other man he knew the intimate connection of Napoleon with the revolutionary party, and the favours with which he had loaded them; for Cavour himself had been the confidant of those intrigues. He calculated that by taking on their own responsibility a daring and irrevocable step, the Emperor would be forced along with them, and would submit to leave in their hands the conclusion of his own enterprise. It would be a great thing, too, to appear before the Congress with the authority of a *fait accompli*. The government would obtain in a far greater degree the enthusiasm of the Italian nation; and in casting off the influence of France, they could reckon on the support of England. Azeglio is said to have supported Cavour; also Rattazzi and Monticelli. La Marmora and Dabormida urged the king to remain on good terms with France; and their prudent councils prevailed.

Nov. 11. The Prince of Carignan refused the regency. But the opportunity which had been brought about with so much trouble was too splendid to be thrown away; and it was resolved to take advantage of the confidence of the three assemblies to secure, in some degree, the predominance of Piedmont, and the probability of annexation, without wholly rejecting the imperious advice of France.

Nov. 13. The Prince of Carignan received Minghetti and Peruzzi, who were deputed by the national assemblies to offer him the regency, and delivered to them the following address:

"I am deeply moved by your offer; and tender my thanks to the assemblies and the peoples of Central Italy, who have given me so great a proof of their confidence. I believe that, in making this offer, you are influenced less by my personal merits than by your devotedness towards the king and by your feelings, which are not only liberal and national, but also those of order and respect for monarchical institutions. Weighty representations, reasons of political propriety, and the approaching Congress, deter me, much to my regret,

from responding to your appeal, and accepting the charge offered to me. This forbearance on my part, and the sacrifice I am thus making, will prove more useful to the interests of our common country than if I had acted otherwise. Nevertheless, I thought to do an act of service in designating the Chevalier Buoncompagni as the person who ought to be intrusted with the regency of Central Italy.

Return my thanks to the people you represent: tell them that their perseverance and their general conduct deserve the sympathies of Europe; tell them to reckon always on the king, who will support their wishes, and who will never abandon those who intrust their destinies to his loyalty."

*Nov. 15.* The Sardinian government issued a circular despatch explaining its views relative to the appointment of Buoncompagni. The most significant passages were as follows: "It was impossible for his majesty, as well as the prince, not to consider seriously the motives which had dictated the offers of the Assemblies of Central Italy, and not to concur in the measures suggested to them by high motives of expediency to guarantee from all agitation those countries who have placed their confidence in the House of Savoy. His royal highness has accordingly believed himself able to appoint the Chevalier Buoncompagni to take the regency of those provinces until assembled Europe has regularised their position. This proof of friendly solicitude will, the king's government believes, tranquillise the public mind. Centred in one hand, authority will be more vigorous and powerful. It will keep in a respectful attitude the factions which, profiting by the public impatience, might attempt to incite the populations and the army to inconsiderate and dangerous acts. In a word, it is a pledge to the security of Italy, to the tranquillity of Europe, while the Congress are deliberating upon the questions unfolded before it."

To this arrangement France objected, with the concurrence of Austria; but the Piedmontese government insisted, and consented only to dismiss Buoncompagni from their

service. He was to be regarded as acceptable to the Italians, both as being in the confidence of the Prince of Carignan, and for the part he had already played in the Tuscan revolution. After explanations had been given, France accepted the compromise; and, Nov. 17, the assemblies of Bologna, and of Parma and Modena, expressed their thanks to Carignan for the substitute he had recommended to them, and their readiness to accept him. Those three states were subject to Farini, himself a Piedmontese official. He had no great inducement to object to the appointment, as Buoncompagni was to reside at Florence, and he was sure to remain practically supreme in the states which he governed. But at Florence an unexpected opposition arose. Ricasoli, a great Tuscan nobleman, who for six months had governed the country, found himself suddenly reduced to an inferior position beneath a man whose grade and reputation were not equal to his own. In offering the regency to Carignan, it had not been the intention of the Tuscans to offer him the right of appointing a regent.

*Nov. 19.* Ricasoli protested at Turin against the nomination. Negotiations were carried on for some time before Buoncompagni was allowed to come to Florence. Salvagneti settled the conditions with him at Modena, and Ricasoli himself went for the same purpose to Turin. Buoncompagni's appointment is accepted as a provisional arrangement; he enjoys neither the lustre nor the power of a regent; and the attempt of the Sardinians to anticipate the resolutions of the Emperor and of the Congress by a decisive measure has completely failed.

Meantime the position of Garibaldi was as great a difficulty to the Piedmontese government as the question of the regency. In conjunction with Fanti, he commanded the volunteers and irregulars of the Italian army, and stood as the advanced guard of the revolutionary army on the road to Ancona. His army consisted of a rabble of all nations. There were at one time 6750 Piedmontese, 3240 Lombards, 1200 Venetians, 2150 Neapolitans, 500 Romans, 1200 Hungarians, 230 French and English, 150

Maltese and Ionians, 260 Greeks, 450 Poles, 370 Swiss, 160 other foreigners, and about 800 escaped malefactors. Between these men and the regular force of Fanti there was no good understanding, and inaction produced symptoms of disorganisation. Garibaldi kept them in motion on the frontier of the marches, in order to attract the attention of the Roman army, and to give an opportunity for a rising at Ancona, or some other place which he would have instantly assisted. But a force of this kind can subsist only by aggressive action; and Garibaldi at last found that he could not keep the men to his standard, or preserve their enthusiasm, without making some bold attempt. Discipline could not be maintained by severity; and the severity he was obliged to use at the beginning of November led to many desertions. The refusal of the regency brought matters to a crisis. That cautious and timorous measure was incompatible with the permanent employment of Garibaldi, and it increased the disgust and excitement of his troops. He was summoned to Turin.

*November 17.* Garibaldi resigned his command, publishing, Nov. 23, the following proclamation:

**"TO MY COMPANIONS IN ARMS IN CENTRAL ITALY.**

Let not my temporary absence cool your ardour for the holy cause that we defend.

In separating myself from you, whom I love as the representatives of a sublime idea—the idea of Italian deliverance—I am excited and sad; but consolation comes in the certainty that I shall very soon be among you again, to aid you in finishing the work so gloriously begun.

For you, as for me, the greatest of all possible misfortunes would be not to be present wherever there is fighting for Italy. Young men, who have sworn to be faithful to Italy and to the chief who will lead you to victory, lay not down your arms; remain firm at your post, continue your exercises, persevere in the soldier's discipline.

The truce will not last long; old diplomacy seems but little disposed to see things as they really are. Diplomacy still looks upon you as the

handful of malcontents which she has been accustomed to despise. She does not know that in you there are the elements of a great nation, and that in your free and independent hearts there germinate the seeds of a world-wide revolution, if our rights shall not be recognised, and if people will not allow us to be masters in our own home.

Italians, I say again, do not lay down your arms; rally more closely than ever to your chiefs, and maintain the strictest discipline."

Garibaldi's retirement was an act of political necessity; it severed for the time the alliance of Piedmont with the revolution. The republicans suffered most by it, for he had cast a sort of military glory, almost of respectability, upon them. All the admiration which is felt for them, but which their sanguinary deeds makes it indecent to proclaim, centred in the man who was the sword of a party whose usual weapon is the dagger. Mazzini vainly exhorted him to take the conduct of the Italian cause into his own hands. At Bologna a movement of his adherents was vigorously repressed by Farini. Fanti recalled his corps from the Roman frontier, and replaced it by the most disciplined part of his army. Many of the officers threw up their commissions. The energy of the Italian movement was broken, and Piedmont was at length in a condition to appear at the Congress.

The conservative party in Central Italy took no advantage of these events. In Tuscany they opposed all through an inert resistance to the government; many persons were arrested. At Leghorn the discontent was considerable; the municipal elections throughout the Duchy failed, because nobody took the trouble to vote. In Modena the country people offered in one place a feeble resistance to a levy of troops; the Modenese Bishops protested against the measures of Farini; and when Victor Emmanuel received an ovation at Genoa, the clergy held aloof. But not a leader has appeared among them, not a single step has been taken which could serve even as a demonstration or a protest on which the powers could found their efforts at restoration; nevertheless, in Tuscany the vast

majority of the population is evidently hostile to the new system, and the clergy has nowhere exhibited signs of defection from the cause of order. It was impossible to foresee that the Italian clergy would be so remarkably deficient in energy and influence, although every advance of the Piedmontese party is accompanied by a spoliation of the Church.

*November 25.* Farini proscribed the Jesuits in Romagna. Gennarelli, the publisher of the celebrated *Diary of Bonchard*, is commissioned to undertake the congenial labour of publishing the authentic acts of every proceeding of the Roman government which can throw odium upon it.

It is evident that those who have gone too far to retrieve their steps, and who have obtained too much to consent to lose it, prevail by terror over the mass of the population; and the liberation of Italy from the tyranny of an unscrupulous minority must be the work of foreign states. Naples has sent a considerable force to the Roman frontier, and is enlisting mercenaries from German Switzerland through agents on the Lake of Constance. Piedmont having demanded an explanation of these hostile preparations, the Neapolitan go-

vernment replied that it should give no explanation; and that as its troops stood on the Roman, not on the Sardinian frontier, Sardinia had no right to ask questions.

The Pope likewise is recruiting his army in Austria. Austrian officers are conducting the enlistment, and a certain number of soldiers have been sent by sea already.

*November 21.* The extraordinary powers committed to the Piedmontese government April 25 expired, and new elections were appointed for Sardinia and Lombardy combined. The deputies to be elected at the rate of one to 30,000 inhabitants, which gives 158 to Sardinia, and 102 for Lombardy. The ministers had, however, made ample use of the time when all power was in their hands. Forty-seven decrees were published on the last day before their authority expired.

*December 8.* Modena, Parma, and Romagna were united under a single administration. In this position Italy awaits the settlement of its affairs by the Congress which is summoned for January, at Paris; at which all powers who were parties to the Treaties of Vienna have agreed to appear.